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 Abstract 
 
Generalization of classically conditioned fear to novel stimuli that closely resemble a 
danger cue (CS+) can be adaptive, as the brief mobilization of biological defense 
reactions is typically not harmful to the organism and the outcome can, in some contexts, 
mean the difference between life and death. Generalization becomes maladaptive when 
fear is generalized to 1) to stimuli with an established safe signal value (CS-) and 2) to an 
excessively wide range of benign stimuli that inconsequentially resemble the danger cue 
(generalization stimuli [GS]) as excessive defense mobilization eventually becomes 
harmful to the organism. Mechanistic conditioning models of human anxiety pathology 
have termed this maladaptive form of generalization as overgeneralization, and 
experimental studies have established overgeneralization as a correlate of clinical anxiety 
(e.g., the anxiety disorders). These models have also, until recently, largely discounted 
the pathological contribution of instrumental avoidance of feared stimuli. This is in stark 
contrast to clinical models of anxiety pathology, which establish that the most severe 
forms of anxiety disorder involve excessive avoidance that results in loss of valued 
activity and opportunity to extinguish fear, and links this avoidance to individual 
differences in a variety of personality traits. Recent mechanistic work has partially 
addressed this gap and investigated the relationship between generalized fear and 
generalized avoidance, but has largely not incorporated individual difference variables. 
The current investigation furthers the merging of mechanistic conditioning and clinical 
models in this area by testing how broadband individual differences (e.g., personality 
traits) ranging from normative to pathological can improve prediction of instrumental 
avoidance from generalized fear. Candidate personality variables include those related to 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion, both traits that are linked to learning and approach 
systems. The method for this investigation involved lab-based assessment using 
established conditioning paradigms with behavioral and psychophysiological indicators, 
as well as multidimensional self-report inventories and a multilevel modeling analytic 
approach to facilitate more precise testing of personality-related hypotheses. Results 
indicate that 1) multiple measures of pathological negative affect are related to increased 
fear generalization and facilitate a maladaptive fear-avoidance relations; 2) Extraversion-
related variables generally buffer against fear-avoidance covariation, whereas 
 v 
pathologically low Extraversion (detachment) facilitates the fear-avoidance relation; 3) 
Conscientiousness-related variables both facilitate and inhibit the fear-avoidance relation, 
depending on context; and 4) the relationship between the personality variables, 
generalized fear, and avoidance depends partially on how the fear metric is 
operationalized (e.g., physiologically or behaviorally). These results are discussed within 
a framework of improving methodology for investigations that combine conditioning and 
individual differences approaches and using this type of work to inform translational 
efforts to further refine and personalize treatments for anxiety and trauma-related 
psychopathology.  
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Introduction 
Conditioned fear and avoidance models of anxiety pathology have led to valuable 
advances that have directly contributed to diagnostic frameworks and effective 
interventions that meaningfully alleviate symptoms, most notably exposure therapy and 
other components of the cognitive behavioral framework (Bouton & Swartzentruber, 
1991; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Rachman, 2015). These advances are partially 
attributable to sustained empirical focus, increased experimental precision, and 
advancements in behavioral and biological measurement in the conditioning field over 
the last century (Craske, Hermans, & Vervliet, 2018; Hermans, Craske, Mineka, & 
Lovibond, 2006). Despite this, as a field we can do better: a significant minority of 
people with debilitating anxiety and trauma-related disorders do not respond to 
empirically-supported treatment (Arch & Craske, 2009; Craske, Treanor, Conway, 
Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014; McNally, 2007; Rothbaum, Meadows, Resick, & Foy, 2000; 
Steenkamp, Litz, Hoge, & Marmar, 2015) and precision-medicine is still a distal goal for 
clinical psychology and psychiatry (Cuijpers, Ebert, Acarturk, Andersson, & Cristea, 
2016; Ozomaro, Wahlestedt, & Nemeroff, 2013). It is still difficult to know who will 
complete or positively respond to a “gold-standard” psychotherapy and what factors will 
positively or negatively impact their course of treatment (Gutner, Gallagher, Baker, 
Sloan, & Resick, 2015; Ong, Lee, & Twohig, 2018; Schneider, Arch, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 
2015).  
   From the clinician point of view, this is fairly understandable: many treatments 
are developed using carefully curated samples comprised of groups of “modal 
participants” that likely do not reflect the heterogeneity of the clinic population (Barber, 
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2009; Najavits, 2015). Consider prolonged exposure (PE), a gold-standard treatment for 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with strong roots in conditioning theory and 
research which inform PE’s focus on fear and avoidance reduction through repeated 
imaginal and behavioral exposure (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa, Hembree, & Rothbaum, 
2007). However, the conditioning framework that underlies PE gives no indication of 
how to handle inter-individual differences in key non-fear related traits and states that can 
have a profound impact on treatment adherence and outcome, such as strong levels of 
impulsivity, anhedonia, or disorganization (Minnen, Harned, Zoellner, & Mills, 2012; 
Reger et al., 2013). Although there are clearly developments and techniques from outside 
the tradition of conditioning research that clinicians use to handle these issues while 
maintaining treatment fidelity (e.g., Arkowitz & Westra, 2004; Hundt, Barrera, Arney, & 
Stanley, 2017), there still remains the concern that fear conditioning investigations 
continue to be limited in their applicability to “real world” heterogeneity of individual 
differences seen in patient populations (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 
2013; Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). Accordingly, for the fear conditioning field to continue to 
have a meaningful impact on clinical research and outcomes, the issue of “real world” 
heterogeneity of individual differences, and how they relate to conditioned fear and 
avoidance processes, requires redress.  
 This dissertation represents a step towards this goal. We will first review the 
conditioned fear and avoidance literature, with a focus on generalization of fear and 
avoidance, which has been posited as a core pathogenic mechanism of anxiety and 
trauma pathology (Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche, & Hermans, 2014; LeDoux, 
Moscarello, Sears, & Campese, 2017; Lissek, 2012; Pittig, Treanor, LeBeau, & Craske, 
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2018). Next, we discuss the association and potential covariation between generalized 
fear and avoidance, and establish the relative lack of empirical investigations of 
individual differences in this relationship, despite its importance to understanding and 
treating anxiety and trauma pathology. We then review the available evidence for 
individual differences in fear generalization, avoidance, and their covariation, with a 
focus on personality variables (using the general definition of a relatively stable 
disposition towards a behavioral outcome, e.g., Tellegen, 1991) and clinical disorders 
(e.g., DSM disorders; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The bulk of the 
dissertation then describes the first large-scale study of personality differences in 
generalized fear, avoidance, and their covariation. We end with a discussion of the study 
results, contextualize them in both the conditioning and clinical research traditions, and 
conclude with implications for future research and clinical endeavors. 
Pavlovian Fear Conditioning and Generalization of Fear 
Pavlovian fear conditioning, also referred to as classical fear conditioning, is an 
associative learning process in which an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) is paired 
with a previously benign cue that now becomes a conditioned danger cue (CS+), with the 
CS+ eliciting fear even when not paired with the US (Pavlov, 1927). This form of fear 
learning is highly adaptive in many contexts, as it promotes proper mobilization of 
defensive responses to threats in the environment (e.g., Bradley, Moulder, & Lang, 2005; 
Lang, McTeague, & Bradley, 2014). For example, it is adaptive for a child to be afraid of 
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a large Rottweiler1 dog after that dog lunges and bites him2 (with the bite as the US and 
the Rottweiler becoming the CS+) and continues to experience fear when encountering 
that specific dog. The child has quickly conditioned to associate a fear response with this 
stimulus (i.e., automatically experiences fear when encountering the CS+), and this fear 
response serves as an aversive signal to inform future behavior. Given the context, this 
fear is adaptive because the Rottweiler is a genuine threat. Another important element of 
fear conditioning is that some stimuli in the environment are never paired with the US, 
and become conditioned safety cues (CS-), as they signal safety or absence of threat. 
Continuing with the previous example, the child might also encounter a different dog that 
is dissimilar to the Rottweiler, such as a toy poodle. The poodle never attempts to bite the 
child, and the child does not develop a fear response to the toy poodle. The lack of fear 
response is adaptive in this context, as the poodle is safe and a signal for further 
defensive responding is not needed. Discriminating between danger and safety cues, such 
as the ones described, is crucial for survival across species and is also key for optimizing 
internal reactions and external behavior to maximize resource allocation and usage 
(Maren, 2001; Rachman, 1991). It also serves as the foundation for basic experimental 
investigations of Pavlovian fear conditioning, referred to as discrimination conditioning 
paradigms. This paradigm has served as the basic framework for investigating different 
fear conditioning processes and mechanisms, with a large number of conditioning 
 
 
1 The author would like to note that he does not host any animus towards Rottweilers – they are simply a 
well-known dog breed with an easily recognizable name and perceptual features that lend themselves well 
to examples of fear generalization. 
2 A gendered pronoun is used to refer to the child in this example and examples that follow to streamline 
prose in this dissertation; the implied gender is not meaningful or relevant within these examples and a coin 
flip was used to select between male or female pronouns. 
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paradigms using it as a foundation for more complex experimental manipulations 
(Lonsdorf et al., 2017). 
One mechanism of particular empirical interest is generalization of Pavlovian-
conditioned fear (Kalish, 1969; Mackintosh, 1974; J. B. Watson & Rayner, 1920), in 
which fear is elicited by stimuli that perceptually or conceptually resemble the CS+ but 
are not dangerous (i.e., generalization stimuli, or GS). The importance of studying fear 
generalization stems from both its implication as a mechanism underlying anxiety 
disorders and its relevance to optimizing behavior in a world that contains many 
ambiguous stimuli with differing signal values (Dymond, Dunsmoor, et al., 2014; Lissek 
et al., 2005). To continue the Rottweiler example, the child’s fear of the Rottweiler might 
generalize to dog breeds that are very similar in coloring and shape, despite some key 
differences in physical attributes (e.g., Dobermans, which have the same coloring and are 
of similar height and length, but are generally less muscular and have a slimmer facial 
structure than Rottweilers). Fear generalization can also be viewed from the lens of 
adaptive vs. maladaptive depending on the context. For example, it might also be 
adaptive to have some fear to unfamiliar Rottweilers that show warning signs of danger 
(e.g., exposed teeth, growling) but have not actually attempted an attack (i.e., a stimulus 
that is very similar to the CS+ but has not yet been paired with a US), as the brief 
mobilization of biological defense reactions is typically not harmful and the outcome can, 
in some contexts, mean the difference between serious harm or death and remaining safe. 
Conversely, it is likely maladaptive for a child to respond fearfully to a Doberman that 
has never displayed signs of threat or aggression (i.e., a GS), as there is no evidence that 
the dog is actually dangerous, and the fear response is unnecessarily activated in a safe 
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context. Further, the child might excessively generalize his fear and continue to respond 
fearfully to non-dangerous dogs that only superficially resemble a Rottweiler (e.g., black 
coloring, similar body profile) or even a Doberman, and have many features that are quite 
distinct from a Rottweiler (e.g. different face profile, much smaller size). This degree of 
increased fear generalization, deemed overgeneralization, can be conceptualized as a 
particularly maladaptive instantiation of the fear generalization process (Dunsmoor, 
Kroes, Braren, & Phelps, 2017; Dunsmoor & Paz, 2015; Lissek, 2012). 
Fear generalization has increasingly been studied using laboratory-based 
paradigms (Dymond, Dunsmoor, et al., 2014; Lissek, Biggs, et al., 2008; Vervliet & 
Geens, 2014; Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 2004). In fear generalization paradigms, 
participants complete an initial conditioning phase (typically referred to as the acquisition 
or conditioning phase) during which the signal-value of a CS+ and CS- are learned. The 
CSs are typically simple visual stimuli that are clearly distinguishable from each other 
(e.g., a large and a small circle)3, and the US is typically a simple aversive stimulus, such 
as a mild shock. In the next phase (typically referred to as the generalization phase), GSs 
are presented to the participant. Exact procedural and stimulus characteristics vary by 
study (e.g., US reinforcement rate, number of GS presentations and permutations), but a 
key unifying aspect of these paradigms is that the GSs will parametrically vary along a 
continuum of similarity that is anchored by the CS+ and CS- (see Figure 1 for example 
 
 
3 It should be noted that a growing number of studies are investigating conceptual, as opposed to 
perceptual, fear generalization. In these studies, stimuli differ in terms of their conceptual similarity (e.g., 
birds and bats), as opposed to their perceptual similarity. Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
given both that the current study is one of perceptual generalization and that field has not yet begun to 
study conceptual generalization in association with avoidance, readers are referred to Dunsmoor & Murphy 
(2015) for a review on the importance of continued study of conceptual generalization. 
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from Lissek et al., 2014). This experimental manipulation allows fear generalization to be 
operationalized by a response gradient (i.e., line representing response magnitude at each 
stimulus) from the CS+, to the GSs, and then to the CS-. More precipitous declines in 
response magnitude from the CS+ to the CS- represent less generalization, and shallower 
response gradients that adhere closer to a perfect linear decline represent more 
generalization. These paradigm properties also allow for testing of overgeneralization, as 
this can be conceptualized as a response gradient with GS slope components that exceed 
the response expected as part of a perfect linear decline – in other words, 
overgeneralization is seen when one or more GS responses are elevated above a 
hypothetical straight line that connects the CS+ and CS- (see Figure 1 for graphical 
representation). Those with gradients representing higher levels of generalization can be 
conceptualized as experiencing maladaptive fear, as the fear response is activated 
unnecessarily due to the lack of danger represented by the presented stimulus and, in 
some cases, can lead to chronically activated fear and stress states associated with a range 
of negative emotional and medical health outcomes (e.g., Besnard & Sahay, 2016a, 
2016b; Kudielka & Kirschbaum, 2005). 
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Figure 1. Example of generalization gradients from participants without psychopathology 
(i.e., “healthy control participants”). Physiological (startle electromyography) and 
behavioral (risk rating) gradients are presented. Gradient images adapted from a scientific 
presentation given by Dr. Lissek, with his permission. CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ 
= conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimuli; ITI = inter-trial interval; RR = 
risk rating.  
Instrumental Avoidance and Approach-Avoidance Conflict 
Although it is possible to conceptualize the maladaptive consequences of 
excessive fear generalization solely through internal consequences, such as the 
aforementioned health outcomes, it leads to an incomplete picture. In particular, it is 
missing something that is quite clear and intuitive if we continue the example of the 
Rottweiler and child: if the child continues to maintain fear to both the Rottweiler and 
dogs that are similar, he will likely seek to avoid those dogs. To review this topic, we 
temporarily step away from the Pavlovian fear conditioning literature and laboratory 
paradigms and consider avoidance as a basic psychological construct. Avoidance refers to 
the mobilization of resources (e.g., physical energy, time spent planning) in the service of 
 9 
behavior that reduces the organisms contact with or moves it away from negatively-
valenced stimuli or outcomes (Corr, 2013; Elliot, 2006). Avoidance of aversive stimuli in 
the environment can be accomplished either through active avoidance (e.g., when the 
child sees a feared dog down the street he walks the other way) or passive avoidance 
(e.g., deciding not to leave the house if the weather is fair and dogs might be outside 
walking), with both forms serving the goal of reducing fear and perceived chance of harm 
(for reviews, see Arnaudova, Kindt, Fanselow, & Beckers, 2017; Krypotos, 2015; Pittig 
et al., 2018). Both these forms of avoidance are variations on the basic conditioning 
principle of instrumental (or operant) conditioning, in which a behavioral outcome is 
shaped through prior experience, either positive or negative (Skinner, 1937, 1963)4. In the 
case of aversive stimuli, instrumental avoidance is conceptualized as a negative 
reinforcement process in which escape or reduction of an aversive consequence promotes 
future avoidance (e.g., Fernando, Urcelay, Mar, Dickinson, & Robbins, 2014; Mkrtchian, 
Aylward, Dayan, Roiser, & Robinson, 2017; Sidman, 1962).  
Just as with Pavlovian fear conditioning, we can consider instrumental avoidance 
of aversive stimuli as adaptive or maladaptive for the organism (Lommen et al., 2017; 
van Meurs, Wiggert, Wicker, & Lissek, 2014). In both instances of the avoidance 
described in the ongoing example, the determination of adaptive vs maladaptive outcome 
is dependent on the specific context of the avoidance: if the child actively avoids when 
the dangerous Rottweiler (CS+) is present, it is an adaptive decision and harm is avoided; 
 
 
4 The current dissertation focuses on active avoidance, both because it is tested in the current study and 
because the majority of prior human clinical work has focused on paradigms utilizing active avoidance (for 
review, see Arnaudova, Kindt, Fanselow, & Beckers, 2017). 
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if the child avoids a dissimilar looking and benign toy poodle (CS-) then, at first glance, it 
is maladaptive and avoidance was unnecessary due to the lack of danger. 
However, simply terming these outcomes as adaptive or maladaptive based on the 
dichotomy of “was avoidance necessary or not” is problematic. First, it ignores that from 
the child’s view, both instances of avoidance resulted in a favorable outcome for him: his 
fear is likely reduced or has not increased, and the child would view both instances of 
avoidance as adaptive. To fully appreciate the relevant adaptive or maladaptive 
consequences in this example, especially as they pertain to future learning for the child, 
we need to consider motivations other than the motivation to avoid harm and reduce fear, 
and if there is a conflict created by competing motivations (Corr, 2013; Pittig & Dehler, 
2018; Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018). The most commonly studied motivational conflict 
across species is the risk-reward or cost-benefit conflict, which hinges on the conflict 
experienced when attempting to maximize gains while minimizing losses and is well-
documented on both the behavioral and neural levels (for reviews, see Levy & Glimcher, 
2012; Reyna & Huettel, 2014). This conflict can emerge when the decision hinges on 
outcomes of the same valence or of opposing valences (Aupperle & Paulus, 2010; Gray, 
1990), and is driven by the challenge of either deciding between two different rewards 
(e.g., choosing between ice cream or cake), deciding between two different costs/risks 
(e.g., running on the treadmill or going for a swim to lose weight), or from the deciding if 
a reward outweighs the negative consequence (e.g., deciding whether to eat ice cream 
when trying to lose weight). A specific form of the latter type of conflict that is the most 
relevant to the ongoing example and the current study is the approach-avoidance conflict. 
Proposed as a core structure of human motivation (Elliot, 2006; Elliot & Thrash, 2002), 
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the approach-avoidance conflict results when an approach action is associated with both 
potential reward and potential risk or harm (e.g., Aupperle, Sullivan, Melrose, Paulus, & 
Stein, 2011; Aupperle & Paulus, 2010; Carver & White, 1994; Elliot, 2006; Gray, 1990). 
Resolution of the conflict results from either a decision to approach or a decision to 
avoid; it is not contingent on actually receiving the reward or punishment. This provides 
context for a complete definition of maladaptive avoidance: if avoidance is enacted at the 
expense of reward when there is no risk of harm, it is maladaptive. The opposite situation 
can also serve as a definition of adaptive avoidance (avoiding when there is genuine risk 
and forgoing reward). In both cases, there is an assumption that the risk and reward are 
sufficiently hedonically salient to motivate an actual approach-avoidance conflict 
(Aupperle & Paulus, 2010).  
Bringing us back to the ongoing example, we see that adding a reward or 
approach component helps determine the adaptiveness of the child’s dog-related 
decisions. For example, if the child is on his way to school and sees the Rottweiler (CS+) 
walking down the street he is on, and he then decides to take another street that is out of 
his way and causes him to be late, this might be considered adaptive: it is likely better to 
arrive at school slightly late than receive a painful dog bite. However, if the dog the child 
encounters is the toy poodle (CS-) and he takes the other road and arrives late to school 
than this outcome can be deemed as maladaptive, as avoidance resulted in an unnecessary 
loss of reward (for this example, the child is very studious and values arriving at school 
on time and engaging in education).  
Covariation of Generalized Conditioned Fear and Instrumental Avoidance.  
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 Returning to a conditioning framework, we can conceptualize how Pavlovian 
conditioning and instrumental avoidance are two interconnected parts of how fear is 
learned and maintained: CS+s are signals for avoidance due to their negative valence, and 
the absence of fear as a result of avoiding a CS+ is a negative reinforcer for future 
avoidance. This view was first widely posited by O. H. Mowrer and termed two-factor 
learning theory (Mowrer, 1951). In two-factor learning theory, Mowrer proposes that 1) 
initially benign stimuli acquire threat valence through Pavlovian conditioning and then 2) 
the reduction of fear accomplished through avoidance of the conditioned stimulus serves 
as the “reward of avoidance” (potentially experienced as relief, for a seminal review on 
this distinction see Hull, 1935) and reinforces future avoidance (hence, instrumental 
avoidance). Although this theory was met with considerable criticism and offering of 
contradictory empirical evidence that led to a temporary but lengthy reduction in the use 
of avoidance paradigms in the conditioning field (for a narrative history and summary of 
critique, see both LeDoux et al., 2017 and Rachman, 2015) and alternative theories 
emerged to fill in perceived gaps in its logic or as advances in its basic tenets (e.g., 
expectancy/cognitive models and meaning-making models, e.g., Lovibond, Saunders, 
Weidemann, & Mitchell, 2008; Seligman & Johnston, 1973; Thompson, 1981), the basic 
two-factor structure was maintained by some theorists as a parsimonious and 
fundamentally sound, if not overly precise, description of one of the commonly observed 
relationships between fear and avoidance (Allen, Handy, Miller, & Servatius, 2019; 
Lissek & van Meurs, 2014; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Sidman, 1953; Solomon & 
Wynne, 1954). For the current endeavor, we view it as a helpful framework for 
understanding possible determinants of psychopathological anxiety and fear responding, 
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but default to a simpler assertion as to how generalization of Pavlovian fear can lead to 
generalization of instrumental avoidance: as conditioned fear towards a GS increases, so 
does the likelihood of avoidance. In other words, as fear varies, so does avoidance, and 
their relationship can be described as one of covariation, herein referred to as Aversive 
Pavlovian-Instrumental Covariation (APIC), which is subdivided into APIC-CS+ 
(covariation of Pavlovian and instrumental responses to the danger cue) and, most 
importantly for this dissertation, into APIC-G (covariation of Pavlovian and instrumental 
responses to generalization stimuli). Below, we expand on the relevance of APIC-G and 
its appearances in the empirical literature. 
APIC-G and APIC-CS+ 
 Empirical documentation of APIC-G is still relatively sparse. This is somewhat 
surprising, given that APIC-G has been proposed in the experimental literature as a 
primary pathogenic mechanism that converts the distress of generalized fear into 
impairment related to maladaptive avoidance, and might explain why overgeneralized 
fear is found in the majority of cited case-control anxiety disorder studies. To date, only 
four5 studies have experimentally tested APIC-G using generalization paradigms 
employing stimuli on a continuum of similarity (Arnaudova, Krypotos, Effting, Kindt, & 
Beckers, 2017; Boyle, Roche, Dymond, & Hermans, 2016; Cameron, Schlund, & 
Dymond, 2015; van Meurs et al., 2014). Shared characteristics of these studies included 
1) use of mild shock as a US, 2) an acquisition phase in which a CS+ and CS- are 
 
 
5 It should also be noted that at this time, two analyses of a subset of the sample collected for this 
dissertation have been published (Hunt, Cooper, Hartnell, & Lissek, 2017, 2019). These manuscripts 
provide valuable insight into the discussed topics, but cannot be said to represent separate empirical 
endeavors or independent samples from the current study and are therefore excluded from this literature 
review. 
 14 
conditioned and used as anchors on a generalization continuum (GSs) introduced in a 
subsequent phase, 3) avoidance was operationalized as active avoidance in the form of a 
behavioral decision (single button press) that completely negated the chance of shock in 
at least one portion of the experiment (the exception is that one of two related 
experiments in Arnaudova et al., 2017, Experiment 1, only includes a task that uses a 
response time index of avoidance that differs slightly from the other studies), and 4) 
measurements included both physiological and behavioral indices of fear and risk 
perception. All of the cited studies found evidence of generalized fear and generalized 
avoidance separately (i.e., not APIC-G), with generalization gradients indicating 
participants generally feared and avoided the closest approximation to the CS+ (i.e., the 
GS most similar to the CS+) more than the CS- or a control safety stimulus (e.g., a 
triangle in a task that uses circles for a GS continuum). Additionally, three of the four 
cited studies tested APIC-G as part of their analytic plan (the study by Arnaudova et al., 
2017, did not include a correlational analysis or similar that directly tests APIC-G). In 
these studies, significant correlations between behaviorally indexed Pavlovian 
generalization (e.g., online risk ratings) and generalized instrumental avoidance ranged 
from r = .46 to r = .83, depending on how generalization was operationalized and if 
Pearson (generalization stimuli coded as continuous) or Spearman (generalization stimuli 
coded as ordinal) correlations were calculated. Only van Meurs et al. (2014) found a 
significant relationship between a physiological index of Pavlovian generalization (fear-
potentiated startle measured by electromyography [EMG]) and generalized avoidance, 
with correlation coefficients ranging from .32 (association between overall shapes of 
Pavlovian and instrumental generalization) to .39 (generalization as indexed only by 
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response values for the closest approximation to the CS+ and no other stimuli). Although 
Boyle et al., (2016) and Cameron, et al., (2015) did not find significant associations 
between physiological indices of Pavlovian and instrumental generalization, both studies 
found non-significant correlations in the same direction (i.e., positive) and of very 
roughly comparable magnitude (rs ranged from .16 to .24). Differences between these 
studies are possibly due to 1) van Meurs and colleagues (2014) use of fear-potentiated 
startle to physiologically assess Pavlovian generalization compared with the use of skin 
conductance response (SCR) in the other two studies, which has been shown to be more 
susceptible to non-emotional influences and other sources of noise, and is perhaps less 
suited to generalization assessment than startle (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 2007; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Lissek, Biggs, et al., 2008), and 2) a larger sample size 
in van Meurs et al. (2016) compared with one of the other studies (44 in van Meurs et al., 
2016, compared with 28 in Boyle et al., 2016). Differences in study design preclude more 
complex inferences from this small sample of studies, but the general conclusion that 
Pavlovian generalization is associated with instrumental generalization is supported, and 
evidence suggests that fear of a stimulus is contributing to avoidance of that stimulus and 
that these paradigms are suitable tools for probing this APIC-G. 
Notably, only one of the cited studies (van Meurs et al., 2016) involves an explicit 
focus on the “approach” part of the approach-avoidance conflict: in this study, the 
participant completes a video game-like task that is framed in the context of a farmer 
harvesting crops; participants are explicitly instructed that approach results in a 
successful harvest, avoiding results in a high likelihood of losing the crops. The other 
cited studies do not provide explicit approach motivation, which might hinder 
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interpretation of results in the context of adaptive vs maladaptive avoidance decisions. To 
help illustrate the importance of including approach motivation as a variable in 
conceptualizes of APIC-G and relative adaptiveness of an APIC-G outcome, we return to 
the example of the child and the Rottweiler. As previously established, it is adaptive for 
the child to avoid the dangerous Rottweiler (CS+). That avoidance will be negatively 
reinforced as the child continues to successfully negate danger through avoidance, and 
this will keep the child safe regarding this particular Rottweiler. However, as the child 
generalizes fear and avoids safe dogs that only superficially resemble the dangerous 
Rottweiler (GS) they will also likely avoid those dogs, which are benign and could 
perhaps confer benefits to the child (e.g., companionship, increased confidence in ability 
to handle fear) and avoidance of them could result in interference in valued areas of 
living (e.g., being late to school, not wanting to go outside to meet friends) above and 
beyond what might be expected if the child was just avoiding the Rottweiler. In other 
words, the generalization of Pavlovian fear has led to generalization of avoidant behavior 
with negative consequences to the individual’s functioning. Further, continued avoidance 
of safe dogs might result in lost opportunities for the child to extinguish their fear and 
unnecessarily negatively reinforces the avoidant behavior, which then continues to 
interfere with the child’s goals and reward obtainment. Overall, it is clear from this 
example that the child’s avoidance has become maladaptive, as avoidance has led to a 
decrease in behavioral repertoire and subsequent loss of reward that does not correspond 
to an actual increase in safety or negation of danger. In other words, the approach-
avoidance conflict has been resolved with a non-optimal outcome.  
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A final consideration is how APIC-CS+ might fit into the approach-
avoidance/adaptive vs. maladaptive framework. As the CS+ represents a genuine threat, it 
would be generally adaptive to avoid the CS+ and therefore APIC-CS+ can be considered 
an adaptive learning process. This was previously framed in the ongoing example as 
avoiding a dangerous Rottweiler is an adaptive choice. We can also view the inverse of 
APIC-CS+, approach behavior in the presence of the CS+, as maladaptive: a different 
child who continues to approach the dangerous Rottweiler and receives bites on every 
approach is not benefitting from additional learning opportunities (i.e., learning to avoid 
through instrumental learning) and is harmed every time they approach. That said, it 
should also be noted that uniformly deeming APIC-CS+ as adaptive might be 
oversimplifying – whereas the APIC-G clearly is related to unnecessary loss of reward or 
exhaustion of resources in the absence of actual threat or risk, APIC-CS+ might 
sometimes be maladaptive depending on context. For example, if we change our example 
slightly and assume that the child’s parent has had the same learning experiences as the 
child and is as equally afraid of the Rottweiler, and is confronted with a situation in 
which the child is about to be bitten by the dog, a more complex approach-avoidance 
conflict is present. The parent presumably prioritizes their child’s safety over the majority 
of all other concerns, and non-avoidance (intervening to save the child) in this case is 
considered adaptive because of this priority. However, for the purposes of this endeavor 
we will assume APIC-CS+ is generally adaptive, given that it takes a somewhat contrived 
or unusual situation to produce an example of adaptive CS+ approach and that in the vast 
majority of conditioning studies there is no analogue to the previously described example 
(for review of conditioning paradigms, see Lonsdorf et al., 2017).  
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In terms of empirical support for APIC-CS+ in humans, this exists both in the 
cited APIC-G studies and, more substantially, in differential fear conditioning studies that 
do not contain a generalization component (e.g., Alarcón, Bonardi, & Delamater, 2017; 
Claes, Vlaeyen, & Crombez, 2016; Delgado, 2009; Garofalo & Robbins, 2017; Lewis, 
Niznikiewicz, Delamater, & Delgado, 2013; Y. Xia, Gurkina, & Bach, 2019). Findings 
are consistent across these types of studies, with the CS+ related to an increased rate of 
instrumental avoidance (e.g., Delgado, 2009; Garofalo & Robbins, 2017; Lewis, 
Niznikiewicz, Delamater, & Delgado, 2013). The exception to this occurs in the minority 
of studies that contain an approach-avoidance conflict by including some form of reward 
manipulation (e.g., Alarcón, Bonardi, & Delamater, 2017; Claes, Vlaeyen, & Crombez, 
2016), such as a graphical representation of reward (e.g., food) or winning points. These 
studies sometimes find that reward-seeking behavior “overrides” the instrumental 
avoidance learning, as some participants perhaps prefer to win regardless of a harmful 
outcome (e.g., Claes, Vlaeyen, & Crombez, 2016). These studies also typically have 
smaller sample sizes, which potentially creates vulnerability to unstable effects 
introduced through sample idiosyncrasies that might not be observed in another sample. 
Also of note related to APIC-CS+ is its clinical relevance to alcohol and drug dependency 
(Garbusow et al., 2016; Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006; Schad et al., 2019), as those 
with substance-related pathology will approach their desired substance even in the 
context of severe consequences (corresponding to maladaptive approach, as well as 
maladaptive APIC-CS+). Although this is not directly related to the current dissertation, 
it is important to note for later general discussion of reward-related personality traits. 
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Taken together, we see that both APIC-G and APIC-CS+ are clinically relevant, 
that significant effects for both have been documented in the literature, and that 
experimental procedures are sufficiently able to elicit these processes in the lab. Moving 
beyond the laboratory view, we return to our “real-life” example of the child and the 
Rottweiler. It is at this point that we might consider a question that has lingered in the 
background of this ongoing example: how does this child’s behavior compare to others, 
and is this particular child’s pattern of behavior normative or is it increasingly 
idiosyncratic and potentially problematic? Further, does it perhaps meet criteria for a 
psychological disorder? If taking a broader view, are there dispositional traits that 
contributed to or buffered against the development of the potentially pathological or 
maladaptive behavior?  What information about the child’s dispositional traits and its 
relation to his behavior would be helpful to know before declaring an outcome adaptive 
or maladaptive? Overall, we are left with the essential question of “why did this child 
develop this set of behaviors, and others did not?”. The following section addresses these 
questions and related areas of inquiry. 
Normative and Pathological Individual Differences in Generalized Fear, 
Generalized Avoidance, and APIC-G/APIC-CS+ 
Remarkably, only one previous study with a primary focus on APIC-G has tested 
for sources of potential inter-individual variance that might help sharpen prediction and 
improve explanatory accounts of the process (van Meurs et al., 2014), and even in this 
study only the instrumental avoidance outcome was correlated with a limited set of 
negative affect related traits and states. Further, this and the other previously reviewed 
studies do not find Pavlovian generalization to be highly predictive of instrumental 
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avoidance (i.e., the APIC-G relationship is of moderate strength), which is at odds with 
the intuition that people avoid feared stimuli because they are afraid of said stimuli and 
somewhat surprising given that this relationship is defined and constrained by 
experimental conditions that are nominally within the investigators control. That said, 
there are multiple reasons to view this as an unsurprising result. The explanation that is 
the focus of this dissertation is that what is actually viewed as error or “noise” in APIC-G 
and obscuring the true signal is actually inter-individual variation that can be measured 
and analyzed to help resolve the noise and produce a cleaner signal (see Lonsdorf & 
Merz, 2017, for a compelling and comprehensive review of this issue that we will discuss 
at multiple points throughout this dissertation). 
The importance of inter-individual personality differences. 
Inter-individual differences (hereinafter shortened to individual differences; intra-
individual differences will be referred to as such or by specific description when needed) 
refers to the natural variation of people in a variety of domains, and further classification, 
delineation, prediction, and intervention related to individual differences and their 
associated behaviors is seen as a core tenet of psychological science (Eysenck, 1950; 
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1987; Harkness & Lilienfeld, 1997; Meehl, 1972, 1995; Paunonen 
& Ashton, 2001). Individual differences in human decision-making processes that 
underlie any behavior, including avoidance, can emerge from a vast range of possible 
sources of inter-individual variation (Aczel, Bago, Szollosi, Foldes, & Lukacs, 2015; 
DeYoung, 2015). Further, the decision-making process that underlies avoidance does not 
just receive input from neural fear circuity (e.g., Spielberg, Miller, Warren, Engels, 
Crocker, Banich, et al., 2012; Spielberg, Miller, Warren, Engels, Crocker, Sutton, et al., 
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2012; Tovote et al., 2016). Put simply, there are other sources of variation that contribute 
to why or why not an individual would avoid a feared stimulus besides variation in the 
fear variable itself, likely even if we concede that some of these sources of variation exert 
influence on avoidance through modulation of the initial fear itself. Past investigations of 
APIC-G, as well as a good portion of the fear conditioning literature, have 
unintentionally treated those sources of variation as noise. We now turn our attention to 
personality variation as one form of individual difference that can help us refine this 
noise and convert it into signal. 
 At its core, personality science and its constructs and techniques help us explain 
divergent outcomes between people in similar contexts, both those that are challenging 
and those that are routine (e.g., L. A. Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994; DeLongis & 
Holtzman, 2005; Watson & Clark, 1992; Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994; Webster & 
Ward, 2011). Personality taxonomies, in a sense, provide a framework through which to 
view these divergences and consider possible explanations, some quite different or 
unrelated to each other (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999; Morey, Gunderson, Quigley, & 
Lyons, 2000; Shackman & Fox, 2018; Tackett, Quilty, Sellbom, Rector, & Bagby, 2008). 
This can be illustrated using a modification to the ongoing example: consider if there are 
now two children that have equally overgeneralized fear of dogs due to a harmful 
encounter with the Rottweiler. One of these children might avoid all dogs that resemble 
the dangerous Rottweiler, while the other child might choose not to avoid at all. Multiple 
factors could explain this difference: perhaps the non-avoidant child is more motivated by 
the potential positive value of interacting with dogs despite negative experience, or they 
cannot go to a birthday party without encountering the dog and value the party enough to 
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not avoid. Another explanation could be that the non-avoidant child has received firm 
instructions from their parents and would prefer to confront a dog than disappoint their 
parents. A third possible explanation is that the child is embarrassed by his fear and has 
resolved to aggressively confront the dog, even if it results in further harm. Hypothetical 
explanations are near limitless, but what is clear from this example is that if one asks the 
question “why do some people avoid and some do not?”, an answer that only refers to 
fear or the determinants of fear and no other possible factors is likely an incomplete 
answer and ignores individual variation that might contribute to APIC-G. Put another 
way: Pavlovian conditioned fear is, of course, relevant to the question of why people 
avoid, but it is not a complete answer. Interestingly, this and related questions are ones 
that the applied clinical literature has long considered relevant, as psychological 
treatment for anxiety pathology based on combinations of specific individual differences 
(i.e., personalized or individualized treatment; e.g., Ball, Stein, & Paulus, 2014; Cuijpers, 
Ebert, Acarturk, Andersson, & Cristea, 2016; Moscovitch, 2009; Ozomaro, Wahlestedt, 
& Nemeroff, 2013) or variation on a candidate personality dimensions (e.g., neuroticism 
or negative affectivity; Barlow et al., 2010; Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 
2013; Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012) continues to be a prominent goal in the clinical science 
field. However, the question of personality individual differences in APIC-G has little to 
no footprint in the mechanism-focused experimental conditioning literature. 
Review of individual differences work in generalization and related studies. 
To outline the impetus for the current study and to help structure our hypotheses, 
we temporarily take a step back from a personality focus and in the following sections we 
review multiple types of individual differences in APIC-G, and, given the paucity of 
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relevant work in APIC-G (and APIC in general), experimentally-elicited conditioned fear 
generalization and instrumental avoidance generalization. The following section is 
organized into two broad classifications: normative individual differences (those that are 
mostly or entirely normally distributed in the population) and pathological individual 
differences (those that display a markedly skewed distribution in the population, with the 
majority of people tightly clustered around the lowest/absent values). This distinction is 
made partially to facilitate a natural organizational structure in both this section and the 
reported analyses, and to help consider which findings might be replicated in or relevant 
to the current study, which does not sample explicitly from a pathological or patient 
population (e.g., psychiatry clinic) and is therefore is more likely to be representative of 
normative functioning and dispositional variation. We would also like to emphasize that 
this is an imperfect and partially artificial distinction, as copious research demonstrates 
both that normative individual difference scales (e.g., Big Five personality scales) are 
appropriate for measurement of clinical/pathological levels of trait variation (Kotov, 
Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Mahaffey, Watson, Clark, & Kotov, 2016; Malouff, 
Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2005; L. C. Morey et al., 2002, 2000; Rector, Bagby, Huta, & 
Ayearst, 2012; D. Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2014) and that joint factor-analytic and 
other latent modeling approaches to the study of measures targeting normative and 
pathological personality variance find evidence that these spectrums actually exist on a 
single unified dimension (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; Forbes et al., 2017; Kotov 
et al., 2017; Krueger & Tackett, 2003; Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005). Nevertheless, 
we contend it is a helpful framework for the current endeavor and will consider the 
ramifications of this distinction on our results and interpretation in the discussion.  
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Pathological individual differences.  
Abnormalities in Pavlovian fear conditioning are a central part of etiological 
accounts of categorically-defined anxiety disorders (Dunsmoor & Paz, 2015; Lissek & 
van Meurs, 2014; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). One of the most fundamental abnormalities 
seen in anxiety disorders is overresponding to safety cues (Duits et al., 2015; Lissek et 
al., 2005), which provided the impetus for more recent studies of fear generalization in 
anxiety disorder patient populations using laboratory paradigms. The clinical relevance of 
fear generalization and, potentially, APIC-G is also established in the clinical literature. 
This is most directly evidenced by the fact that the DSM, which has been the guiding 
system for psychopathology research for a considerable amount of time, requires both 
fear or anxious distress and some form of avoidance be present for any of the most 
common anxiety, trauma, or obsessive-compulsive disorders to be diagnosed (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The most common disorders of this type include 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD), specific phobia, social anxiety disorder (SAD), and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) (Kessler, Ruscio, Shear, & Wittchen, 2009). The only potential exception 
to this consistent pattern cross these DSM diagnostic criteria is GAD, although it can be 
argued that the required worry component of the disorder represents a cognitive form of 
avoidance that is central to GAD pathology and functionally resembles the more overt 
avoidance included in the DSM entries for the other listed disorders (Behar, DiMarco, 
Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009; Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). To facilitate 
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readability, specific findings for each of these disorders are discussed separately6. Given 
the field’s prominent history of conditioning models for explaining the etiology of 
anxiety pathology, each disorder is briefly described and contextualized within the 
conditioning literature, followed by a review of relevant studies. When possible, 
pathological individual differences that were tested along a continuum, as opposed to 
categorically, are highlighted. 
PTSD.  
Formerly considered an anxiety disorder as recently as DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and now under the “trauma and stress-related disorders” 
heading of DSM-5, PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), PTSD is 
characterized by chronic fear and avoidance related to reminders of one or more past 
traumas accompanied by hyperarousal and negative mood and cognition symptoms. 
PTSD is the only DSM anxiety or trauma disorder with a clear precipitant (a “Criterion 
A” trauma, which most commonly for people diagnosed with PTSD is a direct exposure 
to actual or threatened death, bodily harm, sexual violence; e.g., Breslau, 2009) required 
for diagnosis, and therefore conditioning models are particularly intuitive and well-suited 
to characterizing this disorder due to clear links between the conditioning constructs and 
PTSD diagnostic features, both in terms of acquisition of fear (e.g., the threat during the 
trauma is a US, the cues present during the trauma comprise the CS+ ) and difficulty 
 
 
6 Despite the inclusion of PTSD, acute stress disorder (ASD) is excluded from the current review. This 
diagnosis created to capture maladaptive functioning and intense distress in relation to trauma before a 
PTSD diagnosis can be made (i.e., < 1 month since trauma), there is considerable debate as to the validity 
of ASD as a diagnostic entity (Bryant et al., 2017; Marshall, Spitzer, & Liebowitz, 1999; McNally, 2003). 
Given the lack of fear generalization and instrumental avoidance studies with ASD, as well as the 
uncertainty regarding the diagnosis, we considered it a reasonable exclusion. 
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reducing the fear response over time (e.g., slower or delayed extinction learning). 
Proposed conditioning accounts of PTSD offer a compelling overview of how 
conditioning mechanisms contribute to the development and maintenance of PTSD 
(Blechert, Michael, Vriends, Margraf, & Wilhelm, 2007; Lissek & van Meurs, 2014; 
Mahan & Ressler, 2012; Pitman, 1988; VanElzakker, Kathryn Dahlgren, Caroline Davis, 
Dubois, & Shin, 2014), particularly when viewed through the lens of two-factor theory. It 
should be noted that although most of these accounts are comprehensive in their 
explanations of the pathogenesis of PTSD and how it results in its constituent symptoms, 
both the authors of these accounts and other evidence suggests that there are factors other 
than conditioning mechanisms that contribute to the pathology, particularly in terms of 
risk factors for PTSD, such as reward- and impulse-related differences (e.g., Admon, 
Milad, & Hendler, 2013; Kramer et al., 2016). That said, these risk factors can be viewed 
as interacting with the conditioning aspects of PTSD (e.g., some risk factors contribute to 
enhanced fear conditionability, which in turn leads to greater chance of developing 
PTSD), and overall that conditioning models of PTSD perhaps offer the most explanatory 
power of current theoretical models, even with the noted gaps. 
Fear generalization has been identified as a particularly important conditioning 
correlate of PTSD given the phenomenology of the disorder (Lissek & Grillon, 2012; 
Lissek & van Meurs, 2014; Zuj & Norrholm, 2019), and clinically-informed accounts of 
PTSD highlight the transfer of fear from the trauma itself to resembling cues as a core 
symptom and a priority treatment target (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa, Steketee, & 
Rothbaum, 1989). At present, three studies have directly tested fear generalization in 
participants diagnosed with PTSD (Kaczkurkin et al., 2016; Lissek & Grillon, 2012; R. 
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A. Morey et al., 2015). Two of these studies (Kaczkurkin et al., 2016; R. A. Morey et al., 
2015) used neuroimaging to identify neural substrates associated with overgeneralization 
in PTSD, with both studies identifying correlates of overgeneralized fear (e.g., insula, 
implicated in interoception and prediction of aversive events, Paulus & Stein, 2006) and 
deficient generalization of safety learning (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex; 
implicated in inhibition of fear; Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004). Results 
notably differed between these studies, as abnormalities in some candidate brain areas 
implicated in fear generalization, including the amygdala, thalamus, and hippocampus 
were associated with PTSD in one study, but not the other. Further, Kaczkurkin and 
colleagues (2016) found behavioral evidence of overgeneralization in PTSD in the form 
of ratings of shock expectancy (i.e., risk ratings), whereas Morey and colleagues (2015) 
did not. These differences are potentially explained by 1) differences in the experimental 
paradigms used (e.g., use of emotional faces in one paradigm and neutral shapes in 
another) and 2) heterogeneity in PTSD (DiMauro, Carter, Folk, & Kashdan, 2014) that 
might not be obvious in these samples due to both the assessment technique used to 
assess PTSD (e.g. and relatively small sample sizes to detect reliable signals of 
heterogeneity within the PTSD groups. Most importantly for the current endeavor, 
Kaczkurkin et al., (2016) conducted additional analyses in which PTSD symptom 
severity was quantified dimensionally using total scores derived from a well-validated 
interview of PTSD symptoms (Blake et al., 1995) and correlated with a single-score 
measure of generalization gradient steepness (with higher scores indicating more shallow 
slopes and therefore greater generalization). These symptom severity scores were 
significantly associated with greater generalization in the right anterior insula and the left 
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ventral hippocampus/amygdala, indicating that generalization positively covaries with 
symptom severity level and not just with categorically-defined PTSD. Also noteworthy is 
that this study had a representative range and a normal distribution of symptom severity 
scores, as it tested participants categorized into trauma-control, sub-threshold PTSD, and 
PTSD groups; this suggests that these results reflect a true dimensional relationship in the 
population. 
In terms of instrumental avoidance, generalized or otherwise, there are 
remarkably no published studies investigating this process in PTSD. This is particularly 
striking considering avoidance is one of the DSM-5 PTSD symptom clusters and required 
for diagnosis, that it is central to many etiological conceptualizations of PTSD (e.g., 
Asmundson, Stapleton, & Taylor, 2004; Solomon & Wynne, 1954; Thompson & Waltz, 
2010), and that it is a primary intervention target for psychotherapeutic treatment (S. A. 
Rauch, Eftekhari, & Ruzek, 2012; Rothbaum et al., 2000). Even if expanding our review 
to experimental studies of avoidance in PTSD, there is still a limited amount of extant 
relevant research to help inform the current study. One study used a video-game task that 
allowed participants to either engage for points or hide to escape aversive on-screen 
outcomes and point loss (Sheynin et al., 2017). These studies identified a consistent 
pattern of more persistent avoidance behavior in a high PTSD symptom group, as 
indexed by avoidance during a phase in which it was not possible to lose points or 
experience the aversive event. Two limitations hinder interpretability of the results. First, 
the findings purportedly support a link between lab-based avoidance and avoidance 
symptoms of PTSD, but a plausible alternative interpretation is that those with higher 
PTSD symptoms were better at learning the task more likely to adaptively avoid and 
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maximize success on the task; it is also notable that the higher PTSD symptom group had 
significantly more points at the end of the task than the lower symptom group. Second, 
the instrument used to define the groups is an imperfect measure of PTSD and can lead to 
false positive classification of PTSD (Wilkins, Lang, & Norman, 2011); the authors 
address this in their study, but it is important to consider the possibility that these results 
are not particularly informative in regards to pathological individual differences. Finally, 
given the paucity of research around instrumental avoidance in PTSD, it is no surprise 
that there have not been any investigations of APIC-G and this remains a needed area of 
investigation. 
GAD.  
Intense and pervasive worry that is present for at least six months in conjunction 
with related anxious-arousal symptoms are required for a GAD diagnosis (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The etiology of GAD is relatively less well-understood 
when compared with many of the other anxiety disorders, with multiple overlapping 
theoretical accounts of GAD development and maintenance in existence but with no clear 
dominating view (Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009). Limited 
conditioning models of GAD have been proposed and provide some explanatory power 
for GAD pathology, but they either are not comprehensive and/or are still in preliminary 
stages (Cooper, Grillon, & Lissek, 2018; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006) or are currently 
limited to animal research (Delgado, Olsson, & Phelps, 2006; Luyten, Vansteenwegen, 
van Kuyck, Gabriëls, & Nuttin, 2011). The most compelling evidence for the role of 
conditioning abnormalities in GAD pathology is from fear generalization work done in 
this population. Three studies provide consistent evidence that people with GAD 
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overgeneralize fear compared with control participants (Cha et al., 2014; Greenberg, 
Carlson, Cha, Hajcak, & Mujica-Parodi, 2013; Lissek et al., 2014), with all results 
pointing towards GAD-specific increased fear reactivity to the GS that was the closest 
approximation to the CS+, and the two studies using neuroimaging (Cha et al., 2014; 
Greenberg et al., 2013) identifying deficient inhibitory learning as indexed by a lack of 
vmPFC response to GSs. However, two studies provide contradictory evidence, both 
from the same research group (Tinoco-González et al., 2015; Torrents-Rodas et al., 
2013). Both do not find differences in fear generalization between an anxiety group and a 
control group. In the first study, a continuous measure of trait anxiety is dichotomized in 
high/low group and proposed as an analogue of GAD; in the second study GAD is 
assessed using a brief diagnostic interview and with the same measure of trait anxiety. A 
possible explanation for the difference in results between these two studies and the three 
studies with significant generalization findings lies in these grouping details. In both 
studies with null results, the mean trait anxiety was considerably lower than both the 
mean trait anxiety level in the other studies and the recommended diagnostic cutoff for 
the measure (e.g., Kvaal, Ulstein, Nordhus, & Engedal, 2005). Thus, it is possible that the 
GAD group was miscategorized and that it and anxiety disorder analogue group were not 
sufficient for group differences to emerge. 
At present, there are no published studies of instrumental avoidance, generalized 
instrumental avoidance, or APIC-G in GAD. This is less surprising than the lack of 
literature on this topic for PTSD, as there is still debate over the role of avoidance in 
GAD (Behar et al., 2009; Olatunji, Moretz, & Zlomke, 2010), especially overt behavioral 
avoidance, and there is not as compelling a case for study of instrumental avoidance in 
 31 
GAD as there is for PTSD. However, normative dimensions of negative affect, such as 
Neuroticism and trait anxiety, are considered in the following section, and the review of 
those dimensions as they relate to instrumental avoidance has some relevance to GAD 
given conceptual and empirical overlap (see Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; 
Kotov et al., 2010; Watson, 2005). 
Panic disorder. 
Panic disorder is defined by a history of uncued panic attacks, in which the person 
rapidly experiences intense physiological symptoms and fearful cognitions, and 
subsequent intense worry or behavioral avoidance related to fear of having another panic 
attack (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Conditioning accounts of pathological 
panic acquisition are prominent in the etiology literature (Acheson, Forsyth, Prenoveau, 
& Bouton, 2007; Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001; De Cort et al., 2017; De Cort, Griez, 
Büchler, & Schruers, 2012) and, broadly, posit that Pavlovian fear conditioning occurs 
during the initial panic attack, in which the panic symptoms are the US and incidental 
cues in the environment become CSs7. Further, in many cases, people with PD develop a 
pathological aversion to and avoidance of settings and cues which they associate with 
panic attacks and believe they would have difficulty escaping from (i.e., agoraphobia). 
Although not required for a PD disorder, agoraphobic symptoms are evident in ~25% to 
50% of PD cases (Grant et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2006) and are central to widely 
accepted models of the disorder and its treatment (e.g., Barlow, Craske, Cerny, & Klosko, 
1989; Craske & Barlow, 1988). 
 
 
7 Although beyond the scope of the current dissertation, it should be noted that there is some debate and 
contention around what constitutes the US, CS+/CS-, and other equivalents to conditioning phenomena in 
panic disorder (for discussion, see Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001; McNally, 1990). 
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As with PTSD, fear generalization has been proposed as a compelling explanation 
for how panic disorder pathology develops and maintains over time (Duits et al., 2016; 
Lissek et al., 2009). At present, one study demonstrates fear overgeneralization in panic 
disorder compared with control participants (Lissek et al., 2010); there are no equivalent 
studies that use a method appropriate for dissociating the separate roles of fear/excitatory 
and safety/inhibitory learning (e.g., fMRI). 
Experimental avoidance studies of panic disorder are also limited, as the majority 
of studies of panic-related avoidance involve correlating responses to an acute stressor 
(e.g., CO2 inhalation) with psychometric self-report indices of avoidance behaviors (e.g., 
Bystritsky, Craske, Maidenberg, Vapnik, & Shapiro, 2000; Spira, Zvolensky, Eifert, & 
Feldner, 2004). Thus, there are currently no relevant instrumental avoidance studies 
available for review. One study that potentially has implications for APIC-G used an 
idiographic anxiety induction and compared panic disorder patients who used in-situation 
safety-seeking behaviors (e.g., to those who did not, and found that those who did not use 
safety-seeking behaviors (which were sometimes overt avoidance and sometimes more 
covert forms of avoidance, such as emotional grounding using a held object; e.g., 
Funayama et al., 2013) reported significant decreases in negative beliefs and anxiety 
(Salkovskis, Clark, Hackmann, Wells, & Gelder, 1999). Although an imperfect analogue, 
this finding does roughly correspond to the assertion that generalized fear (in this study, 
fear related to learned threat cues) is associated with generalized avoidance (in this study, 
safety-seeking behaviors in response to these cues) and that, consistent with two-factor 
views, this serves to maintain the learned fear associations and facilitates continued 
anxiety. 
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SAD.  
People with SAD report severe and pervasive anxiety in relation to social 
activities, either generally or in specific areas (e.g., public speaking), and pathologically 
avoid feared social contexts due to concern regarding the judgments and evaluations of 
others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Etiological accounts of SAD trend 
towards cognitive models, in which different forms of interpretation biases (e.g., 
tendency to interpret interpersonal information as negative) are posited as key factors in 
the development and maintenance of SAD symptoms (D. M. Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Spence & Rapee, 2016). However, 
conditioning abnormalities are also considered part of SAD etiology: over-
conditionability and impaired discrimination learning related to threatening social cues 
have been identified in patients with SAD (Hermann, Ziegler, Birbaumer, & Flor, 2002; 
Lissek, Levenson, et al., 2008; Sachs, Anderer, Doby, Saletu, & Dantendorfer, 2003), and 
conditioning mechanisms have been incorporated into cognitively-focused causal models 
that establish how a “landmark” stressful events or series of events (e.g., bullying) lead to 
threat cues that are part of the development of negative interpretation biases (Hofmann, 
2008; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Rapee & Spence, 2004; Spence & Rapee, 2016). 
Currently, there is one published study that has found evidence for fear 
overgeneralization in SAD (Ahrens et al., 2016). Notably, this study did not use shock as 
a US, as was used with the majority of other generalization studies; instead socially-
relevant USs were used (co-occurring scream and fearful face) which is in line with other 
studies that have used conditioning paradigms with social USs to differentiate those with 
SAD from healthy control participants (e.g., Lissek, Levenson, et al., 2008) and suggests 
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US specificity plays a role in fear generalization (i.e., for generalization to occur the US 
must be disorder relevant). Also notable is that Ahrens and colleagues (2016) found 
physiological, but not behavioral, generalized conditioned responses to the CS+ and the 
three classes of GSs must similar to the CS+ in SAD, but not controls. Behaviorally, they 
found overall greater threat estimation in SAD when compared with control participants 
(i.e., a main effect), but no evidence of generalization differences. This is perhaps 
reflective of the prominence of cognitive, as opposed to emotional or physiological, 
factors underlying excessive and pervasive apprehension of social stimuli in those with 
SAD (Spence & Rapee, 2016); although it should be noted that desynchrony between 
physiological and behavioral measures of generalization has been documented in other 
disorders (Greenberg et al., 2013) and is consistent with earlier theories of these disorders 
(Hodgson & Rachman, 1974). 
Approach-avoidance conflict in SAD has received moderate empirical attention, 
despite SAD and its signature conflict between social fear and valued activities being an 
intuitive example for understanding how approach-avoidance conflicts operate outside of 
the laboratory setting (Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018). Although there are no APIC-G in 
SAD studies published as of this date, two studies have experimentally investigated 
covariation of fear (experimentally conditioned and unconditioned) and instrumental 
avoidance in SAD (Ly & Roelofs, 2009; Pittig, Alpers, Niles, & Craske, 20158) and 
found somewhat contradictory instrumental avoidance findings. Ly and Roelofs (2009) 
 
 
8 Although not explicitly conceptualized as an instrumental conditioning task, the paradigm used in Pittig et 
al. (2015) does meet the definition for instrumental avoidance, as the behavioral outcome (gambling 
choice) was shaped through prior experience. The first author also chose to categorize this study as one of 
instrumental avoidance in a later review he wrote (Pittig et al., 2018). 
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compared those with high SAD symptoms to those with low SAD symptoms and did not 
find differences in instrumental avoidance rates between the two.  Pittig and colleagues 
(2015) found a positive correlation between preconditioned (i.e., in vivo or naturally 
conditioned) fear and avoidance decisions in a group of SAD patients completing a 
public speech and a gambling task. Numerous differences in study design and population 
could account for these differences, most pertinently that 1) one study only assessed 
aversive avoidance without a reward component (Ly & Roelofs; 2009) while the other 
study (Pittig et al., 2015) included both fear and reward but they were part of separate 
tasks that were only statistically, not experientially, related and 2) one study used SAD 
analogues that perhaps are not representative of SAD patients and the other only 
conducted within-group analyses of SAD patients and did not include a control group. 
Given these complications, it is difficult to make strong conclusions about APIC-G in 
SAD based on these data, and further investigations are needed. 
Specific phobia.  
Specific phobia involves excessive fear and avoidant behavior in response to a 
narrowly-defined stimulus or context, such as spiders, blood and needles, or confined 
spaces (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Due to the circumscribed nature of fear 
in this disorder and relative homogeneity of symptoms within specific phobia types, 
conditioning models are seen as the most parsimonious explanation for the pathology and 
have held dominance in the field for decades (Field, 2006; McNally, 1987; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006; Stein & Matsunaga, 2006), with a sizable number of studies documenting 
fear conditioning abnormalities in different types of specific phobias (see Duits et al., 
2015) and using this evidence base to develop remarkably effective and brief treatments 
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for the condition (Choy, Fyer, & Lipsitz, 2007; Öst, 1989, 1996). However, it should be 
noted that although conditioning models are the dominant view of social phobia etiology, 
this does not mean that fear acquisition/simple discrimination learning models are 
dominant; current theories posit that multiple conditioning mechanisms contribute to the 
specific phobia (e.g., vicarious conditioning; Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). This 
is important to note because it might seem that there is no need to go beyond simple fear 
acquisiton models if considering specific phobia from the perspective that it is based on a 
simple link between a US (e.g., dog bite) and CS+ (e.g., the dog). 
Indeed, fear generalization is also implicated as a mechanism underlying specific 
phobia pathology. To date, two studies have experimentally investigated conditioned fear 
generalization in specific phobia (Dymond, Schlund, Roche, & Whelan, 2014; Lange et 
al., 2019). Both studies compared participants with spider phobia to non-phobic controls. 
Only one study, Dymond et al. (2014) found those with spider phobia demonstrated 
symbolic (as opposed to perceptual) overgeneralization (in the form of behavioral ratings 
of threat expectancy). The other study conducted by Lange and colleagues (2019) found 
support for enhanced conditionability in specific phobia (stronger responses to the CS+) 
and enhanced (not impaired, as found in prior studies) discrimination learning. The 
difference in results might be due to Dymond et al. (2014) using a symbolic 
generalization task (i.e., part of the task involved learning arbitrary relationships between 
dissimilar stimuli), as opposed to the perceptual generalization tasks used in most other 
studies, including Lange et al. (2019), and suggests that perhaps those with specific 
phobia are more susceptible to generalization of newly learned arbitrary associations, but 
can successfully discriminate between the visual properties of the CS+ and a close 
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approximation. Additionally, Dymond et al. (2014) used a disorder-specific US (spider 
images), whereas Lange et al. (2019) used a disorder-agnostic US (shock), which 
potentially created a strong situation that obscured group differences (i.e., elicited a 
uniform defensive response across all participants, see Lissek, Pine, & Grillon, 2006). 
Instrumental avoidance has been directly studied in two investigations of specific 
phobia (Pittig, Brand, Pawlikowski, & Alpers, 2014; Rinck et al., 2016), both of which 
found greater avoidance in participants with spider phobia than controls. However, 
interpretation and implications differ based on task design: Pittig et al. (2014), which 
contained an approach-avoidance manipulation (modified gambling task) frame the 
finding of increased avoidance as maladaptive because it came at the cost of potential 
reward, whereas Rinck et al. (2016), which only contains aversive stimuli with no reward 
or approach element, frame their results as more efficient learning of when to avoid a 
spider. Although initially appearing to contradict each other, these findings are actually 
quite compatible: because Rinck et al. (2016) did not contain a reward/approach element, 
there is not proper context to deem avoidance as adaptive or maladaptive. Regardless, it 
is clear that those with specific phobia are more likely to avoid feared stimuli. Neither 
study provides direct insight into fear and avoidance covariance or APIC-G, although 
both found that trait levels of spider fear were associated with more avoidance decisions.  
This is also consistent with a number of studies using a Behavioral Approach Task (BAT) 
that find greater avoidance in those with phobias, as indexed by fewer approach “steps” 
toward a CS+ compared with controls (Lange et al., 2019; Olatunji, Cisler, Meunier, 
Connolly, & Lohr, 2008; Valentiner, Telch, Petruzzi, & Bolte, 1996; Zoellner, Echiverri, 
& Craske, 2000). These studies also perhaps provide insights into how experimentally-
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elicited generalized avoidance might function in specific phobia, as the BAT perhaps has 
inherent generalization properties due to its design as a graded approach task that (e.g., 
first participants see the CS+ from a distance, then walk closer, and eventually touch the 
CS+), although it should be noted that sensitization (i.e., non-associative increase in a 
response to a stimulus over repeated exposures) might be a better explanation for this 
avoidance pattern than an associative process such as generalization. 
OCD. 
 The cardinal features of OCD are distressing and repeated obsessive thoughts and 
compulsive behaviors enacted to control or reduce distress, typically distress related to 
the obsession. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) As with PTSD, OCD was 
reclassified in DSM-5 and was moved from the anxiety disorder to the obsessive- and tic-
related disorders section. It is included due to its mechanistic similarities to the other 
discussed disorders. Although there is support for a conditioning model of OCD etiology 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2017; Geller et al., 2017; Milad et al., 2013; Mineka & Zinbarg, 
2006; Nanbu et al., 2010; Tracy, Ghose, Stecher, McFall, & Steinmetz, 1999), the 
primary contribution of conditioning principles to the OCD literature has been in the area 
of intervention, in which exposure and response prevention techniques have become a 
first-line treatment for OCD and include components related to two-stage theory 
(Abramowitz, 1996; Foa et al., 2007; Foa & McLean, 2016; Ludvik, Boschen, & 
Neumann, 2015). Further, the role of conditioning processes in OCD is complicated by 
the fact that the majority of conditioning studies involve conditioned fear, yet there is 
evidence that disgust, as opposed to fear, is the driving motivational force in many cases 
of OCD (Cisler, Olatunji, & Lohr, 2009) and that heterogeneity in the disorder might 
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reflect distinct phenotypes that might not be appropriately described with a single 
conditioning model (McKay et al., 2004). 
 As Pavlovian conditioning studies of OCD are limited (Duits et al., 2015; Lissek 
et al., 2005), it is not surprising there is only one published study of conditioned fear 
generalization related to OCD or obsessive-compulsive traits (Kaczkurkin & Lissek, 
2013). In this study, limited evidence for psychophysiological generalization of 
conditioned fear was found for those with a higher, but not lower disposition towards 
threat estimation as measured by a self-report measure of obsessive beliefs. Accordingly, 
it is difficult to make substantial inferences regarding conditioned fear generalization in 
OCD based on this study.  
Similarly, inferences regarding instrumental avoidance/generalized avoidance and 
APIC-G are difficult, as to our knowledge there are no available studies on these 
processes in diagnosed OCD. However, one study that tests an OCD analogue group in 
comparison to a control group using an instrumental avoidance test does provide some 
insight (Hassoulas, McHugh, & Reed, 2014). Results from this study, which contained 
both an un-signaled avoidance task (point loss was uniformly accomplished via a specific 
button press) and an instrumental avoidance task (cues indicated which combination of 
button-pressing responses would result in avoidance of point loss) indicated that those 
higher on OCD traits showed greater un-signaled avoidance (i.e., habitual avoidance) but 
did not differ in terms of instrumental avoidance. Also of note, the finding of increased 
un-signaled/habitual avoidance in OCD has been documented in previous studies (Gillan, 
Apergis-Schoute, et al., 2014; Gillan, Morein-Zamir, et al., 2014). Taken together, it is 
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possible that OCD is not related to instrumental avoidance abnormalities and is 
characterized by broad tendencies towards avoidance, but further research is needed. 
Interim summary of pathological individual differences. 
 As there are inconsistencies in findings both across disorders and within 
disorders, a complete synthesis is not tenable. However, some specific conclusions are 
possible despite this heterogeneity of findings. First, there is strong support for 
overgeneralization of conditioned fear as a transdiagnostic feature of anxiety and related 
disorders, although the strength of this effect might vary by disorder. Second, a general 
tendency towards avoidance in experimental studies is seen across the disorders, although 
this is fairly unsurprising given the avoidance symptoms required for diagnosis, and 
verges on circular logic. Transdiagnostic conclusions for the role of experimentally-
induced instrumental avoidance, generalized or otherwise, in the reviewed disorders are 
not possible due to 1) a lack of relevant published findings and 2) inconsistency in the 
findings that do exist (e.g., for specific phobia). However, theoretical conditioning 
models of these disorders based on clinical observation and treatment studies generally 
support the statement that APIC-G and its constituent processes are relevant to the 
etiology of anxiety/trauma/obsessive-compulsive pathology, with empirical support 
limited to inferences constructed from a set of findings that provide indirect evidence (for 
review, see Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018). It is noteworthy that there are no available 
studies of dimensionally-conceptualized or measured pathological individual difference 
(e.g., clinical scales from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI] or 
Personality Assessment Inventory [PAI], see Butcher & Rouse, 1996) as they pertain to 
fear and avoidance generalization, despite clear relevance of these multiband scales to 
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fear conditioning processes (e.g., the subscales of the “ANX” scale on the PAI that 
capture cognitive vs. physiological symptoms of anxiety independent of specific 
disordered manifestations; L.C Morey & Boggs, 1991). Related to this, we also 
acknowledge the inherent heterogeneity in and comorbidity issues related to DSM 
disorders (Krueger, 1999; Krueger & Markon, 2006; Lilienfeld & Treadway, 2016) and 
that alternative empirically-derived classification structures (Kotov et al., 2017; Krueger, 
McGue, & Iacono, 2001) might better map onto the basic fear generalization substrates 
identified in the studies using DSM disorder.  
Narrowband normative individual differences.  
Normative/non-pathological individual differences in generalized fear, avoidance, 
and APIC-G have received less empirical focus than the study of pathological differences 
in these processes. This is likely due to multiple factors, including: 1) fear and avoidance 
conditioning are commonly linked to clinical conditions and hold intuitive appeal in how 
they relate to those conditions; 2) these individual differences are typically modeled as 
continua, which is difficult to incorporate into the ANOVA/factorial statistical 
framework that predominates the fear conditioning field (e.g., Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017; 
Vanbrabant et al., 2015); and 3) until recently, reliance on categorical DSM disorders as 
the predominant measurement model of experimental psychopathology (e.g., Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013; Krueger & DeYoung, 2016) 
 Due to this lack of literature, we also briefly review normative individual 
differences in fear acquisition measured during discrimination learning paradigms when 
available, in addition to reviewing findings from generalization paradigms; this is 
justified because discrimination learning with a threat and safety cue or condition can be 
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conceptualized as a form of generalization (Lissek et al., 2005), just on the opposing pole 
of the same dimension (i.e., greater discrimination = less generalization). Additionally, 
the following review makes a further distinction between types of individual differences 
and is thus subdivided into “broadband” and “narrowband” individual differences or 
personality variables (Goldberg, 1999)9. In this case, broadband refers to superordinate 
traits that can be conceptualized as capturing coarser, but also wider, variance and 
content areas than narrowband traits (for examples of broader vs. more specific 
personality coverage, see Goldberg, 1990; Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992). Put 
another way, broadband traits have greater sensitivity and broader coverage of variance 
and content area, but less resolution and specificity. The opposite is true for narrowband 
traits, which are typically specific to a single content area or a closely related group of 
constructs. 
Trait anxiety. 
 Trait anxiety is the individual tendency to experience high levels of anxiety in the 
moment (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). In other words, the 
higher a person’s trait anxiety, the more likely they are to respond anxiously or 
experience thoughts, feelings, and sensations associated with anxiety (i.e., with higher 
state anxiety). It is purportedly normatively distributed in the population and does not 
specifically demarcate pathological anxiety, although studies have identified cutoff scores 
for detection of pathology (e.g., Kvaal et al., 2005). The specific domain or type of 
 
 
9 We conceptualize all the individual differences variables discussed in this review and tested in the current 
study as reflecting personality (and consistent with Tellegen (1991) and others’ definitions of personality) 
and therefore accurately termed personality variables; however, to facilitate the pathological vs. normative 
dichotomy, within this section we refrain from terming variables as personality variables unless they are 
part of an explicitly defined personality structure (e.g., Big Five).  
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anxiety is not considered in trait anxiety, which is one of the primary criticisms directed 
at the trait anxiety construct (Endler & Kocovski, 2001; Reiss, 1997). Another relevant 
criticism is that the trait anxiety construct is not sensitive to anxiety, but rather to 
negative affect in general, and does not reliably discriminate between anxiety and 
depression conditions (Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 1998; Endler, Cox, Parker, & 
Michael, 1992; Kennedy, Schwab, Morris, & Beldia, 2001). Despite these limitations, it 
is the most common normative individual difference tested in association with fear and 
avoidance conditioning processes (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). In terms of fear acquisition, 
results are very mixed in terms of significant vs null findings, directionality or source of 
findings, and desynchrony between different measures of fear in the same study. Studies 
with significant results can be loosely categorized into those that found a relationship 
between trait anxiety and a poorer discriminative fear conditioning driven by reduced 
responsivity to the CS+ (Indovina, Robbins, Núñez-Elizalde, Dunn, & Bishop, 2011; 
Sjouwerman, Scharfenort, & Lonsdorf, 2018) and those that found this relationship was 
driven by heightened responsivity to the CS- (Gazendam, Kamphuis, & Kindt, 2013; 
Haaker et al., 2015; Haddad, Pritchett, Lissek, & Lau, 2012; Kindt & Soeter, 2014). Also, 
in most of the cited studies, there was some inconsistency between physiological and 
behavioral findings (i.e., one index would be significantly related to trait anxiety, but not 
the other). Additionally, as of this date, there are more null findings than significant 
findings in this sub-area (for a more in-depth review and discussion of this issue, see 
Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). 
 Only a single study has explicitly focused on investigation of trait anxiety as it 
relates to conditioned fear generalization (Torrents-Rodas et al., 2013). As previously 
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discussed, the high trait anxiety group in this study was also proposed as a GAD analogue 
group, and no generalization differences were found, possibly due to limitations related to 
sampling or analytic technique. Similarly, the only published analyses of instrumental 
avoidance as it relates to trait anxiety did not find a significant relationship (Lommen, 
Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010; van Meurs, Wiggert, Wicker, & Lissek, 2014). There 
are no published analyses of the relationship between trait anxiety and APIC-G (or APIC 
overall). 
Due to substantial methodological and sample heterogeneity within these and the 
previously cited studies, most notably as it relates to 1) US reinforcement parameters 
(e.g., 100% vs < 100% reinforcement, which has been shown to substantially affect 
between- and within-subjects differences in fear responding, e.g., Chase, Kumar, 
Eickhoff, & Dombrovski, 2015; Chin, Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016; W. Xia, 
Dymond, Lloyd, & Vervliet, 2017); 2) how the trait anxiety dimension was dichotomized 
to facilitate categorical between-subjects analyses (i.e., what cut-score was used, see 
Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017, p. 710, Figure 3, for a striking visualization of heterogeneity in 
chosen cut-score); and 3) sample size (a majority of the cited studies were susceptible to 
type II error due to being underpowered), we refrain from providing an overall 
interpretation of trait anxiety effects. A single exception is that findings of exaggerated 
fear responding to the CS-, which can be conceptualized as a form of GS, in those higher 
on trait anxiety (e.g., Gazendam, Kamphuis, & Kindt, 2013; Haaker et al., 2015; Haddad, 
Pritchett, Lissek, & Lau, 2012; Kindt & Soeter, 2014) is perhaps indicative of 
overgeneralization (or at least increased  generalization) being associated with trait 
anxiety. 
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Intolerance of uncertainty.  
 Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a trait that captures a tendency towards negative 
beliefs and maladaptive behaviors regarding future events with uncertain outcomes and 
consequences (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004). IU has more 
recently become of particular empirical interest given its can serve as an index of 
differential responding to uncertainty and ambiguity, which has been proposed as a 
behavioral correlate of activity neural circuits relevant for optimal decision-making and 
goal-selection (e.g., Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Grupe, 2017; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). It 
is moderately-to-strongly positively associated with trait anxiety (Khawaja & Yu, 2010; 
Sexton & Dugas, 2009) and has been identified as a core psychological substrate of 
multiple affective disorders (Carleton, 2012, 2016; Einstein, 2014; Shihata, McEvoy, 
Mullan, & Carleton, 2016), with a particular focus on how it relates to GAD and 
potentially facilitates the development of pathological worry that underlies the disorder 
(Deschênes, Dugas, & Gouin, 2016; Dugas et al., 2004; Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). 
IU is still a relatively new variable in terms of formal empirical investigation 
using conditioning techniques, and fear conditioning investigations of IU are limited. As 
with trait anxiety, findings are mixed and somewhat contradictory, but in this case, there 
are explanations that help to somewhat resolve these inconsistencies. First, in line with 
conceptualizations of IU as predicting sensitivity to uncertainty, significant effects for IU 
have been found when measuring fear acquisition to cues with uncertain signal value or 
measuring fear response in a period of experimentally-controlled uncertainty (Chin et al., 
2016; Morriss, 2019; Morriss, Saldarini, Chapman, Pollard, & van Reekum, 2019; 
Nelson & Shankman, 2011). Unfortunately, these findings contradict each other in terms 
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of directionality and/or strength of the associations. To further complicate interpretation, 
other studies have not found any significant IU differences during unpredictable 
conditions or in response to unpredictable/ ambiguous cues (S. Chen, Yao, & Qian, 2018; 
Dunsmoor, Campese, Ceceli, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2015; Morriss, Saldarini, & Reekum, 
2018; Morriss & van Reekum, 2019). Finally, another set of findings are consistent with 
predictions then when threat/danger is certain, IU effects will not be present (Morriss, 
Christakou, & Reekum, 2015; Morriss, Christakou, & van Reekum, 2016), although this 
also is somewhat contradicted by findings from Chen et al. (2018), who find that IU is 
associated with increased worry during a period of certain threat. Overall, these 
discordant results are possibly explained by the considable methodological heterogenity 
that is present in these studies and, as discussed in the previous section about trait 
anxiety, can have substantial and, problematically, idiosyncratic influences on results 
(Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). In this case, likely culprits are differences in the US used (e.g., 
shock vs aversive tone), differences resulting from use of paradigms using cue-based 
conditioning vs those using context based-conditioning or negative affect eliciting 
procedures, variability in the IU self-report measure used, or differences in fear 
measurement method (e.g., SCR vs behavioral report). It should also be noted that 
although IU effects on fear acquisition are not consistent, there is somewhat more 
homogeneity in results during fear extinction, a process which potentially maps on the IU 
construct more cleanly (Morriss et al., 2018; Morriss & van Reekum, 2019). 
 At present, there is one study of IU and fear generalization, in which a negative 
relationship between Prospective IU (an IU subscale), and overgeneralization as indexed 
by electrocortical response (EEG measured event-related potentials [ERP]); a behavioral 
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index and IU were not related (Nelson, Weinberg, Pawluk, Gawlowska, & Proudfit, 
2014). This finding is explained by noting that the ERP measured, the late positive 
potential, is sensitive to sustained attention towards affectively arousing stimuli, differs 
from common fear measures. Accordingly, this analysis potentially captured those with 
higher Prospective IU exhibiting a more adaptive discrimination process that results in 
attenuated generalization. There is also only one study of IU and instrumental avoidance 
(Flores, López, Vervliet, & Cobos, 2018). This study also found results with Prospective 
IU in particular, as it was associated with increased avoidance rate during the 
instrumental conditioning period. Taken together, the considerable heterogeneity of IU 
results leads to hesitation in making strong conclusions based on the existing data. At 
present, it appears that Prospective IU might be more sensitive to experimental 
conditioning manipulations and perhaps is related to fear generalization and avoidance, 
but further research is clearly needed. At this time, the main conceptual link between IU 
and heightened generalization is related to the assertion that the GSs communicate threat 
uncertainty. Also of relevance is that GAD has been linked to overgeneralized fear (e.g., 
Lissek et al., 2014), which might indicate IU would be related to fear generalization as 
well given the higher levels of IU observed in the disorder. 
Anxiety sensitivity. 
 Anxiety sensitivity (AS) reflects the individual tendency to consider anxiety and 
fear related sensations as threatening and is sometimes termed “fear of fear” (Reiss, 
Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). As with IU, there is an established association 
between trait anxiety and AS (McNally, 1989; Sandin, Chorot, & McNally, 2001), as 
well as an association between AS and IU itself (Allan et al., 2017; Fergus & Bardeen, 
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2013). There has been some contention in the field around the construct validity of AS 
and if it represents a separate construct from trait anxiety (Lilienfeld, 1997; Lilienfeld, 
Jacob, & Turner, 1989; Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1993) or if it is a highly-related but 
distinguishable construct (McNally, 1989; Peterson & Heilbronner, 1987; S. Taylor, 
1996). The most consistent claim for AS as a separate construct is based around its 
specificity towards somatic and physiological sensations of anxiety or those related to 
anxiety (Joiner Jr et al., 1999; Ocañez, McHugh, & Otto, 2010; Schmidt & Joiner, 2002; 
Sturges, Goetsch, Ridley, & Whittal, 1998) and its differential relationship to anxiety 
disorders when compared with trait anxiety (Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Olatunji & 
Wolitzky-Taylor, 2009), with AS demonstrating particular relevance as a pathogenic 
mechanism contributing to panic disorder (McNally, 2002; Poletti et al., 2015; Schmidt, 
1999).  
 At present, AS is the least studied of the reviewed narrowband normative 
individual differences in the context of fear conditioning, with only a single study 
relevant to the current review (Forsyth, Palav, & Duff, 1999). In this study, Forsyth and 
colleagues (1999) tested a trichotomized sample (high/medium/low AS) using a CO2 
inhalation for the US to specifically probe AS-related responses that were paired in a 
conditioning procedure with brief movie clips of negative or neutral valence. The authors 
did not find significant differences between AS groups on physiological indices, which is 
potentially explained by a confound in conditioning procedure: the CSs differed in 
valence and relevance to interoceptive vs exteroceptive anxiety sensations, which 
potentially activated a covariation bias (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Tomarken, 
Mineka, & Cook, 1989) that was a stronger influence than the AS-specific manipulation 
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of CO2 inhalation and thus obscured AS group effects. Another explanation lies in the 
recurring theme of artificial categorization of a continuous trait complicates statistical 
testing and inference, with this being a particular problem with trichotomization due to it 
introducing another potentially arbitrary cut point over median-split techniques (Zedeck, 
1971). 
 To our knowledge, there are no available studies of AS and conditioned fear or 
instrumental avoidance generalization. In terms of other fear-or threat-related avoidance 
measured using other paradigms, a small selection of studies provide some insight, with 
significant findings of higher AS associated with greater avoidance of spider images 
(Lebowitz, Shic, Campbell, Basile, & Silverman, 2015) and risky-decisions (Broman-
Fulks, Urbaniak, Bondy, & Toomey, 2014). There are also correlational and latent factor 
studies that find positive associations between AS and self-reported measures of 
behavioral avoidance (e.g., Asmundson & Taylor, 1996; Wilson & Hayward, 2006). 
Taken together, there is preliminary evidence that AS is related to overall avoidance of 
aversive stimuli and situations, but conclusions related to conditioned fear or avoidance, 
generalized or not, are not possible at this time. One possible exception is that it is 
reasonable to predict AS is associated with fear generalization based on findings of 
overgeneralized fear in panic disorder (Lissek et al., 2010). 
Broadband normative individual differences. 
Neuroticism. 
 One of the most commonly identified and psychometrically stable traits from the 
personality literature, Neuroticism (or Emotional Stability) reflects a dispositional 
tendency towards experiencing negative affect, such as anxiety and depression, (Cattell & 
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Scheier, 1961; Widiger, 2009) and is part of the widely used and studied Big Five 
taxonomy10 that organizes personality variance into five broad traits (Fiske, 1949; 
Goldberg, 1981; McCrae & Costa, 1987). Neuroticism is perhaps the personality trait 
most associated with psychopathology (Kotov et al., 2010; Lamers, Westerhof, Kovács, 
& Bohlmeijer, 2012; Malouff et al., 2005; Ormel et al., 2013), and is notable as the only 
Big Five trait that is typically keyed in the maladaptive/negative direction. It is also the 
broadband personality trait that over time has been the most frequently included as a 
predictor of interest in conditioning studies (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017) and was central to 
early prominent theories as to why some people conditioned more readily or to a greater 
degree than others (Eysenck, 1970; Pavlov, 1927; J. B. Watson & Rayner, 1920). In some 
ways, Neuroticism (somewhat aligned with the concept of neurosis, per the Freudian 
tradition, earlier in the 20th century) was the focal individual difference for human fear 
conditioning research for most of its early history as an experimental area (H. J. Eysenck, 
1962, 1979; Franks, 1956).  
 In terms of findings from more modern conditioning paradigms (e.g., 
discrimination learning paradigms), results are mixed, with the majority of studies 
finding no association between Neuroticism and differential fear conditioning (for 
review, see Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). This notably includes studies using physiological 
measurement (e.g., Hur, Iordan, Berenbaum, & Dolcos, 2016; Martínez et al., 2012; Otto 
et al., 2007; Pineles, Vogt, & Orr, 2009), behavioral ratings (e.g., Arnaudova, Krypotos, 
 
 
10 It should be noted that the Neuroticism factor was found in studies that predate the modern inventories 
and usage of the term Big Five, starting with seminal work by Thurstone (1934), and that alternative 
structures to the Big Five also contain Neuroticism factors (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Lee, Ogunfowora, & 
Ashton, 2005). For the purposes of this dissertation, we will consistently limit ourselves to the Big Five 
framework when discussing Neuroticism, as well as other traits that comprise the Big Five. 
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Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2017; Lommen, Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010; Tzschoppe 
et al., 2014), and/or neuroimaging (e.g., Panitz et al., 2018; Tzschoppe et al., 2014) and 
also includes studies using relatively large samples (e.g., N = 217; Pineles, Vogt, & Orr, 
2009). The few studies finding a positive association between Neuroticism and fear 
acquisition typically find complex effects that require substantial inference and 
qualification, such as a finding related to a specific subscale (facet) of Neuroticism 
(Pineles et al., 2009) or a similar construct (Gazendam et al., 2014), being conditional on 
other experimental or quasi-experimental factors (e.g., executive load, Hur, Iordan, 
Berenbaum, & Dolcos, 2016; presence of dopamine-related polymorphism, Panitz et al., 
2018), or found to be a non-significant predictor when controlling for other conceptually 
similar variables (Sjouwerman et al., 2018).  
 To our knowledge there is only one study of the Neuroticism trait in the context 
of a fear generalization paradigm (Arnaudova, Krypotos, et al., 2017). In this study, 
Arnaudova et al. (2017) did not find an effect of Neuroticism on levels of fear 
generalization. Of note, this was a relatively small sample (N = 58) that was 
dichotomized into high and low Neuroticism groups, which creates additional concern 
about interpretations based on these data (Altman & Royston, 2006). 
 Both the previously cited study by Arnaudova et al. (2017) and one other study 
that predated the Arnaudova study, used similar methods, and also dichotomized 
Neuroticism into high/low groups in a relatively small sample (N = 55; Lommen, 
Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010), provide results related to Neuroticism and 
generalized instrumental avoidance. Only Lommen et al. (2010) found a significant effect 
of Neuroticism, with those higher on Neuroticism demonstrated increased generalized 
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avoidance. This result was not replicated in Arnuadova et al. (2017). Although both of 
these studies contain the procedural components needed to assess APIC-G, neither report 
relevant results. Overall, these results seem to offer, at best, a modest endorsement of 
Neuroticism as a predictor of generalized avoidance. 
Extraversion. 
Conceptualized as another core personality trait and part of the Big Five (Costa & 
McCrae, 1980; Quilty, DeYoung, Oakman, & Bagby, 2014), Extraversion refers to a 
dispositional tendency towards approach and sociability. Although frequently referred to, 
both in scientific studies and in the media, as a being a social domain, Extraversion can 
be conceptualized as capturing general approach and reward tendencies and correlates 
strongly with questionnaires that explicitly measure those constructs (e.g., Carver & 
White, 1994; DeYoung, Weisberg, Quilty, & Peterson, 2013; Gomez, Cooper, & Gomez, 
2005; Quilty, DeYoung, Oakman, & Bagby, 2014; Smits & Boeck, 2006). Lower levels 
of Extraversion (introversion) are frequently observed as a correlate of internalizing 
psychopathology (Kotov et al., 2010; Naragon-Gainey, Watson, & Markon, 2009; D. 
Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2014; D. Watson, Stasik, Ellickson-Larew, & Stanton, 
2015). Extraversion was a particular focus of earlier conditioning theories that revolved 
around the assertion that those low on Extraversion (i.e., high on introversion) were 
particularly vulnerable to fear and anxiety and would more readily condition (Davidson, 
Payne, & Sloane, 1964; H. J. Eysenck, 1979; J. A. Gray, 1972; Kelly & Martin, 1969). 
Modern conditioning studies that have tested Extraversion as an individual 
difference variable of interest are extremely limited, and there are no available fear 
generalization or avoidance (generalized or otherwise) studies. One differential fear 
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conditioning study with an explicitly exploratory aim did not find an overall effect of 
Extraversion on fear acquisition, but instead found a number of effects related to narrow 
subscales (facets) of Extraversion (Pineles et al., 2009). Specifically, those lower on a 
“warmth” or “activity” facets showed maintenance of the fear response. Two other 
studies using a differential fear learning task replicated the overall Extraversion null 
result; facets were not tested (Martínez et al., 2012; Otto et al., 2007). Although the role 
of reward and positive affect has been clearly linked to Pavlovian fear conditioning 
models using experimental manipulations (e.g., Casa, Mena, Ruiz-Salas, Quintero, & 
Papini, 2018; Pittig & Dehler, 2018; Pittig, Hengen, Bublatzky, & Alpers, 2018), it 
appears that at present there is very weak to no evidence for an association between 
Extraversion and fear conditioning (and, adhering to the aphorism that “absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence”, it is not possible to confirm this as a “true” null 
finding at this time; Altman & Bland, 1995). A potentially compelling explanation for 
this, besides the relative lack of research in the area overall, is that previous studies have 
not included reward-related variables, most notably approach-avoidance elements, that 
might “activate” the significant effect of Extraversion in fear conditioning studies 
(Aupperle et al., 2011; Pittig, Hengen, et al., 2018; Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018). 
Conscientiousness. 
 The third Big Five trait of relevance to the current study, Conscientiousness refers 
to the dispositional tendency towards order, discipline, and goal-orientation (Roberts, 
Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005; Roberts, Lejuez, Krueger, Richards, & Hill, 
2014). Extreme levels of Conscientiousness have been linked to the presence of 
psychopathology (Hewitt & Flett, 2007; Roberts, Jackson, Burger, & Trautwein, 2009; 
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Samuel & Widiger, 2011), with high levels of Conscientiousness-related traits and/or 
perfectionism linked to elevation on an obsessive-compulsive spectrum of pathology 
(e.g., Carter, Guan, Maples, Williamson, & Miller, 2016; Hopwood, Schade, Krueger, 
Wright, & Markon, 2013; L. C. Morey et al., 2002; Samuel & Widiger, 2011), although it 
should also be noted that the OCD diagnosis itself is, somewhat paradoxically, related to 
lower Conscientiousness (e.g., Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Rector, Hood, 
Richter, & Bagby, 2002; Wu, Clark, & Watson, 2006), which has been posited to reflect 
that although there is a tendency towards rigidity and orderliness in those with OCD, 
actual productivity and achievement is severely impacted and therefore reflected in 
overall Conscientiousness scores. 
Like Extraversion, prior work on the trait in relation to fear conditioning is scarce 
and there are no studies of fear generalization or instrumental avoidance. To our 
knowledge, the only available and reported11 fear conditioning results related to 
Conscientiousness are in the same studies that also tested Extraversion using a Big Five 
measure (Martínez et al., 2012; Pineles et al., 2009). In Pineles et al. (2009), an overall 
effect of Conscientiousness was not found, but several facets were related to fear 
conditioning variables. Those higher on “dutifulness” and “order” showed attenuated fear 
responses, whereas those high on “self-discipline” demonstrated potentiated fear 
responding. In contrast to the overall null effect of Conscientiousness found in Pineles et 
al. (2009), the study conducted by Martínez et al. (2012) found trait Conscientiousness 
was negatively associated with differential fear conditioning; this is consistent with some 
 
 
11 Otto et al. (2007) report using the full NEO Five Factory Inventory in their study, but only reported 
Extraversion and Neuroticism results in their manuscript. 
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of the facet-level findings from Pineles et al. (2009). Taken together, there appears to be 
preliminary evidence that Conscientiousness buffers against acquisition of conditioned 
fear, and this is perhaps driven by lower-level facets. Interestingly, a sizable amount of 
fear conditioning research, including generalization research, has been published on the 
effect of self-defined “rules” and experimenter-defined instructions as they pertain to 
conditioning phenomena (e.g., Ahmed & Lovibond, 2018; Boddez, Bennett, van Esch, & 
Beckers, 2016; Duits et al., 2017; Mertens & De Houwer, 2016; Wong & Lovibond, 
2017) and has found different learning effects depending on differences in these two 
constructs, suggesting the possible differences in Conscientiousness are associated with 
these effects and therefore the trait has a larger effect on fear conditioning processes than 
previously thought. 
Interim summary of normative broadband and narrowband individual 
differences. 
 Overall, the relative scarcity and heterogeneity of research in normative 
individual differences does not lend itself to strong conclusions. There appears to be 
some viable signal slightly rising about the noise, as some studies, especially those with 
larger sample sizes (e.g., N > 150; Flores, López, Vervliet, & Cobos, 2018; Martínez et 
al., 2012; Pineles, Vogt, & Orr, 2009), have found significant associations between these 
individual differences and fear conditioning variables. Further, there is some evidence of 
a positive association between negative affect related narrowband traits (trait anxiety, IU) 
and heightened responding to stimuli with ambiguous or safe signal values (e.g., Chin, 
Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016; Gazendam, Kamphuis, & Kindt, 2013; Haaker et al., 
2015; Haddad, Pritchett, Lissek, & Lau, 2012; Kindt & Soeter, 2014; Morriss, Saldarini, 
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Chapman, Pollard, & van Reekum, 2019), which provides some evidence that these traits 
are positively related to fear generalization. However, at present it is most reasonable to 
conclude that the bulk of the research in this area has yet to be conducted. This is 
especially true for studies of instrumental avoidance, which at this point in time consists 
mainly of two studies using largely identical paradigms with results that contradict each 
other. Given the current state of the literature, it appears investigators are still mainly in 
the “exploratory” phase, as opposed to the “confirmatory” phase of the scientific research 
process (Jebb, Parrigon, & Woo, 2017; van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016), which is also 
a sentiment that is discussed by Pineles et al. (2009) and contributes their conclusion that 
the personality and conditioning relationship is a complex one that still requires 
considerable additional research. This is particularly true for traits that are not 
conceptualized as primarily reflecting negative affect (e.g., Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion) that can be reasonably expected to influence approach-avoidance conflict, 
and therefore generalization processes during these conflicts, but have not been studied at 
all. We also contend that this represents a myopic view in which investigators are 
attempting to conduct studies with negative affect traits that have face-valid relevance to 
internalizing psychopathology, yet ignoring variables that are certainly related to 
internalizing psychopathology but are not as obvious a target of study as the negative 
affect variables. 
 As a next step towards confirmatory hypothesis testing and a more consistent 
approach to examining normative individual differences testing in fear conditioning, we 
support the recommendations made by Lonsdorf and Merz (2017) in regards to 
standardization of methodology (also see Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 
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2013; Lissek, Pine, & Grillon, 2006; Lonsdorf et al., 2017). The following four factors 
appear to be the most important inconsistencies or problematic decisions to address: 1) 
transforming inherently dimensional data into categorical creates numerous problems, 
including those related to statistical inference (Altman & Royston, 2006) and 
inconsistencies in cut-scores and group ranges (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017); 2) relatively 
small sample sizes that are underpowered for detecting the relatively modest effects that 
are found in psychological science research (Lattin, Carroll, & Green, 2003; Lykken, 
1968; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001), especially those relationship measured across different 
measurement methods (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Kozak & Miller, 1982; Lang, 
Levin, Miller, & Kozak, 1983), and potentially lead to overinterpretation of unstable, 
sample-specific effects (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Fiedler, 2011); 3) 
continued usage of univariate approaches (i.e., only using one individual difference as a 
predictor or conducting separate models for each predictor without also including an 
omnibus multivariate test) that do not take advantage of multivariate statistical techniques 
to sharpen or control for interacting effects between individual differences measures 
(Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017; Sjouwerman et al., 2018); and relatedly, 4) inconsistent usage 
of different individual difference measures and, with two exceptions (Gazendam et al., 
2014; Pineles et al., 2009), an apparent lack of empirical interest in applying measures 
that capture hierarchical variance structures which capture individual differences of 
interest at different levels (e.g., personality traits and facets) and can provide insight into 
broad vs. specific individual difference influences on fear conditioning processes within a 
single study. The lack of sophisticated individual difference measurement and 
corresponding advanced statistical methodology is particularly notable and likely 
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problematic given copious research showing the substantial advantages in using 
hierarchical and empirically-derived multidimensional personality systems to quantify 
human variance, amongst them improved prediction of behavior and stronger links to 
biological substrates and meaningful clinical correlates (e.g., Corr & Matthews, 2009; 
DeYoung et al., 2010; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; Goldberg, 1999; Kotov et al., 
2017; Paunonen, 1998; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). Additionally, lack of standardization 
regarding experimental parameters and quantification of experimental outcome variables 
(e.g., differences in how startle EMG is quantified can lead to different predictive 
validity, statistical testing power, and/or interpretations; (Bach et al., 2018; Bradford, 
Kaye, & Curtin, 2014) might contribute to inconsistent replication and increased 
heterogeneity of findings that hinder synthesis in the area. 
Individual difference variables with potential relations to generalization 
variables. 
 Beyond the individual difference variables discussed previously, there are a 
number of candidate individual differences that, to this point, have not been tested as 
predictors of fear or avoidance conditioning. These variables represent potentially 
meaningful sources of variation in APIC and its constituent processes, either due to 
measuring relatively unstudied sources of variation (e.g., pathological manifestations of 
personality variables) or measuring established individual differences variables with 
different techniques that result in more refined or nuanced data. Candidate variables that 
are relevant to the current study are discussed below, with a focus on establishing what is 
unique about these variables compared to those currently employed in generalization 
studies. 
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Dimensional pathological individual differences. 
 There is considerable evidence that normative personality measures also capture 
pathological variance (e.g., Mahaffey, Watson, Clark, & Kotov, 2016; Watson & 
Naragon-Gainey, 2014), and preliminary evidence suggests that these measures are 
sensitive enough to link certain normative traits with conditioning abnormalities (e.g., 
Gazendam et al., 2014; Martínez et al., 2012; Pineles, Vogt, & Orr, 2009). However, 
measures that specifically target pathological variance (i.e., the tails of the normal 
distribution assessed by the normative personality measures) offer multiple benefits over 
normative measures, including broadening the range of the predictor being tested (which 
likely reduces potential ceiling effects in the normative personality measures, with the 
likely exception of Neuroticism; e.g., Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2014 ) and 
incorporation of more unusual or lower base-rate behaviors and internal processes that 
are relatively rare in the general or even clinical population (e.g., moral/sexual/religious 
obsessions; Fullana et al., 2010; Haslam, Williams, Kyrios, McKay, & Taylor, 2005; or 
visual hallucinations; e.g., Johns & van Os, 2001; Stefanis et al., 2002). That said, the 
most commonly used measures of pathological personality (e.g., MMPI, PAI) might have 
been designed to be somewhat too attuned to clinical problems, or contain too much 
content that is keyed to specific categorical clinical disorders, for ideal use outside of 
clinical populations and perhaps have a floor effect (for discussion of this issue, see Costa 
& McCrae, 1992; Krueger & Markon, 2014; Samuel, Simms, Clark, Livesley, & 
Widiger, 2010). This suggests there is a need for measures that capture a higher upper 
limit than normative measures while maintaining sensitivity to the lower limits of the 
range and ensuring that low base-rate symptoms are not overrepresented in item content 
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(i.e., obtaining a distribution that, although skewed, maintains substantial density towards 
the lower end of the trait). Fortunately, this type of measure aligns closely with a 
(relatively) recently invigorated push towards dimensional classification of 
psychopathology (e.g., Hopwood et al., 2018; Kotov et al., 2017). Currently used 
instruments of this type have yielded important candidate variables for fear and 
avoidance generalization studies, including higher order internalizing traits such as 
Negative Affectivity/Negative Emotionality/Emotional Dysregulation with strong fear, 
anxiety, and distress components, as well as other traits that might be related to increased 
and potentially maladaptive approach under threat, such as 
Disinhibition/(Dis)constraint/(low) Inhibitedness (Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, 
& Skodol, 2012; Kushner, Quilty, Tackett, & Bagby, 2011; Simms et al., 2011). The 
advantages of using these types of instruments to measure these dimensions is that they 
can be used in an assumed normative population (e.g., undergraduates, general 
community members) without extensive concern regarding range-restriction or zero-
inflation. It should be also noted that although the cited measures and studies mainly 
reflect efforts to measure personality disorders using a dimensional approach, these 
measures and the conclusions from studies employing them are quite valid when applied 
to other forms of psychopathology (as well as when considering the issue from the point 
of view that there is no viable distinction between personality disorders and other forms 
of psychopathology (L. A. Clark, 2005; Kotov et al., 2017; Krueger & Markon, 2014; 
Widiger & Shea, 1991). Overall, these types of variables show great promise for APIC 
investigations given the breadth of pathological variance measured and the interest in 
pathological manifestations of APIC from an etiology and intervention standpoint and 
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can be conceptualized as extensions of the normative variables that are already employed 
in the area. 
Lower-level personality variables. 
 Part of the appeal of applying personality methods to the study of fear 
conditioning phenomena is the broad coverage of variance and content without creating 
an unrealistic burden for participants, as well as potential reliability and validity issues, 
through administration of many narrowband measures for a variety of disparate content 
areas. A potential drawback of using personality methods is if measurement is only 
conducted at the trait level of personality, which is perhaps too far removed from the 
fine-grained psychological and neurobiological substrates of experimentally induced fear 
conditioning processes12. A viable solution to this issue is to consider that personality 
structure is naturally hierarchical (Costa & McCrae, 1995; DeYoung, 2006; McCrae et 
al., 2008) and to use measures that provide viable measurements at different levels of the 
hierarchy. If considering the “trait” level (e.g., Big Five traits) as the relative anchor or 
center that we then use define other levels of the hierarchy, then those representing a 
broader superordinate set of factors are “higher-level” (DeYoung, 2006; Digman, 1997) 
and, most importantly for this endeavor, those more narrow factors that are subordinate to 
the traits are “lower-level” (Costa & McCrae, 1995; Goldberg, 1999). 
 Lower-level personality variables can vary in degree of specificity (i.e., how far 
down the hierarchy they are in relation to traits), with some of the most common 
narrowband measures that focus on symptoms of specific disorders perhaps representing 
 
 
12 The author is making a general statement that and is not explicitly referring to or intending to remind the 
reader of the person-situation debate (e.g., Mischel, 1977), nor implying that personality psychology is not 
applicable to experimental (situational) psychology.  
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one of the lowest levels of personality (Clara, Cox, & Enns, 2003; Kotov et al., 2017; 
Markon et al., 2005; Widiger et al., 2019). In terms of commonly studied lower-levels of 
personality, the most relevant ones here are aspects (DeYoung et al., 2007) and facets 
(Goldberg, 1999), with facets representing a specific type of content that is part of a trait 
(e.g., as mentioned previously, Warmth is a facet of Extraversion on some scales), and 
aspects are below traits and contain a subset of facets within them. These lower-level 
variables might be more refined predictors of fear conditioning processes than the traits, 
especially considering that traits include aspects or facets that might interact with other 
aspects or traits within the same trait, and that these interactions might be more 
informative than the individual univariate relationships. For example, Neuroticism is 
frequently identified as having both strong anxious and depressive elements (Barlow, 
Ellard, Sauer-Zavala, Bullis, & Carl, 2014; Barlow et al., 2013; L. A. Clark & Watson, 
1991; D. Watson, 2005). In some cases, these parts of Neuroticism work synergistically 
to produce an effect (e.g., increased substance use and poorer health outcomes; e.g., 
Burns & Teesson, 2002; Mykletun, Overland, Aarø, Liabø, & Stewart, 2008; Sartorius, 
Üstün, Lecrubier, & Wittchen, 1996), whereas in other cases they differentially relate to a 
criterion (e.g., mortality, positive affect, or approach behavior; L. A. Clark & Watson, 
1991; Mykletun et al., 2009; Shankman & Klein, 2003). When modeled separately from 
Neuroticism in a multivariate model, these effects can be clarified, but when modeling 
only the Neuroticism trait it is impossible to disentangle the distinct contributions of 
anxiety and depression. This is particularly notable for fear conditioning given that 
anxiety is consistently linked with fear conditioning abnormalities, whereas depression is 
not (e.g., Dibbets, Broek, & Evers, 2015; Jovanovic et al., 2010), and there is evidence of 
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a “dampening” effect in depression physiology (e.g., Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 
2008; Sloan & Sandt, 2010) that can attenuate the signal in common fear conditioning 
measures, such as startle EMG or skin conductance. Thus, if Neuroticism is assumed as a 
marker of anxiety and entered in a model, but depression is not modeled (“covaried out”), 
false negatives (type II error) are more likely because the depression variance within the 
trait might “wash out” the anxiety signal. 
 Even when including multiple lower-level variables instead of a single higher-
level trait there are potential statistical effects that affect interpretation and potentially 
offer added explanatory power. For example, DeYoung and colleagues (2007) established 
that two aspects (lower-level factors located between traits and facets in a hierarchical 
model) of Conscientiousness, termed Industriousness (tendency towards productivity, 
focus, and goal-oriented) and Orderliness (tendency towards control and rule-following), 
are differentially associated with Neuroticism when calculating zero-order correlations: 
Industriousness is significantly anticorrelated with Neuroticism, and Orderliness has 
almost zero correlation. However, when including both in the same model predicting 
Neuroticism, Orderliness was now significantly correlated with Neuroticism. This is an 
example of a suppression effect, in which two positively-related variables are differently 
related to a third variable, but these relationships are potentially suppressed in simple 
bivariate procedures (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Paulhus, Robins, 
Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Put another way, the shared source of variance between 
the two predictors needs to be controlled for before the unique relationships for each 
predictor emerge.  
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 Again, the use of lower-order personality traits is an attractive compromise for 
fear conditioning studies, as they balance resolution with generalizability. They might be 
particularly well-suited for studies of fear and avoidance generalization because these 
processes are naturally more complex than basic discrimination learning and therefore 
use more complex laboratory tasks with an increased number or depth of experimental 
parameters, and the lower-level traits can be more easily operationalized in terms of 
behavior and adaptations to specific situations (e.g., DeYoung, 2015; DeYoung & 
Krueger, 2018; Jackson et al., 2010). Further, it might be a de facto necessity to use 
lower-order traits in this type of research if aiming to inform future research on anxiety- 
and trauma-related pathology, as the higher-order traits (e.g., Neuroticism) lump together 
variance that needs to be split out (e.g., anxiety, depression) to usefully inform the 
development of etiological models and treatments for this pathology. 
Trait fear as a complementary construct to trait anxiety. 
  As noted previously, trait anxiety13 has dominated the individual differences 
work in the fear conditioning field, and results are mixed. A possible explanation lies in 
the assertion that the trait anxiety construct is too broad to be useful and that measures of 
trait anxiety are prone to capturing depression-related variance: the strength of the trait 
anxiety signal is not strong enough to overcome the noise inherent to the measure, 
particularly when it is the anxiety-specific variance that is the basis for hypotheses 
regarding fear conditioning constructs. To further complicate the issue, even the term 
 
 
13 We acknowledge that “trait anxiety” is purportedly measured by different instruments and therefore 
operationalized slightly differently depending on the measure used. We continue to use the previously 
stated definition of “disposition towards experiencing anxiety in the moment” that is most commonly 
associated with Spielberger and colleagues’ (1983) definition and associated questionnaire, the STAI. 
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“anxiety” is problematic in this context. There is considerable variability in terms of how 
people, both lay and scientific expert, define anxiety (trait or not) and the related 
construct of fear (Joseph E. LeDoux, 2017; N. McNaughton, 2011; Perusini & Fanselow, 
2015; Shackman & Fox, 2016; D. Watson, Stanton, & Clark, 2017), with some 
differentiating between the two terms and some using them interchangeably to the point 
that they are synonyms for each other (Gaylin, 1979; N. McNaughton, 2011). This 
problematically affects both how participants respond to trait anxiety questions (with 
items on the same scale that indiscriminately include the words fear, anxiety, worry, 
stress, terror, etc. and might be  prone to significant error due to idiographic 
interpretations of those words) and how researchers conceptualize, implement, and 
interpret their studies of trait anxiety. In short, trait anxiety to some might not be trait 
anxiety to all. 
Taken together, trait anxiety (as conceptualized in the majority of current 
empirical research) is rife with construct validity issues (as classically defined by 
Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) and does not appear to be a useful construct as it pertains to 
conditioning studies. That said, regardless of how they are defined (or if defined as a 
single construct), there is clearly a need to accurately and usefully measure what people 
commonly refer to as anxiety and fear using a transdiagnostic, dimensional approach – it 
just needs to be a measurement that does not hinge on continued reification of a flawed 
trait anxiety construct. Thus, an alternative or modification to the trait anxiety construct 
and its measurement is needed.  
One proposal is to subdivide trait anxiety into empirically-supported factors that 
map more closely to the specific experiences referred to as anxiety, such as somatic vs 
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cognitive experiences (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007; Ree, French, MacLeod, 
& Locke, 2008). Another proposal is to use an undifferentiated term of “anxiety and fear” 
when referring to the general concept and for more precise discussion to move towards 
taking a more granular view of these constructs and when possible define them in terms 
of the specific threat processes and conditions (Shackman et al., 2016; Shackman & Fox, 
2016). Finally, another proposal has been to formally distinguish between trait anxiety 
and trait fear by clarifying the behavioral, neurobiological, and clinical properties of each 
and to use these as referents for future operationalization (Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & 
LaPrairie, 2011). The proposed solutions are not necessarily incompatible with each other 
and all three likely represent important steps forward for the field – however, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, we continue discussion with a focus on the third solution of 
separately measuring trait fear.  
Trait fear, as measured separately from trait anxiety, is generally defined as a 
disposition to react defensively and experience subjective distress in response to an acute 
threat (Perkins, Cooper, Abdelall, Smillie, & Corr, 2010; Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 
2011); this also helps define trait anxiety by defining it as reaction to an uncertain or 
distal threat. It should also be noted that there are differences in how scientists 
specifically define and operationalize trait fear, especially in regards to what is defined as 
a lack of fear (e.g., Kramer et al., 2019; Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 2011) or how 
approach behavior relates to the construct (N. McNaughton, 2011; Perkins et al., 2010), 
but that the provided definition represents a conceptual overlap. Most importantly, the 
trait fear construct appears to capture variance that is conceptually related to and might 
predict fear conditioning processes: fear conditioning paradigms using cue-based 
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manipulations (e.g., a CS+ or CS- visual stimulus) create acute threat conditions that are 
proposed as the situation in which trait fear differences emerge. Further, those higher on 
trait fear would be expected to show greater fear generalization, as trait fear represents a 
probabilistic tendency to react fearfully when controlling for situation (i.e., lower 
threshold), and therefore those higher on the trait would have a lower threshold for 
reacting to GSs. Finally, trait fear is conceptualized as not only an index of internal 
responsivity but also of behavioral tendency (e.g., escape; Perkins, Cooper, Abdelall, 
Smillie, & Corr, 2010) and would be expected to correlate with avoidance tendencies in 
instrumental conditioning paradigms. Based on these assumptions, it follows that trait 
fear is a dimension with great appeal for APIC research, and might be a “cleaner” signal 
of the negative affect that underlies generalized fear and avoidance than trait anxiety or a 
higher order trait such as Neuroticism. 
Methodology of Individual Differences 
Conceptual rationale for a dimensional individual differences approach. 
 Drawing from our conclusions from the previous sections, it is clear that more a 
refined individual differences approach is necessary to push forward fear conditioning 
science. As previously stated, there are many benefits to this approach. Instead of 
rehashing this point, we turn briefly to a conceptual rationale for incorporating 
dimensional individual differences-based approaches into fear conditioning work, and 
generalization work in particular. This rationale is based on 1) current prominent 
frameworks in the psychopathology field and 2) historical calls for the integration of the 
individual differences and experimental psychology subfields.  
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The relatively recent introduction of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) by the 
National Institute of Mental Health (RDoC; Insel et al., 2010) has shifted research 
priorities towards a series of conceptually-linked systems (e.g., Negative Valence) that 
contain multiple constructs (e.g., Acute Threat, Potential Threat) measured across 
multiple units of analysis (e.g., circuits, physiology, behavior), with an emphasis on 
neurobiological or neurobiologically-linked measures (National Institute of Mental 
Health, 2016), and away from the DSM framework that (problematically) classifies 
psychopathology using expert-determined categorical categories (L. A. Clark, Cuthbert, 
Lewis-Fernández, Narrow, & Reed, 2017; Krueger, Hopwood, Wright, & Markon, 2014). 
This focus nominally benefits fear conditioning research given the focus on brain-based 
models of Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (H. Kim, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 
2006; J. J. Kim & Jung, 2006; Maren, 2001). However, linking the RDoC constructs to 
meaningful measures of variation in human behavior, particularly pathological variation, 
will be difficult without improved individual differences methodology (Krueger et al., 
2014; Lilienfeld, 2014; Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017; Patrick et al., 2013a; Shackman et al., 
2016; Shackman & Fox, 2018; Shackman & Wager, 2019). 
Since the early 1950s, scientists have identified a tradition of “two disciplines” in 
psychological science research, in which the “correlation scientist” is concerned with the 
covariation of a wide number of descriptive variables in a large sample and discounts 
within-subject processes, and the “experimental scientist” views these variables as 
“error” in their goal of carefully controlling an experiment (while habitually 
underestimating the difficulty of true experimental control; Lykken, 1991) to observe a 
differences between conditions or groups that provide insights on a specific mechanism 
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(Cronbach, 1957, 1975). This conflict has been noted in more recent reviews and studies 
as hindering scientific progress, (e.g., Patrick et al., 2013; Patrick & Hajcak, 2016; 
Yancey, Venables, & Patrick, 2016), including those from fear conditioning researchers 
(Gazendam et al., 2014; Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). with the most notable effect of this 
conflict being incompatible or ambiguous interpretations for groups of studies that 
purportedly measure the same constructs but use very different approaches (e.g., studies 
of the anhedonia component of PTSD have very different results depending on if they are 
from the individual differences, (e.g., Armour et al., 2015), or experimental tradition 
(Nawijn et al., 2015).  
Statistical rationale for a dimensional individual differences approach. 
 One of, if not the greatest, barriers to wide-spread implementation of a 
dimensional individual differences approach to the study of fear conditioning is that it 
would require a shift to new statistical methodology. We start with identifying what 
makes the current statistical paradigm in the field unsuitable to individual difference. At 
present, the workhorse analytic technique for the fear conditioning field (and a good 
percentage of experimental studies in psychology overall) is analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and techniques from the ANOVA family (ANCOVA, MANCOVA), 
particularly repeated-measures ANOVA (rmANOVA). As the standard ANOVA 
framework is fundamentally a test of mean differences, it is a natural fit for experimental 
work and factorial structures. Repeated-measures ANOVA is a particularly good fit for 
conditioning work because it allows testing of differences in both within-subject and 
between-subject variances; many fear conditioning questions revolve around factorial 
within-subject manipulations related to the signal value of a particular stimulus that is 
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presented multiple times (e.g., “is response to CS+ > CS-? For all participants”). 
Unfortunately, rmANOVA is subtly, but decisively, unsuited to a comprehensive study of 
fear conditioning variables as they related to dimensional individual differences, 
including personality variables and dimensional models of psychopathology that continue 
to gain traction in the RDoC era (e.g., Conway et al., 2019; Hopwood et al., 2018; Kotov 
et al., 2017). A primary reason for this is that an overwhelming amount of evidence 
establishes personality variables as dimensional (Corr & Matthews, 2009; Trull & 
Durrett, 2005) and that artificially categorizing them for primary analyses is usually not 
defensible, regardless of technique or cut-score used (Altman & Royston, 2006; Dawson 
& Weiss, 2012; Iacobucci, Posavac, Kardes, Schneider, & Popovich, 2015; Irwin & 
McClelland, 2003; MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002; Pittenger, 2004). 
Continuous predictors are not possible in the rmANOVA framework14. Even if artificially 
dichotomized variables are used as “preliminary” predictors within an rmANOVA, the 
results are substantially unstable and biased, leading to the possibility of drastically 
different results between dichotomized and continuous variable predictors (Altman & 
Royston, 2006; J. M. Taylor & Yu, 2002). Clearly, proper dimensional individual 
differences work in the fear conditioning area cannot be conducted using rmANOVA, 
and more recent investigations that have used more appropriate techniques are 
responsible for some of the more comprehensive and robust recent findings in the field 
(e.g., Gazendam et al., 2013). 
 Issues with rmANOVA applied to generalization data. 
 
 
14 Although continuous covariates can be modeled with ANCOVA based techniques, these are limited in 
that they only help account for between-subjects variation in the context of a categorical predictor (i.e., 
adjust the group means by the covariate) and cannot function are true predictors of the outcome variable. 
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 Moving to the area of fear generalization in particular, we encounter further issues 
with the rmANOVA framework. Vanbrabant and colleagues (2015) provide a detailed 
critique of the rmANOVA approach for fear generalization studies (which applies equally 
to avoidance generalization studies) and compare it in a proof-of-concept investigation to 
multilevel modeling techniques (also referred to as mixed models or hierarchical 
modeling). We briefly summarize the critique from Vanbrabant et al. (2015) and then 
review why multilevel modeling (MLM) is a superior technique for generalization data, 
including data from the current study.  
 Vanbrabant et al. (2015) contend that rmANOVA is inappropriate for 
generalization data due to 1) the previously discussed issue of needing to dichotomize 
continuous predictors for use in an ANOA; 2) the generalization gradient is, by definition 
in the ANOVA framework, treated as a categorical variable; and 3) the design of 
generalization experiments inherently violate rmANOVA assumptions and therefore bias 
statistical tests to an unacceptable degree. Regarding categorical generalization gradient, 
this is perhaps the only tenuous or debatable claim made by Vanbrabant et al. (2015). It is 
likely true that representing the generalization stimulus continuum as dimensional better 
captures generalization as it exists outside of the lab (e.g., Sims, 2018; Tenenbaum & 
Griffiths, 2001), but it is not clear yet if the experimental instantiations of generalization 
stimuli for human participants are sophisticated enough to capture a truly continuous 
gradient or if that would be a meaningful endeavor. That said, of two imperfect options it 
appears that representing generalization stimuli as a continuous variable is the preferable 
option from a statistical standpoint. In terms of violations of sphericity, this is the area in 
which generalization research creates the most conflict with the rmANOVA framework. 
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In experimental generalization research there is, by definition, a violation of sphericity 
(i.e., variance of differences between the paired combinations of repeated-measure 
factors are unequal). This is clearly seen when considering that the variance of 
differences between a CS- and its closest approximation will be much smaller than the 
variance of the difference between the CS+ and CS-, which typically have the least 
amount of variance due to the conditioning acquisition procedure (for expansion of this 
example and explanation see Vanbrabant et al., 2015). Corrections for violation exist, but 
they are limited and potentially result in a higher chance of a type II error, especially 
compared with other techniques for repeated-measures data (e.g., Misangyi, LePine, 
Algina, & Goeddeke, 2006; Vanbrabant et al., 2015). An additional point made by 
Vanbrabant et al. (2015) is that all cases subjected to rmANOVA must be complete (i.e., 
can’t have any missing data), which results in loss of power through participant exclusion 
and, in some cases, uneven sample sizes (and between-subjects different degrees of 
freedom) for different analyses from the same study if different dependent variables are 
analyzed with separate analyses (e.g., missing psychophysiological data for 5 participants 
compared with only missing expectancy rating data for 1 participant will result in 
different sample sizes for each analysis unless viable risk rating data is excluded). It 
should also be noted that the specific points made by Vanbrabant et al. (2015) are also 
made by other authors commenting on issues in the general area of experimental 
psychophysiological research (Bagiella, Sloan, & Heitjan, 2000; Kristjansson, Kircher, & 
Webb, 2007; Vasey & Thayer, 1987), psychiatry (Gueorguieva & Krystal, 2004), and 
other psychological and medical fields of study (Hoffman & Rovine, 2007; C. Krueger & 
Tian, 2004). 
 73 
 Using multilevel models with generalization data. 
 Vanbrabant et al. (2015) and others (e.g., Hoffman & Rovine, 2007; Kristjansson, 
Kircher, & Webb, 2007) propose MLM as the solution to the problems inherent 
rmANOVA. MLM can directly address the specific issues identified in the rmANOVA 
framework: it can model continuous predictors (both between-subjects and within-
subjects), has less stringent assumptions than rmANOVA (most notably it does not 
require sphericity), can exclude missing data pair-wise, and generally contains all the 
advantages of the regression framework while allowing for the dependencies that are seen 
in the experimental variables that are modeled in repeated-measures designs (Gelman & 
Hill, 2006). The MLM framework is also more robust for hypothesis testing and to 
multiple comparisons issues due to technique used to pool variance for estimates of 
population variance used in hypothesis testing (Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2012). The only 
relative drawback is that MLM typically needs larger sample sizes than those used for 
rmANOVA (Maas & Hox, 2005), however, this is mitigated both by the option of using 
fewer parameters in MLM if 1) obtaining a proper sample size is an issue and 2) the 
reduction of model complexity can be justified (McNeish & Stapleton, 2016; McNeish & 
Stapleton, 2016). The requirement for relatively larger sample sizes is particularly 
important if using MLMs in the context of dimensional individual differences research, 
as a larger sample size will be required to sufficiently detect stable effects related to those 
differences (e.g., Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Roberts, Walton, & 
Viechtbauer, 2006; Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). 
 Stepping back from the specific details of MLM, we also contend that there is a 
conceptual difference between the rmANOVA compared with the MLM approach that 
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summarizes the primary rationale for generalization research to fully embrace MLM and 
other more advanced techniques. The rmANOVA framework is predicated on the 
viability of using a measure of central tendency (marginal means in most cases, 
specifically group means and repeated-measures factor means) to answer a scientific 
question that revolves around if two or more categorical variables are significantly 
different. In this case, variance around the means are reduced to a metric of uncertainty 
(i.e., error) that influences hypothesis tests (e.g., if there is a large group difference but 
also substantial variability around the mean, then the test will likely not be significant). 
MLM, on the other hand, allows for modeling and testing of these means (termed fixed 
effects, equivalent to the effects modeled in standard multiple regression), but also allows 
for the modeling of individual-level variance (termed random effects). Put another way, 
MLM reclaims what the rmANOVA treats as error and uses it as part of the model. This 
flexibility and the move away from only testing mean differences is the most compelling 
argument for using the MLM framework over rmANOVA. Unless an investigator can be 
sure that 1) members of a group are more similar to each other than to members of 
another group, 2) the mean response when holding all predictors constant (i.e., the 
intercept) does not meaningfully differ across participants, or 3) that participants do not 
meaningfully differ in their pattern (i.e., slope) of responses across one or more repeated-
measures, rmANOVA is likely not a good fit for their data and can lead to biased 
estimates and interpretations. For a worked example demonstrating these points, see 
Vanbrabant et al. (2015). Within the context of the current dissertation, we use another 
modification of the previously established example of the Rottweiler and the child to 
broadly illustrate these points. Let us establish that, in addition to the child from the 
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original example, that there are ninety-nine other children who live on his block (it’s a 
big block) who have encountered the Rottweiler (CS+), the toy poodle (CS-), and the 
other dogs that resemble the Rottweiler to some degree but are not dangerous (GS). This 
gives us a sample size of 100 children that have generalized fear from the Rottweiler to 
the similar looking dogs. If we took the average response (an arbitrary unit of fear) to the 
continuum of dogs, we would likely end up with a reasonable approximation of a fear 
generalization gradient, with the highest response to the CS+, and responses precipitously 
diminishing from the CS+, with perhaps a slight “bump” or more shallow decline to the 
closest approximation of the CS+. Further, based on what we know about APIC-G, we 
might expect that this fear generalization gradient might help us predict future 
generalized avoidance for this block, or even for future blocks in similar neighborhoods. 
However, for the parent or parents of each individual child, this might not be so 
reassuring – they are concerned about their children’s level of fear and would like to be 
able to intervene in an effective manner. One option is to allow the children to go out and 
encounter the CS+ and GSs so many times that the parents have enough data to make a 
reasonable prediction for themselves (i.e., we have sampled one participant many times), 
but the parents might still not be sure based on this information how their child would 
react to a novel, but similar, dog. Another option is to leverage the collected data to 
predict on the individual level. Our first step away from prediction entirely on a group 
mean is to see if we could determine “baseline” level of fear for each child, as it stands to 
reason that some are very fearful and some are temperamentally less fearful. We could 
then use this information to modify the prediction based on the overall group mean. But 
this does not actually tell us anything about differences in generalization – two children 
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with the same baseline fear could generalize very differently. At this point, we would 
then need to determine the pattern of responding to each dog for each child. This would 
provide us with a more accurate prediction for each individual child. 
 It’s at this point that we pause and state that from the experimental point of view, 
we have two issues now: 1) individual variation over time for our arbitrary unit of fear 
might be stronger than the stimulus-specific variation (i.e., more noise than signal) and 2) 
if we individually predict a child’s generalization gradient we lose our ability to make 
inferences about similar children. The first issue is what ultimately makes it difficult to 
produce individual-level prediction in experimental work, which typically uses “noisy” 
methods, but it’s the second issue that is addressed through MLM and not rmANOVA. In 
rmANOVA, it is true that if we model each child as their own group of N = 1, we have 
completely lost any ability to infer what similarities amongst children account for similar 
generalization gradients, both in terms of dispositional predictors (e.g., personality) and 
in terms of which dogs (stimuli) are “driving” differences in generalization. If we take the 
opposite approach and create two groups of N = 50 based only on a single dispositional 
variable, we are now not sure if this represents a “true” difference or if it’s an artifact of 
how we created our groups. That leaves us with treating these children as a single group 
of N=100 individuals, which if done using rmANOVA means we no longer have any 
form of between-subjects factor (i.e., we do not have two or more means to test) and 
cannot predict how generalization varies based on dispositional traits. In the MLM 
framework, we do not have this issue, as we can measure how changes in a dimensional 
dispositional trait (i.e., between-subjects variability) are associated with differences in a 
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generalization gradient (i.e., within-subjects variability). In the rmANOVA framework, 
this would have been impossible.  
Finally, we note that although the majority of generalization studies, including the 
vast majority of the studies cited previously in this document, use rmANOVA, they still 
provide important contributions to the literature and are likely true-positive effects. The 
issue, in our view, is not whether they are false-positives or not. The issues are that effect 
size estimates are likely biased, and conclusions based on these effects are relatively 
imprecise and therefore imperfect foundations for dimensional individual differences 
work. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 At present, the fear and avoidance conditioning literature represents a concerted, 
systematic effort to increase understanding of the mechanisms that underlie fundamental 
dimensions of human behavior – the need to learn and predict danger, discriminate 
between threat and safety, and escape or approach as appropriate for a given context. 
These processes and their behavioral consequences can be adaptive or maladaptive, 
depending on the context. 
Aberrations in these processes that result in maladaptive generalization, as well as 
their covariation (i.e., generalized fear leading to generalized avoidance), are proposed as 
core mechanisms of anxiety and trauma psychopathology. When using a categorical 
approach (e.g., DSM disorders), results from empirical research and observations from 
clinical endeavors coalesce into support for this proposal. In particular, we have strong 
support for the role of Pavlovian (emotional-passive) forms of generalization as a 
pathological correlate. Direct empirical support for instrumental avoidance (active-
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behavioral) generalization, as well as its relation to Pavlovian generalization, is lacking, 
although clinical observations and basic conditioning theories suggest it is also a 
pathological correlate. Empirical work in this area is just beginning, and it will likely be 
years until sufficient literature exists to support broad conclusions in this area. That said, 
enthusiasm for continued research using categorical DSM disorders is dampened by 
established concerns with the construct validity of these disorders and that conditioning 
studies of categorical disorders typically use suboptimal sample-sizes and statistical 
techniques. 
 In parallel to investigations on generalization and pathology, there has been 
empirical interest in identifying normative correlates of fear and avoidance 
generalization, which can  inform our understanding of these processes as they pertain to 
the majority of the population while providing insight into how normative traits and 
behaviors can convert into pathological and maladaptive forms. Initial studies of fear 
generalization have yielded mixed results, with findings frequently contradicting one 
another and notable inconsistencies evident in methodological and statistical approaches. 
Studies of instrumental avoidance generalization are even less interpretable. Additionally, 
the individual differences traits that have been the focus of previous research are 
relatively narrow in terms of content area and likely do not capture enough sources of 
variance to provide optimal predictive validity. There is also concern regarding the 
resolution of the traits tested in previous studies, with almost every reviewed study 
restricting analysis to a single level of the established hierarchical structure of personality 
and ignoring a “middle level” of personality variance that might represent an optimal 
balance of content specificity and sensitivity. 
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 When considering these two lines of related research together, we see that each 
has a unique limitation and then that both also share another limitation. For studies of 
patient groups, there is concern that the grouping variables used (DSM-diagnosed 
disorders) do not reflect a coherent system of psychological or neurobiological processes, 
and therefore the strength of the relationship between these groups and more 
fundamentally and coherent Pavlovian and instrumental processes, is artificially reduced. 
Put another way, the heterogeneity inherent to categorical disorders limits the ability to 
make strong conclusions and, potentially, hinders translational efforts. For studies using 
normative personality traits, a narrow focus on negative affect related traits, as well as 
few researchers leveraging the robust literature establishing the utility of a hierarchical 
approach to improve prediction, has resulted in an incomplete picture of the relations 
between individual difference traits and generalization processes. For both lines of 
research, choices in regards to needed sample size, quantifying individual differences 
(e.g., study-specific cut scores for dimensional traits) and statistical approach (e.g., 
rmANOVA for designs that by default violate sphericity and are inappropriate for 
dimensional predictors, resulting in a focus on means at the expense of predicting 
variances) represent major limitations and, given their entrenchment in the field, likely 
impediments in needed future progress. Our overarching conclusion is that despite a 
number of promising results in the area, key relationships are still either unclear or 
untested, and both represent major gaps in the literature. In terms of gaps in the literature 
related to a lack of clarity in extant research, we highlight the following for their 
relevance to the current study: 
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1. We do not have clarity regarding how the negative affect traits (e.g., Neuroticism, 
trait anxiety, trait fear), especially when measured and analyzed in their naturally 
dimensional form, relate to fear or avoidance generalization. Similarly, it is not 
clear how these traits relate to the covariation of generalized fear and avoidance. 
2. It is still extremely unclear how variables that are not directly reflective of 
negative affect (e.g., Conscientiousness, Extraversion) relate to fear or avoidance 
generalization, despite their relevance to important dimensions of human behavior 
and identified pathological processes. As with the negative affect variables, it is 
also not clear how these variables relate to the covariation of generalized fear and 
avoidance; particularly in the context of approach-avoidance conflicts that allow 
classification of adaptive vs maladaptive outcomes and might be better predicted 
by the variables such as Extraversion or Conscientiousness than the negative 
affect variables. 
3. Only one study so far (Pineles et al., 2009) has compared the predictive power of 
higher-level personality factors (traits) to lower-level factors (facets) in the 
context of fear conditioning work, and this was a largely exploratory endeavor. 
Further, the relatively atheoretical nature of that study resulted in limited analysis 
and interpretation of the lower-level factors. 
4. Although studies of psychiatric patient populations have been fruitful, it is not yet 
clear if the identified pathological markers represent unique substrates of 
categorically defined disorders, or if these markers significantly covary with the 
personality dimensions that have been supported as a superior etiologic and 
taxonomic model of psychopathology (i.e., better “carves nature at its joints”).  
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There are also still questions that have not been addressed yet in the empirical literature 
and represent important next steps. We propose that the following gaps represent the 
most pressing next steps for the area: 
1. In general, there is a lack of research utilizing experimental approaches to 
instrumental generalization. Most notably, there are no available studies of 
pathological individual differences (measured categorically or dimensionally) in 
instrumental generalization, nor studies that take a hierarchical approach to 
studying individual differences and examine higher vs lower-level variables in 
this sub-area. 
2. There are no available studies of individual differences in APIC-G (and, by 
extension, APIC-CS+). Notably, this means the field has not yet established if 
individual differences can improve predication of the APIC processes (which is 
particularly important given the relatively weak predictive power of Pavlovian 
processes), nor has it identified which individual differences moderate the 
relationship between Pavlovian and instrumental responding. This, of course, 
means we do not have empirical evidence of what individual differences are risk 
or protective factors for APIC processes. 
3. There is evidence that putatively normative measures of personality (e.g., Big 
Five) predict pathological processes, behaviors, and outcomes, and that 
personality inventories designed to capture pathological variance can be 
conceptualized as maladaptive extensions of the established normative factors. 
However, this relationship is untested in the conditioning literature. At present, it 
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is unknown if normative, pathological, or combined measures will best predict 
fear and avoidance generalization or APIC processes. 
For a clinical example of why these gaps are in need of address, consider the 
following: there is evidence that people with PTSD overgeneralize compared to those 
without PTSD (Kaczkurkin et al., 2016; R. A. Morey et al., 2015), yet we still know 
extremely little about generalization differences between people who have PTSD (i.e., 
within-group variance) because the prior studies primarily utilized a group-averaging 
approach (i.e., between-group variance/ mean differences). We also know that PTSD is a 
highly heterogeneous disorder in terms of symptom profile (Contractor, Roley-Roberts, 
Lagdon, & Armour, 2017; DiMauro et al., 2014; Zoellner, Pruitt, Farach, & Jun, 2014), 
personality traits (Contractor, Armour, Shea, Mota, & Pietrzak, 2016; Thomas et al., 
2014), and even neurobiological responsivity (Lanius, Bluhm, Lanius, & Pain, 2006). 
Therefore, we have somewhat of a “black box” situation due to the means used to 
characterize the groups and test between-subject variance. Broadly speaking, this is not 
an issue if 1) we assume everyone in the PTSD group is extremely similar on all variables 
of interest and we have accounted for all vital covariates for the aims of the current study 
(which, even in the most well-controlled study, is a difficult goal to achieve) and 2) that 
generalization did not meaningfully differ between those in the PTSD group. This 
becomes problematic when we consider 1) other variables that are very relevant to 
conceptualization, diagnosis, and treatment, but were not part of the previous studies that 
we know are sources of heterogeneity in PTSD (e.g., impulsivity, anhedonia), and 2)  that 
we know as a point of fact that generalization did differ between people in the PTSD 
group in the cited studies, but it is not clear what proportion of this variance is due to 
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measurement or random error and what is due to personality variation that might covary 
with generalization indices. Further, we as of yet have no empirical evidence of 
instrumental avoidance in PTSD, and thus have not observed how fear generalization 
influences generalized avoidance. To tie this back into the clinical picture, we know 
nothing about what predicts differences in fear generalization amongst people with 
PTSD, a primary target for PTSD treatment (for reviews, see S.A. Rauch, Eftekhari, & 
Ruzek, 2012; Sripada, Rauch, & Liberzon, 2016), nor do we know how generalized fear 
predicts avoidance in people with PTSD (with generalized avoidance being another 
primary target of PTSD interventions), and finally we also know that people with the 
PTSD diagnostic label greatly vary on a large number of clinically relevant personality 
traits. In short, we know very little that is helpful for the clinician who is treating an 
individual that, besides being diagnosed with PTSD, might deviate considerably from the 
“average” participant in the lab studies. Yes, the clinician is further convinced by the 
empirical literature that overgeneralization is contributing to his clients symptoms and is 
confident in their choice of a treatment that addresses this and other pathological 
processes, but the empirical literature is silent in regards to the myriad of determinants 
that contribute to this particular client’s problems and how they can be addressed in the 
clinic. The previously listed gaps in the research are all, to some extent, related to issues 
brought up in this clinical example, and of course these issues do not just relate to clinical 
examples: as the literature currently stands, we would not be able to confidently predict if 
the child who was scared of the Rottweiler will develop pathology, and if he does we 
would not have a good idea of what particular traits contributed to that development. 
Clearly, there is much needed work in this area that has yet to be done. 
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The Current Study and Specific Aims 
In the current study, we explicitly address the outlined gaps in the literature by 
applying a broad individual differences approach to the study of fear generalization, 
avoidance generalization, and the covariation between the two using a previously 
validated paradigm (van Meurs et al., 2014) to test a large sample of non-patient 
participants. This task yields indices of both Pavlovian fear and instrumental avoidance 
covariation (APIC) in the context of maladaptive avoidance of benign generalization 
stimuli (APIC-G) and more adaptive avoidance of conditioned threat cues (APIC-CS+), 
making it ideal for addressing the stated gaps. To ensure we comprehensively assess 
sources of variation that could explain individual differences in these dependent variables 
and are relevant as potential risk or protective factors for psychopathology, we use 
measures covering a large range of human variance (e.g., Big Five personality traits; e.g., 
Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990) to assess broadband personality traits that are 
both conceptually related to fear and avoidance conditioning (e.g., Neuroticism). We also 
assess broadband traits that are not necessarily closely, directly, or intuitively linked to 
fear and avoidance but might contribute to or modify the expression of fear and 
avoidance (e.g., Extraversion and Conscientiousness), as well as their generalized forms, 
within the context of an approach-avoidance conflict. These traits are assessed in 
conjunction with narrowband measures that are more narrowly related to symptoms of 
fear and anxiety pathology (e.g., trait anxiety and fear, anxiety and sensitivity intolerance 
of uncertainty). Further, we include measures of both normative (e.g., Big Five 
personality traits) and pathological (e.g., DSM-5 maladaptive personality traits) 
broadband traits, lower-level factors (e.g., aspects) of these traits, and use empirically-
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supported composite indices based on both the normative and pathological measures to 
ensure we are 1) testing a broader range of variance to avoid potential limitations from 
prior work and 2)  including the extremes of personality variation that were likely driving 
results in studies that successfully found generalization effects in patients with anxiety 
and trauma disorders. Finally, we designed our analytic plan around a multilevel 
modeling framework to facilitate a dimensional individual differences approach that 
yields improved statistical fidelity and precision, which represents a needed step forward 
for the field. Overall, we hope this work can both provide new or improved insight into 
basic processes investigated by clinical translational scientists, as well as provide a 
methodological and statistical foundation that facilitates future basic science work. 
Specific aims. 
The overall aim of this study is broad and therefore requires more detailed 
operationalization. Thus, we have identified four primary specific aims for this study. We 
aim to 1) identify dimensional personality predictors of generalized Pavlovian 
conditioned fear, as measured both physiologically and behaviorally, and generalized 
instrumental avoidance, as measured with overt behavior; 2) test whether these 
personality predictors significantly and meaningfully improve prediction of instrumental 
avoidance in APIC models; 3) identify which personality predictors moderate APIC 
either through facilitation or attenuation (i.e., dispositional risk and protective factors) of 
the relationship; and 4) contextualize results in terms of relative adaptiveness of the 
approach-avoidance conflict outcome, which is accomplished through follow-up testing 
of APIC-G (maladaptive avoidance) and APIC-CS+ (adaptive avoidance) using reduced 
versions of the APIC model (i.e., with fewer stimulus classes included in the model). In 
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the following section, we expand on these four aims in the context of specific predictions. 
Note that to facilitate readability, generalized Pavlovian conditioned fear will henceforth 
in this dissertation be referred to as fear generalization or generalized fear and 
generalized instrumental avoidance will be referred to as generalized avoidance or 
generalized avoidance. 
Hypotheses and exploratory testing approach. 
Due to a wealth of research findings with direct relevance to the current 
investigation, numerous a priori predictions are justified. What follows is a relatively in-
depth description of each aim and the associated testing strategy, then specific hypotheses 
(when possible) for that aim which are ordered sequentially by each dispositional trait 
(i.e., we discuss Neuroticism predictions first, then Conscientiousness, etc.). However, in 
certain cases, 1) there is not sufficient published research available; 2) there are notably 
contradictory or inconclusive findings which are exacerbated by methodological 
heterogeneity; or 3) an argument based on solid theoretical rationale is not available. In 
these cases, specific a priori hypotheses are not tenable, and an exploratory approach is 
required and represents an appropriate step forward in the empirical tradition (e.g., Jebb, 
Parrigon, & Woo, 2017). If personality variables without a corresponding hypothesis are 
found to be significant predictors and/or moderators, we will report and interpret those 
findings and note their exploratory nature. 
Aim 1 (A1) Identifying personality predictors of generalization. 
 This aim encapsulates one of the primary contributions of this dissertation: 
identifying which personality traits (both narrowband and broadband, normative and 
pathological) are associated with performance variables on a task measuring fear and 
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avoidance generalization. Accomplishing this aim includes testing and interpretation of 
main effects (i.e., does a trait significantly predict the magnitude of an outcome variable 
across all trial-types) and, most importantly, interaction effects. There are two types of 
interaction effects being tested: linear and quadratic interactions. Both types of 
interactions provide insight into potential associations between personality traits and 
generalization processes; therefore each significant interaction will be interpreted and 
graphed with the goal of identifying generalization effects. Overall, this aim represents a 
first comprehensive step in applying personality methods to the study of fear and anxiety 
generalization. All narrowband traits are tested separately for this aim and all other 
analyses. See Appendix A for specific details regarding the series of models used to test 
broadband traits this aim. 
The majority of our specific hypotheses for this aim focus on measures of 
negative affect (e.g., Neuroticism, its aspects, and related personality constructs; 
narrowband anxiety- and fear-specific variables), as the majority of the literature did not 
include other types of traits as covariates in their predictive models. Therefore, for this 
aim we began all lines of analyses by constructing separate models in which Neuroticism 
or the equivalent variable from another scale (Negative Affectivity and “Distress-PB”, or 
the narrowband variables) or its aspects (Withdrawal, Volatility) was the only trait 
predictor (both in main effect and interaction models), which allows us to more clearly 
compare the current study’s results with prior individual differences in fear generalization 
work. However, the scope of this study, and this aim in particular, is broader than 
negative affect variables, and we thus constructed models for the broadband traits that 
include both the relevant negative affect trait and the other traits of the same kind and 
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level (e.g., Neuroticism with Conscientiousness and Extraversion, Negative Affectivity 
with Disinhibition and Detachment, Volatility and Withdrawal with the other four aspects 
tested in this study, etc.), which enable us to test the unique predictive contributions of 
the negative affect variables, as well as the other personality variables included in the 
current study. 
 Given that the current literature cannot strongly support predictions regarding 
other personality variables (e.g., Extraversion, Conscientiousness), we refrain from 
testing these variables in their own models (i.e., models that only contain one personality 
variable of interest). An exception is for models predicting avoidance: due to the 
empirical evidence and theoretical writings regarding how Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion (as well as their aspects and their corresponding pathological 
manifestations, Disinhibition and Detachment) operate more broadly on behavior, we 
initially included non-negative affect variables in their own models when predicting 
avoidance, and provide specific hypotheses for these models.  
Specific hypotheses to address this aim, along with rationale for each hypothesis, 
are as follows: 
• A1.H1: Withdrawal, an aspect of Neuroticism, will be associated with greater 
generalization across measures, whereas Neuroticism itself and Volatility, the 
other aspect of Neuroticism, will not have a significant relationship with 
generalization. We hypothesize this based on Withdrawal representing most of 
the “anxiety” variance in Neuroticism, as opposed to the “anger/irritability” 
variance that is represented by Volatility (DeYoung et al., 2007) and therefore 
Withdrawal is the most likely of both aspects and the overall trait to predict 
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generalization. That said, Withdrawal also contains items related to 
depression, which might attenuate the hypothesized relationship. Finally, we 
predict that these associations will persist when controlling for other 
personality variables. 
• A1.H2: Negative Affectivity and the Neuroticism + Negative Affectivity 
composite, (Distress-PB), will also be associated with greater generalization 
across measures. Both of these variables are likely better approximations of 
the disorders used in studies identifying shallow generalization gradients in 
anxiety and trauma pathology than the normative traits described above. As 
with the previous hypothesis, we predict that these associations will persist 
when controlling for other personality variables. 
• A1.H3: Conscientiousness will be associated with decreased generalized 
avoidance. This follows from its status as a “protective” trait that assists in 
goal-directed behavior and precision (Roberts et al., 2014a), which might 
protect against poorer discrimination between threat and safety signal value 
that underlies generalization processes. However, extremely high 
Conscientiousness is associated with pathological outcomes, including OCD, 
and we therefore hypothesize that Orderliness will best capture this 
pathological extreme and be associated with increased generalization. Further, 
we expect Industriousness will continue to account for the positive benefits of 
Conscientiousness and be associated with less avoidance generalization. We 
refrain from specific hypotheses regarding overall vs unique contributions of 
these variables (i.e., when they are modeled in isolation vs. with the other 
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personality traits/aspects), with the exception that Orderliness will be a 
stronger predictor of generalized avoidance when controlling for 
Industriousness. 
• A1.H4: As with the previous hypothesis, we predict Extraversion will be 
associated with decreased generalized avoidance, as increased Extraversion 
will correspond with greater reward sensitivity and approach tendencies that 
will buffer against avoidance tendencies. Further, we predict this effect will be 
driven by Assertiveness, which contains content that seems the most relevant 
to approach under conditions of risk. We refrain from specific hypotheses 
regarding the overall vs unique contributions of these variables. 
• A1.H5: In terms of narrowband traits, we predict that higher levels of TF-44, 
IUSF, and ASI will all be associated with increased generalization. We predict 
a null result for the STAI-T, given inconsistent past results and concerns about 
its construct validity. Instead, we believe the three aforementioned 
narrowband variables will be better high-resolution predictors of 
generalization than STAI-T. 
Aim 2 (A2) Testing improved prediction of avoidance in APIC models. 
 This aim centers around the concept of improving the parametrization of our 
statistical models in the service of improved prediction of avoidance – if we know a 
person’s level of fear in response to the experimental manipulation, what other pieces of 
information will help us predict if the person will avoid? For example, if we have 
reasonably accounted for sources of fear and anxiety (via Pavlovian experimental indices 
and self-reported indices of fear, such as trait fear), then does knowing a person’s level of 
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Conscientiousness or Extraversion sharpen our prediction? This aim will broadly address 
this question and uses the same sets of a priori defined individual difference predictors 
that were used within the avoidance models in Aim 1 (see Appendix A). Additionally, 
separate models are constructed for testing APIC with Pavlovian responding 
operationalized by startle and by risk ratings, resulting in a parallel series of models. For 
this aim, we are interested in comparing models to determine if there is incremental 
improvement in models with personality traits of interest (i.e., does the APIC model that 
includes the personality trait provide significantly better prediction than the base APIC 
model?). Therefore, the following specific hypotheses do not refer to individual effects 
(main effects or interactions) and instead are structured around differences in predictive 
models. Specific hypotheses to address this aim, along with rationale for each hypothesis, 
are as follows: 
• A2.H1: We predict that all of the higher-level personality traits being tested 
(Neuroticism, Negative Affectivity, and the composite using components from 
both, Distress-PB) will significantly improve prediction of avoidance when 
added to an APIC model. We base the overall prediction on the observation 
that Pavlovian variables significantly, but not strongly, predict avoidance and 
therefore there is likely sufficient variance related to fear “left over” for the 
trait variables to provide added predictive power. In addition, our prediction 
differs slightly from Aim 1, in which we did not predict Neuroticism would 
relate to generalization – we predict that Neuroticism will be suppressed by 
the Pavlovian variable and therefore become a stronger predictor of 
avoidance.  However, as opposed to Aim 1, we do not make specific 
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predictions regarding the Withdrawal aspect given that Withdrawal contains 
depression variance, which possibly differentially relates to both the predictor 
(Pavlovian variable) and outcome (avoidance) in this model and makes it 
difficult to provide precise predictions. 
• A2.H2: We predict Conscientiousness will also significantly improve 
prediction of avoidance when added to an APIC model, as it provides a source 
of unique variance related to the task (tendencies towards goal obtainment and 
rule-following) that is not captured by other parts of the base APIC model. We 
also predict that modeling Industriousness and Orderliness separately in the 
same model will result in a better model fit than a model with just 
Conscientiousness; this follows from the documented suppression effect 
between Industriousness and Orderliness. 
• A2.H3: We predict Extraversion will also significantly improve prediction of 
avoidance when added to an APIC model, as it also provides a source of 
unique variance related to the task (reward motivation and approach tendency) 
that is not captured by other parts of the base APIC model.  
• A2.H4: In terms of narrowband traits, similar to Aim 1 we predict that TF-44, 
IUSF, and ASI will all significantly improve prediction when added to 
(separate) APIC models. However, in contrast to Aim 1, we predict a 
significant effect of STAI-T, such that it also will contribute significant 
predictive power to the base APIC model. We make this prediction for the 
same reason we predicted Neuroticism would significantly improve 
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prediction: a suppression effect will occur between the Pavlovian variable and 
STAI-T. 
Aim 3 (A3) Moderation of APIC by dispositional variables. 
This aim is concerned with identifying specific dispositions that moderate the 
relationship between Pavlovian variables and instrumental avoidance across the complete 
stimulus continuum (i.e., APIC), either by facilitating the relationship (i.e., positively 
moderate or strengthen the association between the Pavlovian variable and avoidance) or 
attenuating the relationship (i.e., negatively moderate or weaken the association between 
the Pavlovian variable and avoidance). As for Aim 2, separate models are constructed for 
testing APIC with Pavlovian responding operationalized by startle and by risk ratings, 
resulting in a parallel series of models. Unlike Aim 2, this aim focuses on individual 
effects of personality variables, specifically by quantifying the degree to which these 
variables moderate APIC and the pattern of moderation effects across different stimulus 
levels. Statistically, this involves testing the predictive properties of a three-way 
interaction involving the personality variable of interest, a Pavlovian variable, and the 
Stimulus dimension. As the goal of this aim is to broadly identify APIC moderators, the 
entire stimulus continuum (both CS-s, all GSs, and the CS+) are included in these 
models. Hypotheses to address this aim, along with rationale for each hypothesis, are as 
follows: 
• A3.H1: We predict that the negative affect personality variables with 
pathological variance (Negative Affectivity and Distress-PB) will 
significantly moderate APIC. We based this prediction on the theory and 
limited human evidence that APIC is primarily a pathological process 
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which “converts” fear and anxiety into maladaptive avoidance, which 
makes up the majority of APIC variance. This is also the reason we do not 
make a specific hypothesis for Neuroticism, and contend that Neuroticism 
and its aspects are less likely to moderate APIC. 
• A3.H2: We predict Conscientiousness will be a significant moderator of 
APIC, but a weak one unless decomposed into its component aspects. This 
follows from the opposing motivations represented by Industriousness and 
Orderliness and how they likely relate to APIC. We predict that higher 
levels of Orderliness will facilitate APIC relations, as those who are higher 
on this aspect might be more inclined towards controlling internal 
sensations in line with the associated behavioral drive (e.g.,  organizing a 
room when bothered by its state of messiness to reduce distress) and 
therefore more likely to avoid as fear increases. Conversely, we predict 
that higher levels of Industriousness will weaken APIC relations, as those 
higher on this aspect might be more likely to persevere in the service of 
obtaining a goal, and therefore less likely to avoid due to the consequence 
of forgoing a “win”. 
• A3.H3: We predict Extraversion will be a significator moderator of APIC, 
with lower Extraversion facilitating APIC. This follows from Extraversion 
generally corresponding to approach motivation, and that those with lower 
approach motivation will be less inclined to persevere (i.e., approach) 
while afraid in service of obtaining a reward. We also predict that the 
Assertiveness aspect will largely drive this moderation effect, as despite 
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the socially-focused item content, this lower-level factor has been related 
to general personal agency and goal-orientation (e.g., Depue & Collins, 
1999) and potentially represents a protective factor, such that those lower 
on Assertiveness will demonstrate greater APIC.  
• A3.H4: Consistent with previous aims, we hypothesize that of the 
narrowband variables, TF-44, IUSF, and ASI will facilitate APIC, but not 
STAI-T. In line with their conceptualizations as indicators of internalizing 
pathology, we predict that higher levels of these three traits will be 
associated with increased APIC. 
 
Aim 4 (A4) Specific APIC-G and APIC-CS+ effects. 
 Aim 4 is nearly identical in goals and methodological approach to Aim 3; 
however, testing is limited to APIC-G and APIC-CS+ models so as to focus on 
maladaptive or adaptive avoidance without controlling for the other. This is done because 
1) the full APIC model might obscure relevant personality moderators with modest 
effects on either APIC-G or APIC-CS+, but not both; 2) to determine if identified APIC 
moderators persist when tested within the APIC-G and/or APIC-CS+ models; and 3) to 
approximate the analytic approach from previous conditioning work with the goal of 
facilitating interpretation of this dissertation’s results in the contexts of that prior work. 
As previously noted, the APIC-G/APIC-CS+ literature in humans is practically non-
existent, and there are no available studies of personality moderators. Therefore, we 
provide a limited set of broad predictions, and contend that it is necessary to treat this aim 
as a primarily exploratory endeavor. 
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• A4.H1: Similar to Aim 3, we predict that the negative affect personality variables 
with pathological variance (Negative Affectivity and Distress-PB) will 
significantly moderate APIC-G, but not APIC-CS+. Again, our rationale is 
predicated on the evidence that generalization is strongest in those with 
pathological anxiety conditions, that a primary factor underlying the pathology is 
APIC-G, and that these personality traits will be the most appropriate analogues 
for these conditions in the current study.  
• A4.H2: We hypothesize APIC-CS+ will be moderated by Conscientiousness, 
consistent with the equivalent hypothesis for Aim 3. Specifically, we expect 
higher levels of Industriousness to buffer against conversion of fear responding 
into avoidance for the danger cue, and the opposite for those higher on 
Orderliness. We limit this prediction to APIC-CS+ due to this being the least 
ambiguous approach-avoidance conflict contained within current experimental 
paradigms testing APIC (i.e., provokes the clearest conflict between obtaining a 
goal, reducing distress/harm, and “following the rules”) and therefore that the 
situational demands of CS+ trials are the most likely to activate 
Conscientiousness-related individual differences. 
• A4.H3: We hypothesize that lower Extraversion (driven by the Assertiveness 
aspect) will significantly facilitate APIC-G, and again consistent with Aim 3, 
contend that this will be due to lower approach motivation that will decrease the 
chance of taking the risk of approaching during an ambiguous situation (GS 
trials), even when the stimuli only elicit a low or moderate degree of fear. We do 
not predict this moderation effect will hold for APIC-CS+, as the higher degree of 
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fear experienced during the CS+ will not necessarily be offset by the normative 
degree of approach motivation seen in the Extraversion trait and its aspects. Also 
of note is the possibility that these traits might be capturing the same variance 
(i.e., the same participants) who could drive a significant Negative Affect or 
Distress-PB moderating effect for APIC-G – those generally high on negative 
affect traits are also those likely lower on positive affect trait (L. A. Clark & 
Watson, 1991).  
Method 
 
Participants 
We recruited and tested 396 undergraduate and graduate students from the 
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities campus and the surrounding community. All 
participants were English-speaking adults between ages 18 and 50 who are enrolled in an 
undergraduate psychology course and receive research credit for study participation. 
Criteria for exclusion from initial testing were: 1) vision or hearing conditions that could 
interfere with completion of the experimental task; 2) active use of antipsychotics, 
benzodiazepines, or tranquilizers; 3) use of alcohol within twenty-four hours of study 
start; 4) or use of nicotine or caffeine within 3 hours of study start; or 6) active suicidal or 
homicidal intent. Due to the aims of the study involving recruitment of a broad and 
representative sample, current or past psychopathology was not an explicit exclusion 
criterion, although exclusion based on certain medications (e.g., antipsychotics) might 
have de facto excluded participants with certain forms of psychopathology.  
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 Of the 396 participants tested for the study, a total of 108 were excluded from 
final analysis, leaving a final sample size of 288 (65.97% female, Mage = 20.47, SDage = 
3.32). See Table 1 for a demographic overview for the current sample. Despite losing 
~28% of our data, the final sample subjected to analysis is among the largest samples 
tested in a conditioning study (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). The most common reasons for 
exclusion were that the participant did not complete the task due to technical error or they 
elected to discontinue, they did not demonstrate discriminative fear conditioning (e.g., 
responses to the CS+ were equal to or lower than CS- responses during the Pavlovian 
trials of generalization and they did not “learn the task”), questionable self-report 
questionnaire validity based on embedded items created for this purpose, or there were 
technical difficulties that resulted in an unusable dataset (e.g., sufficient physiological 
data was not collected). See Table 2 for exclusion conditions and counts for each 
category and specific conditions. 
Table 1. Participant demographics (N = 288) 
Variable N % 
Female 190 65.97% 
Ethnicity   
 White (non-Hispanic) 190 65.97% 
 Asian 66 22.92% 
 Other or Multiple/Mixed-race 13 4.51% 
 African American or Black 9 3.13% 
 Hispanic 7 2.43% 
 Middle Eastern 2 0.69% 
 Unknown/Did not answer 1 0.35% 
   
 Mean SD 
Age (years) 20.47 3.32 
Education (years) 15.04 1.9 
Note: Participants self-identified gender and ethnicity, with open-
ended input available for both questions to allow for responses that 
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did not correspond with provided options. All participants in the 
reported sample self-identified as either female/woman or male/man. 
 
Table 2. Exclusion conditions and total excluded 
Exclusion condition N 
Performance 35 
  Did not learn CS+/CS- contingency 29 
  Avoidance outlier 3 
  EMG non-responder (<1 µV) 3 
  
Technical issues 51 
  Missing/unreliable EMG 33 
  Missing/unreliable risk ratings 13 
  Other technical issues 5 
  
Other 45 
  Validity concerns on questionnaires 26 
  Current antipsychotic use 1 
  Explicit effort concerns during testing 1 
  Withdrew during lab visit 17 
  
Total, ≥ 1 exclusion condition met 131 
Total, ≥ 2 exclusion conditions met 23 
  
Total, participants excluded 108 
Note: Statistical outliers for mean avoidance rate were all at 100% avoidance. 
Evaluation of CS+/CS- contingency based on risk ratings during the generalization 
phase. CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ conditioned danger cue; EMG = 
electromyography; µV = microvolt. 
 
Materials 
Trait-level questionnaires  
All trait-level questionnaires were administered via an online system that was 
self-paced and completed prior to a laboratory visit completed soon after these 
questionnaires. We embedded a total of three “validity” items within longer 
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questionnaires (no more than 1 in a questionnaire) to assist in the detection of inattentive 
and/or idiosyncratic responding. Example of validity items include “The University of 
Minnesota is located in Wisconsin” and “I was born in 1876”.  
Broadband personality measures. 
Big Five Aspect Scale (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007).  
The BFAS is a factor-analysis derived measure of the Big Five traits (Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism) and the immediately 
subordinate aspects of each trait (2 for each domain, for a total of 10 domains). The 
BFAS is a more recently developed personality inventory that built on research done on 
existing and commonly used Big Five measures (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 
1999) and, through its focus on aspects, captures a level of the Big Five structure that 
exists between the broad traits and the more specific and narrow facets. DeYoung et al., 
(2007) also propose that the BFAS factor solution provides a more optimal classification 
structure for biological investigations of personality (i.e., the aspects can be characterized 
by nominally separate biological substrates and correspond to genotypic variation; Jang, 
Livesley, Angleitner, Riemann, & Vernon, 2002). Accordingly, the BFAS is an ideal 
personality measure for the current investigation due the use of neurobiologically 
informed experimental paradigms (Pavlovian conditioning) and measures (e.g., fear-
potentiated startle). In the current study, we calculated the trait and aspect scores in line 
with scoring method from DeYoung et al. (2007), in which each aspect is comprised of 
the mean of 10 aspect-specific items, and the traits are calculated as the means of its two 
component aspects. Our online system did not permit missing/skipped items on the BFAS 
 101 
given the importance of personality data to the current study, and therefore there was no 
missing data in any calculated scales for participants in the final sample. 
Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5; Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, 
& Skodol, 2012). 
 The PID-5, as with the BFAS, measures broader personality domains, but is 
designed to capture maladaptive personality traits and all of the scales are thus keyed in 
the direction of higher scores corresponding to higher levels of psychopathology. The 
PID-5 indexes five higher order domains (Psychoticism, Disinhibition, Detachment, 
Antagonism, Negative Affectivity) and 25 lower-level facets. These facets load on one or 
more PID-5 trait, with some facets more clearly reflecting a single trait (e.g., the 
“Manipulativeness” facet as part of the “Antagonism” trait) than others (the 
“Depressivity” facet loads almost equally as strongly on the “Negative Affectivity” and 
“Disinhibition” traits as it does on the “Detachment” trait) (e.g., De Fruyt et al., 2013; 
Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2012; Wright et al., 2012). The PID-5 is 
also conceptualized as a measure with explicit clinical utility, as it was developed as an 
accompanying measure for the DSM-5 alternative “hybrid” model of personality disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Krueger et al., 2012) and the PID-5 scales 
show good convergence with the conceptually related scales of personality inventories 
commonly used in clinical assessment settings (Anderson et al., 2013; Hopwood, Wright, 
et al., 2013), as well as scales specifically designed for personality disorder detection 
(Bastiaens et al., 2016; Few et al., 2013; Fossati, Krueger, Markon, Borroni, & Maffei, 
2013; Hopwood, Thomas, Markon, Wright, & Krueger, 2012). 
 102 
Given the five-factor structure of the PID-5, it has sometimes been referred to as a 
“maladaptive Big Five” (e.g., DeYoung, Carey, Krueger, & Ross, 2016; Gore & Widiger, 
2013; Suzuki, Samuel, Pahlen, & Krueger, 2015; Thomas et al., 2013), which is a mostly 
supported statement; the exception is that the Psychoticism trait does not as precisely 
overlap with its conceptual pairing, Openness, as well as the other four trait pairs. That 
said, factor-analytic methods consistently find overall strong convergence between Big 
Five and PID-5 constructs in both nonclinical (Suzuki et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2013) 
and clinical samples (Quilty, Ayearst, Chmielewski, Pollock, & Bagby, 2013; A. G. C. 
Wright & Simms, 2014). In summary, the PID-5 appears to capture the maladaptive 
“extremes” of the Big Five and that these measures are quantifying variance on the same 
set of dimensions. 
In the current study, we calculated the trait and facet scores in line with the 
method used in the original development of the PID-5 (Krueger, Derringer, Markon, 
Watson, & Skodol, 2012) in which each facet comprised of the mean of a variable 
number of facet-specific items, and the traits are calculated as the means of the facets that 
load most strongly on them in prior work, (i.e., facets are allowed to contribute to only 
one trait/ traits do not share facets). Note that in this respect our method differed from 
Krueger and colleagues’ (2016) and the recommendations for the PID-5 measure that is 
published by the APA and reflects the method used in other studies using the PID-5 (e.g., 
Suzuki, Samuel, Pahlen, & Krueger, 2015). As with the BFAS, our online system did not 
permit missing/skipped items on the PID-5, and therefore there was no missing data in 
any calculated scales for participants in the final sample. 
PID-5 and BFAS composite scales (“PB” scales). 
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 Given the conceptual and empirical overlap between the PID-5 and Big Five 
personality structure, the two personality inventories used in the current investigation are 
well-suited to testing the full range of personality variance. Specifically, the BFAS yields 
a normally distributed, broad range of personality variance (DeYoung et al., 2007) that 
potentially includes some pathological manifestations at the tails, whereas the PID-5, 
which is not normally distributed in the general population (Krueger et al., 2012), 
overlaps most strongly with the BFAS tails at the lower end of its distribution, as it is 
designed to capture only maladaptive or pathological personality variance. Further, factor 
analytic studies of the combined PID-5 and BFAS by the respective authors of each 
inventory find that PID-5 facets and BFAS domains demonstrate a good fit with a 10-
factor solution, with one BFAS domain loading highly on one factor (with each BFAS 
domain being the highest loading domain on only one factor) along with conceptually-
linked PID-5 facets (e.g., DeYoung, Carey, Krueger, & Ross, 2016); the 10 factors 
generally resemble the 10 BFAS aspects. This provides support for combining the BFAS 
and PID-5 to capture a more expansive range of maladaptive and adaptive personality 
variance through construction of scales that match the factor analysis results from 
DeYoung et al. (2016). 
To create these PID-5+BFAS scales (termed “PB” scales in this investigation), we 
used the factor structure derived from Sample 2 (which had both a larger sample than 
Sample 1 and was the only sample to exclude participants who did not respond correctly 
to “attention checks” similar to those used in the current study) in DeYoung et al. (2016) 
to identify the scales comprising the PB scales of interest, standardized all scales, and 
then averaged those standardized scales together to create the PB scales. Additionally, we 
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reversed-keyed PID-5 scales that negatively correlated with the PB scale (e.g., the 
“Submissiveness” facet on the PID-5 negatively correlates with the “Assertiveness” PB 
factor) to ensure the average score could be correctly interpreted.  
Narrowband personality measures. 
 Trait Fear – 44 Item Questionnaire (TF-44; Kramer et al., 2019). The TF-44 is an 
empirically-derived dimensional measure of trait fear (when defining the overarching 
construct of “threat sensitivity” from the “fear” end of this bipolar dimension) that was 
originally developed through exploratory factor analysis of a large twin sample that was 
characterized with multiple internalizing and externalizing self-report measures and 
corresponding psychophysiological measurements (Kramer, Patrick, Krueger, & 
Gasperi, 2012). Importantly, the trait fear dimension as assessed by the TF-44 is 
positively associated with biological indices of defensive responding (e.g., fear-
potentiated startle; Kramer, Patrick, Krueger, & Gasperi, 2012) and other measures of 
fear and threat sensitivity (e.g., Kramer et al., 2019). The TF-44 was scored in line with 
the method used in Kramer et al. (2019), with a higher average on all items indicating a 
higher level of trait fear. We calculated a prorated score for cases in which ≤ 3 items were 
missing.  
 Intolerance of Uncertainty – Short Form (IUSF; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 
2007).  
 The IUSF is a dimensional, commonly used, brief measure of IU that converges 
well with the original measure. A two-factor solution fits the IUSF well and indicates the 
presence of distinguishable Prospective and Inhibitory types of IU in the measure. The 
IUSF and its subscales were scored in line with the method used in Carelton et al. (2007) 
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with a higher average on all items indicating a higher intolerance of uncertainty. We 
calculated a prorated score for cases in which ≤ 3 items were missing. 
 Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). 
The ASI is a dimensional, commonly used measure of AS. Later studies of the 
ASI proposed three subscales (Mental, Physical, and Social) based on a best-fitting 
hierarchical three-factor structure (Zinbarg, Barlow, & Brown, 1997). The ASI and its 
subscales was scored in line with the method used in Reiss et al. (1986) and Zinbarg et al 
(1997), with a higher average on all items indicating higher anxiety sensitivity. We 
calculated a prorated score for cases in which ≤ 3 items were missing. 
 Spielberger Trait-State Anxiety Inventory – Trait (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 
1983).  
The STAI-T is a dimensional, commonly used measure of trait anxiety. As 
discussed earlier, the trait anxiety construct has received considerable criticism (e.g., 
Endler & Kocovski, 2001), and current efforts highlight the need to distinguish between 
trait anxiety and trait fear (Kramer et al., 2019; Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 2011). 
Nevertheless, it is included for across-study comparison purposes, as a large number of 
conditioning studies using the STAI-T/trait anxiety as their primary dimensional negative 
affect measure (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). The STAI-T was scored in line with the method 
used in Spielberger et al. (1983) with a higher average on all items indicating higher trait 
anxiety. We calculated a prorated score for cases in which ≤ 3 items were missing. 
State level questionnaires 
In addition to broadband and narrowband personality assessment, the current 
study includes brief measures designed to capture current symptoms associated with 
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anxiety, stress, and depression before the completion of the experimental procedures. 
Relevant measures include state anxiety (part of the STAI [STAI-S]; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), percieved stress level (Perceived Stress Scale 
[PSS]; Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1994),  and depressive symptoms (Beck 
Depression Inventory [BDI-II]; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
Physiological apparatus 
We controlled stimulation and physiological recording via a commercial system 
(Contact Precision Instruments, London) and measured startle blink with 
electromyography (EMG) using two 6-mm tincup electrodes (sampling rate = 1000 Hz; 
online bandwidth filter = 30–500 Hz) applied to the orbicularis oculi facial muscle. In 
accordance with standardized guidelines for human startle studies (Blumenthal et al., 
2005) we placed one electrode below the right lower eyelid in line with the pupil while in 
forward gaze and placed the second electrode approximately 2 cm lateral to the first. 
Additionally, we placed a 9-mm disk electrode on the anterior forearm to serve as a 
ground. We probed the startle blink with a burst of white noise (40 ms, 102 dB) with a 
near instantaneous rise time, that was presented binaurally through headphones. 
Pavlovian-Instrumental Generalization (PIG) task.  
A previously validated task developed by our group was used to assess Pavlovian 
generalization, instrumental generalization, and APIC-G and APIC-CS+ (van Meurs et 
al., 2014). The context of the task is a farming video game in which the participant is 
represented by an abstract farmer avatar on a bicycle. The farmer’s goal is to successfully 
plant and gather crops before a flock of pesky birds destroys the crops. Complicating 
matters is that the farmer rides a bicycle on his way to the crops, and there is a chance of 
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painfully falling off the bicycle (i.e., receiving a shock) under certain conditions. Stimuli 
are displayed in the center of the display and provide information about potential risk.  
Stimuli. 
Stimuli for the task include eight rings of gradually increasing size, with extremes 
serving as conditioned danger (CS+) and conditioned safety cues (oCS-). The six rings of 
intermediary size, averaged into 3 “bins”, serve as generalization stimuli (GSs, with the 
GS1 the stimulus most dissimilar to the CS+ and the GS3 the stimulus most similar to the 
CS+, with the GS2 in-between), and create a continuum-of-similarity between the CS+ 
and the CS-. See Figure 2 for a graphic displaying the stimulus continuum and additional 
information about the task. For 50% of participants the largest ring was the CS+, and for 
the other 50% the smallest ring was the CS+.  Additionally, we used triangles as “non-
circular” conditioned safety cues (△CS-) to assess the degree to which fear might 
generalize to all things circular, but not triangular, and provides a control condition for 
cue-based responses. Two sizes of triangles were used (roughly aligning in size with the 
largest and smallest circular stimuli) and responses were average together to form the △CS- “bin”. Finally, on some trials no cue or shape was presented, also without risk of 
shock (NS- trials), which provides an index of contextual fear and avoidance without a 
discrete cue. Stimuli were presented pseudo-randomly, and no more than two of the same 
stimuli were presented consecutively at any point in the task. The US was a brief electric 
shock (3-5 mA, 100-200ms) administered to the wrist that was calibrated for each 
participant to be uncomfortable but not painful (see Procedure for shock work-up details).  
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Figure 2. Sample graphic of the Pavlovian-Instrumental Generalization (PIG) paradigm. 
The upper part of the graphic shows the general context of the task (a farmer riding a bike 
to tend to his crops), the lower part shows the stimuli that appear in the center of the 
screen. For 50% of participants, the largest circle was conditioned as the danger cue and 
the smallest was the safety cue (as shown in the image); for the other 50% of participants 
this was reversed. Graphic adapted from a scientific presentation given by Dr. Lissek, 
with his permission. CS- = conditioned safety cue, GS = generalization stimuli, CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue.  
Phases. 
  The PIG task is completed in three phases: pre-acquisition, acquisition, and 
generalization. In pre-acquisition and acquisition, the farmer can only travel across a 
short dirt path to reach the crops; a longer paved road is also present but is closed off for 
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construction and the participant does not have the option to take that path during these 
phases. The short dirt path is considered the “danger” path, as the farmer can only fall off 
his bicycle (receive a shock) on this path depending on which stimulus is presented. The 
longer paved road is the “safe” path, as there is no change of falling off the bicycle 
(receiving a shock) when on this path, regardless of the displayed stimulus. Only CS+, 
CS-, △CS-15, and NS- trials are encountered during these phases. In the pre-acquisition 
phase, shock is never administered/the farmer never falls of his bicycle and the 
participant is informed they are at no risk for shock. In the acquisition phase, participants 
are explicitly informed that they are at risk of shock and that if they attend to the task 
they can learn when shock will occur. During acquisition, shock is paired with the CS+, 
and is never administered on CS-, △CS-, and NS- trials. The contingency was reinforced 
on 100% of CS+ trials through a “shock” graphic representing the farmer falling of his 
bike. However, due to concerns about sensitization to the US and potential “strong 
situations” that reduce response variability (Lissek et al., 2006), the physical shock is 
administered on only 50% of CS+ trials. Due to the lack of ability to avoid the shock, 
these phases only contain trials that index Pavlovian conditioning.  
During the generalization phase, there were two trial-types that alternated every-
other trial: Pavlovian and instrumental trials. Pavlovian trials resembled those from the 
previous phases; although the longer paved road was now open, the participant did not 
have the option to take this road in Pavlovian trials and there remains a chance of shock if 
the CS+ is present (with the 50% physical shock reinforcement, 100% visual 
reinforcement maintained from the acquisition phase). These trials are framed as 
 
 
15 Only the smaller sized triangle was presented during pre-acquisition and acquisition. 
 110 
“planting” trials (the farmer is on his way to plant crops) and are procedurally the same as 
those in the acquisition phases except now GS trials can now be encountered, allowing 
for measurement of Pavlovian generalization. 
On instrumental trials, the participant was alerted that they had 5 seconds to 
choose a path based on the displayed stimulus (or lack of stimulus). The participant was 
then able to choose a path via button press (1 = short dangerous path, 2 = long safe path). 
When taking the short path, the participant was always able to successfully gather the 
planted crops (win condition), but when taking the longer path there was a 75% 
likelihood that the participant would have the crops destroyed by pesky birds (lose 
condition). If participants did not decide within the allotted 5 seconds, they were forced 
to take the short path (and risk shock), yet now could not win by harvesting the crops. 
There was no other reward motivation for taking the short path and harvesting crops other 
than intrinsic motivation to do well on the task and a graphic of the farmer successfully 
harvesting the crops with a small shower of shimmering sparkles. Also important to note 
is that immediately prior to the generalization phase, participants completed a brief 
practice session to learn that the long path was now “open” and to received instructions 
on how to select a path via button press. See Figure 3 for a graphical representation of the 
acquisition and generalization phases. 
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Figure 3. Example trials from the acquisition phase and generalization phase (both 
Pavlovian and Instrumental trials) of the Pavlovian-Instrumental Generalization (PIG) 
paradigm. Each graphic of the farm and roads is a distinct trial, except for the rightmost 
column, in which each pair represents a distinct trial. The leftmost column shows 
examples of a series of acquisition trials and how administration of shock is dependent on 
the presented stimulus. The center and rightmost column depict the progress of trials 
from Pavlovian, to Instrumental, to Pavlovian, and so on, and how participants can 
choose to approach or avoid. The blue “risk” box represents the prompt for participants to 
provide a risk rating on this particular trial. The small speaker graphic indicates a startle 
probe was administered on that trial. Graphic adapted from a scientific presentation given 
by Dr. Lissek, with his permission. CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue; GS = generalization stimuli; NS = no shape. 
Pavlovian response measures. 
Pavlovian fear responses were measured both physiologically and behaviorally 
for each trial type. Using EMG and acoustic startle probes, we measured fear-potentiated 
startle, the reliable magnification of the startle reflex when an organism is in a state of 
fear (e.g., Davis, 1992). Startle was assessed while the farmer biked down the road on 
every Pavlovian trial during generalization (6 out of 6 trials per trial type) and was never 
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assessed during instrumental trials; this helped to slow habituation to the startle probes. 
This yielded a total of 36 startle measurements per participants (6 trials each for 6 trial 
types) during generalization. The startle probe was administered prior to shock, if shock 
was also administered on the trial (i.e., during CS+ trials). Greater fear-potentiated startle 
was used a physiological index of greater fear responsivity to a specific stimulus.  
Perceived risk of shock (“risk ratings”) for a given trial was measured by an 
online button press when prompted (1 = no risk, 2 = some risk, 3 = high risk). We 
explicitly instructed participants to rate their perceived risk of shock in the given moment 
based on what was on the screen, and not risk for an acoustic startle probe. Risk ratings 
were collected on 3 out of 6 Pavlovian trials for each stimulus during the generalization 
phase and were never collected on instrumental trials. This yielded a total of 18 risk 
rating measurements per participants (3 trials each for 6 trial types) during generalization. 
Participants were instructed to provide their response as quickly as possible, and response 
time was also recorded, but not analyzed for the current dissertation and will be reported 
elsewhere. Higher risk ratings were used a behavioral index of higher perceived risk (i.e., 
threat estimation). 
Instrumental response measure. 
Instrumental responses were indexed by the dichotomous decision made on 
instrumental trials. When indexed at the individual trial level, responses were coded as 0 
= approached and 1 = avoided. Trials in which the participant did not respond within the 
allotted 5 seconds were not coded and excluded from analyses. Instrumental response 
was recorded for all instrumental trials (6 out of 6 trials per trial type) and was never 
assessed during Pavlovian trials. This yielded a total of 36 instrumental decisions per 
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participants (6 trials each for 6 trial types). As with risk ratings, participants were 
instructed to provide their decision response as quickly as possible, and response time 
was recorded but not analyzed. 
Procedure 
Participants provide informed consent prior to completing the online battery of 
questionnaires. Soon after completing these questionnaires, but on a different day, 
participants arrived at our laboratory. Participants then complete measures of state 
variables (e.g., state anxiety, depressive symptoms) and brief cognitive testing (which is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation and will be reported elsewhere). Next, participants 
were informed that they will begin the part of the study that involves shock, and 
psychophysiological measurement and shock electrodes were attached using a 
standardized procedure. We then calibrated shock intensity to an appropriate level for 
each participant through a commonly used standardized “shock work-up” procedure. In 
this procedure, we asked participants to rate a series of sample shocks on a scale of 1–5 
(1 = no discomfort/ pain, 5 = very painful), with the goal of finding the level of shock 
corresponding to a “3” to “3.5” rating (uncomfortable but not painful) for the participant. 
Once an appropriate level of shock was confirmed, participants put on headphones and 
were introduced to the PIG task. 
The PIG task was presented on a desktop computer with a 22-inch monitor in a 
dimly let experimental booth, with participants sitting approximately 26 inches away 
from the screen. Next, participants completed a brief habituation sequence in which the 
screen was blank and 9 startle probes were administered pseudo-randomly and presented 
with 9-22 seconds between each probe. After the habituation sequence, we provided 
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general instructions regarding the PIG task, and specifically informed participants that if 
they attended to the presented shapes they could learn to predict when a shock will occur, 
but were not explicitly told of the CS+/US contingency. Prior to the generalization phase, 
participants were instructed as to the safety/danger value of each path and are informed 
that what they learned from previous phases still applies. Participants complete 
questionnaires after the acquisition and generalization phase to assess conditioning and 
motivations for avoidance.  
Data Processing and Statistical Analysis Plan  
Startle data reduction and preparation. 
To quantify fear-potentiated startle, we rectified and smooth startle EMG (20-ms 
moving window average). The onset latency window for the blink reflex was set at 20–
100 ms, and the peak magnitude was determined within 120 ms of response onset. We 
then subtracted the average baseline EMG level for the 50 ms preceding the startle 
stimulus from the EMG peak levels, resulting in a final startle magnitude value 
represented in microvolts (μV). Zero magnitudes were included due to part of the startle 
reflex involving a degree of non-responsiveness; however, participants with mean startle 
< 1 μV were excluded from analyses as non-responders.  
Self-report data reduction and preparation. 
Personality variables demonstrating skewness greater than .75 were log-
transformed to normalize the distribution of said variables. Standardization of personality 
variables is described within individual analytic subsections that immediately follow this 
section, as the method of standardization differed based on analytic need.  
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We created five of the aforementioned “PB” scales, which were derived from the 
PID-5 and BFAS. The composite variables constructed were “Distress-PB” (contains 
Withdrawn Distress [BFAS]; Anxiousness, Depressivity, Separation Insecurity [PID-5]); 
“Industriousness-PB” (contains Industriousness [BFAS]; Distractibility, Impulsivity, 
Perseveration, Risk Taking, Irresponsibility [PID-5, reverse scaled]); “Orderliness-PB” 
(contains Orderliness [BFAS]; Rigid Perfectionism [PID-5]),  “Enthusiasm-PB” (contains 
Enthusiasm[BFAS]; Social Withdrawal, Anhedonia, Restricted Affectivity, Intimacy 
Avoidance, Suspiciousness [PID-5, reverse scaled]); and “Assertiveness-PB” (contains 
Assertiveness[BFAS]; (Submissiveness [PID-5, reverse scaled]). All PB variables have 
this abbreviation appended to the end of the scale description to differentiate these scales 
from the BFAS scales that have the same name. 
Preliminary statistical analyses. 
Statistical analyses consisted of three phases: manipulation checks, sample 
characteristics, and main analyses. All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 
2014) in the R Studio environment (RStudio Team, 2018). Each analytic phase is 
described in detail below: 
Manipulation checks.  
We used rmANOVA models fitted in the ez package (Lawrence, 2013) to confirm 
that the PIG task was resulting in successful fear conditioning and generalized fear and 
avoidance that was consistent with prior results using this task. Each model contained a 
single Stimulus factor (△CS-, oCS-, CS+, and for the generalization phase, all GSs) 
modeled as a within-subjects factor, and the dependent variable was represented as the 
average response to each stimulus condition. Two separate models were run for both pre-
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acquisition and acquisition experimental phases (one each for startle and risk rating data) 
and three were run for generalization (startle, risk rating, and avoidance models). In 
addition to testing of the within-subjects main effect, we conducted quadratic trend 
analysis to confirm generalization effects. To align with prior work from our group and 
others, within-subjects T-scores were used for analysis of startle data in rmANOVAs to 
control for potential between-subject variability resulting from non-psychological 
processes (e.g., obligatory startle) and sum of squares calculation was set to be identical 
to what was used in prior studies (i.e., Type 3 calculation – the SPSS default). We 
conducted Mauchly’s sphericity test for all models and applied Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction to all tests that violated sphericity. Omega-squared (ω2) effect size estimates 
are provided for all effects (Olejnik & Algina, 2003). 
Sample characteristics. 
 We conducted two sets of zero-order correlation analyses to assist with 
characterizing our sample and preparing for interpretation of main analyses. The first set 
of correlational tests were those testing the associations amongst the measured 
dispositional individual difference traits. The second set of tests correlated each measure 
collected during generalization (startle, risk ratings, and avoidance) for each stimulus 
with each other; data from the pre-acquisition and acquisition phases were excluded from 
these analyses due to the foci of the current investigation. 
Main statistical analyses.  
All main analyses (i.e., those conducted to address the stated aims of this study) 
were conducted using multilevel models, which we fitted with the lme4 package (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). As previously mentioned, MLM techniques provide 
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substantial incremental utility over rmANOVA models by allowing the testing of 
naturally nested data (for our purposes, within-subject independent variables) in 
conjunction with continuous outcome variables, and do not have the drawbacks inherent 
to rmANOVA. We will first describe overall model characteristics and how they were 
estimated, and then will provide a specific outline of our model fitting, permutations on 
the model, and hypothesis testing strategy. 
Model characteristics and parameters. 
All fitted models were two level MLMs, with level 1 referred to as the “Task” 
level and level 2 referred to as the “Person” level, as each Task variable is nested within 
each Person (i.e., we measured each participant on each trial type on the PIG task). 
Accordingly, all intra-individual difference (i.e., within-subject) variables pertaining to 
the PIG (stimulus class, experimental outcome measure when used as a predictor) were 
entered at level 1, and all inter-individual difference (i.e., between-subjects) variables 
(personality variables, demographic variables) were entered at level 2. The dependent 
variable is by definition a level 1 variable in MLM. Unless otherwise noted, stimulus 
dimension (“Stimulus”) was entered as a continuous variable (consistent with studies 
identifying generalization as an inherently continuous process; e.g., Tenenbaum & 
Griffiths, 2001) in which △CS- was considered the control condition (i.e., no Stimulus 
effect) and therefore was coded as 0, the oCS- was coded as 1, GS1 as 2, GS2 as 3, GS3 
as 4, and CS+ as 5, resulting in a continuous 0-5 scale.  
Pairwise deletion was used to exclude missing outcome data for each participant 
as needed; MLM assumptions are not violated if cases with partially missing data are 
present (Gelman & Hill, 2006). All dependent variables were unstandardized per 
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regression best-practices (Fischer & Milfont, 2010), as well as due to particular 
complications that arise with this technique if done in MLMs (Moeller, 2015). 
Centering/standardization is typically accomplished through two methods in MLM: 
centering at the grand mean (CGM) and centering within cluster16 (CWC), which can also 
be thought of as centering using the grand mean of all participants compared with 
centering repeated measures within each participant using their individual mean, 
respectively (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Each method of centering/standardization is used 
for different reasons related to a priori interest in level 1 effects, level 2 effects, or cross-
level interactions (i.e., interactions between one or more level 1 and level 2 variables). 
Unless otherwise noted, we used CGM for level 2 variables. This decision was made 
based on recommendations (Enders & Tofighi, 2007) that 1) CGM should be used when 
testing level 2 variables while controlling for level 1 variables (e.g.,  effect of 
dispositional trait while controlling for stimulus type to quantify main effect); and 2) 
CGM is recommended for interactions between level 2 variables (i.e., using interactions 
between two dispositional traits as predictors). Our models did not contain level 1 
variables that are appropriately transformed with a centering technique (i.e., they are 
variables representing the stimulus dimension as defined by the PIG task and are a 
constant across participants) with the notable exception of APIC analyses; this exception 
is discussed in the following section. Further, scaling using z-scores was the specific 
centering technique used for CGM; we made this decision in accordance with 
 
 
16 The “clustering” terminology is reflective of a strong MLM tradition within the educational sciences and 
thus many MLM examples and terms refer to clusters of people at level 1 (i.e., children clustered within a 
class) – for our purposes, clustering refers to clusters of task data, not clusters of people. In other words, 
each person is a cluster. 
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recommendations for improving interpretability of interaction terms for two or more 
continuous variables (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Friedrich, 1982). Related to this, 
standardized interaction terms were defined using the product of standardized lower-
order terms, again in accordance with standard recommendations (Aiken et al., 1991; 
Friedrich, 1982). For predicting an assumed normally-distributed outcome (i.e., startle 
and risk ratings), standard MLM (i.e., linear mixed modeling [LMM]) was used to fit the 
data. For predicting a binomially-distributed outcome (i.e., avoidance), the generalized 
extension of a standard MLM was used (i.e., generalized linear mixed model; GLMM) to 
fit the data, with predictors linked to the binomial outcome via a logit-link function (as in 
logistic regression). All model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE), which is standard for MLMs containing a sufficient number of level 2 
observations/sample size (Gelman & Hill, 2006; Maas & Hox, 2005), and the “optimx” 
family of optimization algorithms were used as the computational method for all models 
to maximize the likelihood function central to MLE (Nash, 2014). Two forms of R2 were 
obtained for each MLM using the sjstats package (Lüdecke, 2018): marginal R2, which is 
an estimate of variance accounted for by fixed-effects only, and conditional R2, which is 
an estimate of variance accounted for by fixed-effects plus random-effects (i.e., the entire 
model) (Nakagawa, Johnson, & Schielzeth, 2017). For all models, we visually inspected 
residual plots and qq-plots to detect obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or 
normality (Gelman & Hill, 2006). Finally, it should be noted that due to the complexity 
of the analyses and the relatively small number of observations for each participant 
(compared with the bulk of studies using MLM; Kondo et al., 2009; Sellström & 
Bremberg, 2006), it is possible that a small number of the more complex models will not 
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be successfully fit (i.e., model convergence will not be possible and no parameters can be 
estimated); this will be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
Initial model fitting plan. 
Standard MLM best practices in psychological research involves the fitting of 
successive models in a hierarchical fashion (i.e., each successive model contains all terms 
from the previous model and adds additional terms) with the goal of finding the optimal 
balance between model parsimony and explanatory power while also building a model 
that is useful for addressing the scientific questions under investigation (Aguinis, 
Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Bolker et al., 
2009; Gelman & Hill, 2006). As discussed previously, this approach has been strongly 
recommended for primary analyses in experimental fear generalization studies 
(Vanbrabant et al., 2015) and has been adopted by multiple generalization research 
groups for their studies (e.g., FeldmanHall et al., 2018; Ginat-Frolich, Klein, Katz, & 
Shechner, 2017; Lenaert, van de Ven, Kaas, & Vlaeyen, 2016; Lommen et al., 2017). 
 Given we have three dependent variables, we conducted three parallel “lines” of 
analyses. For each line, we initially started with a random-intercept only model that did 
not contain any fixed effects. These models, sometimes referred to as “null models”, 
provide the rationale for conducting MLM in the first place, as they allow us to answer if 
there is sufficient within-subjects variance (i.e., dependencies) that needs to be accounted 
for through a MLM technique (Gelman & Hill, 2006). An intraclass coefficient (ICC), 
which typically ranges from 0 to 1, is used to quantify the proportion of within-subject 
variance (how similar observations are within a person compared to similarity between 
people), with higher ICCs indicative of a higher proportion of within-subjects variance 
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and need for MLM (Koo & Li, 2016; Musca et al., 2011). We calculated adjusted ICC for 
models that include a random-slope term due to concerns about an unadjusted ICC not 
reflecting the correct variance proportions in these models (Goldstein, Browne, & 
Rasbash, 2002; P. C. D. Johnson, 2014).  
If the ICC confirmed the need for MLM, we then followed the general approach 
outlined by Vanbrabant et al. (2015). “Base models” (models without dispositional traits 
of interest) were constructed, starting with a simple random-intercept only model (Model 
0 in our framework) that allows each person to have their own intercept and also contain 
the continous “Stimulus” variable at level 1 as a fixed effect and Gender (coded 
dichotomously) entered as a level 2 fixed effect. We included Gender as a covariate 
based on 1) preliminary analyses from this and a related sample using the same task that 
significant gender effects exist for multiple dependent variables, most notably avoidance, 
and 2) ongoing research documenting gender effects in experimental studies of fear and 
anxiety (McLean & Anderson, 2009), including fear conditioning studies (e.g., 
Rosenbaum et al., 2015). 
Next, we added a Stimulus random-effect parameter, this parameter estimates a 
random slope for each participant (i.e., the line of best fit given the values observed for 
each level of Stimulus for that particular person), for our first random-intercept/random-
slope model (Model 1). The fixed-effect term for Stimulus is maintained from the 
previous model, as is always the case when adding a random-effect. In the next model 
(Model 2), we add a quadratic effect of Stimulus to our model (Stimulus2) by 
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exponentiating the continuous variable and including it as a fixed-effect in our model17; 
this is both in line with recommendations from Vanbrabant et al. (2015) and prior 
generalization findings of stronger quadratic components indexing less generalization 
(for review, see Dymond, Dunsmoor, et al., 2014). In the final model (Model 3), we also 
add a Stimulus2 random-effect, which allows us to estimate both linear and quadratic 
parameters for each participant’s individual slope. To ascertain which base model was 
optimal for further testing, we used the “keep it maximal” data-driven approach 
recommended by Barr et al. (2013), in which the model with the most complex random-
effects structure that is allowed by the data and study design considerations. In our study, 
this was operationalized as 1) the most complex model in terms of random-effects 
structure; 2) the model contained at least one random-slope term (as the goal of the study 
is to identify individual differences in generalization, which suggests individual slope 
coefficients are needed); 3) model fitting did not result in a singular fit (i.e., one of the 
random-effects accounts close to or exactly 0/the model is overfitted); and 4) the model 
was a significantly better fit for the data than the previous model in the series (i.e., a 
model with exactly one less term), indicating that the additional term was significantly 
improving the predictive power of the model while the model also remained relatively 
parsimonious. To determine this last criterion, we used log-likelihood tests (Bolker et al., 
2009) to assess differences in model fit (see the later section on hypothesis testing for a 
more thorough description of this test). 
Model fitting plan for modeling effects of interest. 
 
 
17 Note that although higher-order polynomials (e.g., cubic) are potentially informative in this context, there 
is a high risk of overfitting the data given the task design (Vanbrabant et al., 2015) and thus we do not go 
beyond the quadratic polynomial 
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 Once a base model was identified as meeting our established criteria, we built a 
series of models predicated on published recommendations (Gazendam et al., 2014; 
Harrison et al., 2018; Vanbrabant et al., 2015), the current investigation’s scientific aims, 
and our hypothesis testing plan. These series of models were defined in a hierarchical 
fashion and, an example of which can be seen in Appendix A. We will use two an 
example involving BFAS traits to provide a detailed illustration of our procedure, one 
that illustrates our procedure for testing a single individual difference measure, multiple 
individual difference measures, and interactions among those measures. 
For the first example: For models testing Neuroticism, we first entered 
Neuroticism in the base model as a level 2 fixed-effect. This model now outputs a 
Neuroticism coefficient and allows for testing of a “main effect” of Neuroticism. Next, 
we interacted Neuroticism with the Stimulus (linear only) variable, and in a separate 
model interacted Neuroticism with both the Stimulus and Stimulus2 (quadratic) variable, 
which results in two separate two-way interactions in the same model that together 
describe a curvilinear relationship. The former model provides an estimate of the effect of 
Neuroticism on the dependent variable that is conditional on the level of Stimulus when 
modeled linearly with no curve, the latter model provides an estimate of the effect of 
Neuroticism on the dependent variable that is conditional on the level of Stimulus when 
also modeled linearly and but now is allowed to curve (i.e., has a quadratic component). 
Alternatively, this can be viewed as testing if Neuroticism helps explain variability in the 
estimated generalization gradient when modeled only using linear components or with a 
polynomial (quadratic) component.  
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 After this stage, further models would be constructed if the candidate personality 
dimension was a higher-order trait that was comprised of two or more lower-order 
dimensions (e.g., aspect or facet) and was specified as a candidate lower-order dimension 
in our a priori hypotheses. For this example, two aspects underlie Neuroticism 
(Withdrawal and Volatility) and we have predictions related to both, thus additional 
models are built to test these aspects. A sub-series of models are built using the exact 
technique as described in the previous paragraph, one for Withdrawal and, separately, 
one for Volatility. Additionally, a third series of models were built that is similar but 
contains both aspects in the same models. In the initial model, Withdrawal and Volatility 
are modeled as separate level 2 fixed-effects, providing “main effects” for one aspect 
while controlling for the other. The next pair of models then contains cross-level 
interactions, with Volatility and Withdrawal separately interacted with 1) the Stimulus 
variable or 2) both the Stimulus and Stimulus2 (quadratic) variable; this latter model 
results in two pairs of separate two-way interactions in the same model. Next, depending 
on specific hypotheses, an additional model contains a within-level 2 interaction between 
the two aspects, which allows for testing of conditional effects of one aspect on the other 
that might be obscured when only modeling the higher-order trait (which is 
mathematically the average of both aspects). Relatedly and also depending on 
hypotheses, two subsequent models would then interact this within-level 2 two-way 
interaction term with one of the two Stimulus terms to create two separate cross-level 
three-way interaction models. Additionally, due to potential concerns about violations of 
model assumptions driven by multicollinearity in the more complex models (Echambadi 
& Hess, 2007; Gelman & Hill, 2006; Snijders & Berkhof, 2008), descriptive diagnostics, 
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most pertinently variable inflation factor (VIF) were produced and examined for all 
models containing more than one level-2 trait variable. 
Modifications in model fitting plan for APIC-G/APIC-CS+ analyses. 
 An exception to the previously outlined procedures is our plan for APIC-G/APIC-
CS+ analyses. To facilitate testing of these relationships and to approximate prior 
research using models without random-effects (van Meurs et al., 2014), we made a 
number of important modifications. First, there were six “lines” of models. There were 
two for APIC overall (not distinguishing between APIC-G and CS+); two for APIC-G 
and two for APIC-CS+: within each type of APIC analysis, there was one model with 
startle values as a level-1 predictor, and one with risk rating values as a level-1 predictor, 
with each Pavlovian value yoked to one avoidance value based on how our data was 
structured. Second, to directly model APIC, initial model fitting included the Pavlovian 
fear index at level-1, and all models interacted the Pavlovian level-1 value with one or 
both Stimulus dimensional variables. Third, due to the nature of the PIG design used in 
this study, we were not able to model each avoidance observation separately, as risk 
ratings are only assessed three times per trial type during generalization compared with 
six times per trial type for avoidance. Due to this mismatch, we used the average 
response on each trial type for all Pavlovian predictors and for avoidance in these models 
(e.g., average startle, risk rating, and avoidance to CS+, GS3, GS2, etc.). Fourth, given 
that APIC modeled using MLM involves a level-1 predictor (Pavlovian x Instrumental, 
both are level-1 variables), Pavlovian variables were centered using CWC (in our study, 
referred to as within-subject centering) per standard guidelines (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). 
This removes between-subjects variation for level-1 predictors (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
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2002) and therefore accounts for the dependency between the two Pavlovian variables 
and avoidance decisions, which is by definition a non-independent/within-subjects 
relationship because all three variables are collected during the PIG task for all 
participants. Fifth, the outcome variable, avoidance, is typically modeled as binary 
outcome in “success/failure” form (i.e., 0 or 1). However, for these analyses, avoidance 
was modeled as the proportion of avoidance decisions (# of avoidance decisions/total 
trials). As the proportion is still bound by 0 and 1, it is permissible, if not ideal, to use this 
form of our avoidance data in the logistic regression framework. At this point, the overall 
APIC model did receive any additional modifications. However, one additional change 
was made for APIC-G and APIC-CS+ models: the coding for Stimulus dimension was 
modified in accordance with the effect of interest. For both APIC-G and APIC-CS+ the △CS- was kept as the referent and coded as zero; for APIC-G the GS1 was coded as 1, 
the GS2 as 2, and the GS3 as 3 (oCS- and CS+ excluded; and for APIC-CS+ only the 
CS+ was added in addition to the △CS- and coded with a 1 (i.e., CS+ and △CS- were 
dummy coded).  
Hypothesis testing plan. 
We used two different techniques for hypothesis testing. The type of test 
depended on the specific hypothesis that we were addressing. For predictions related to 
specific main effects or interactions (and their corresponding coefficients), the 
“lmerTest” package was used (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017) to provide 
appropriate degrees of freedom for hypothesis testing of fixed-effect predictors. In the 
case of standard linear MLMs (i.e., LMMs), which we used for models predicting startle 
and risk rating outcomes, we used Wald F-tests in conjunction with Satterthwaite's 
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method (Satterthwaite, 1946), which provides an effective degrees of freedom for data 
that has an overall distribution comprised of multiple independent sources of variation (in 
our MLMs, this is due to each participant having their own within-task variance) and has 
been proposed as an acceptable technique for testing MLM components (e.g., Berkhof & 
Snijders, 2001). The Satterthwaite estimated degrees of freedom are used in standard F-
tests for each coefficient of interest, and can be interpreted in a similar fashion to how F- 
or t-tests for standard multiple regression models/individual coefficients are interpreted. 
For generalized MLMs (i.e., GLMMs), which we used for models predicting avoidance, 
we again used a Wald’s test; in this case the Wald chi-square goodness-of-fit test that 
yields a χ2 statistic. This test indicates if a model including the tested predictor 
outperforms a model that does not include the tested predictor (Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, & 
Sturdivant, 2013), and in terms of precision and bias performs similarly to a t-test in 
larger samples (Agresti & Kateri, 2011; Hauck Jr & Donner, 1977). Given that it is a 
goodness-of-fit test, there is one degree of freedom, and the reported N for each test 
refers to number of analyzed Level 1 observations (i.e., number of individual avoidance 
decisions available for analysis), not Level 2 observations (i.e., number of participants). 
Both forms of Wald tests previously described are commonly used for testing fixed-
effects in MLM (Berkhof & Snijders, 2001; Maas & Hox, 2005). These tests were used 
for Aims 1, 3, and 4, which all centered on testing specific MLM variance components. 
The second type of test we used was the log-likelihood ratio test (LRT), another 
goodness-of-fit test. This test was used at the level of the whole model, and specifically 
to determine if one model is a significantly better fit for the data compared with a 
different model (i.e., better predictive power without adding excessive error to the model) 
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and is a standard technique for comparing models in an MLM framework (Gelman & 
Hill, 2006). LRTs were performed to either compare initial models that did not include a 
predictor of interest (e.g., personality variable) to a model that contains the predictor of 
interest, or to hierarchically compare goodness-of-fit across a series of models that 
include predictor(s) of interest (e.g., comparing the model that only contains Neuroticism 
to the model that contains the Neuroticism aspects, or to the model that contains 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness). The LRTs reported in this 
dissertation were performed on the deviance statistic that is calculated for all MLMs in 
lme4; this statistic is a numerical index of how well a nested model fits compared with a 
hypothetically perfectly fitted model, with a smaller deviance statistic corresponding with 
a better fitting model. The LRT compares the likelihood of obtaining a “true” deviance 
statistic using the chi-square distribution, and therefore we report χ2 statistics for these 
tests. We also provide the marginal R2 (denoted herein as RM2) when reporting LRT 
results to provide an effect size estimate (i.e., magnitude of prediction improvement). 
Deviation scores, as well as another index of model fit (Akaike Index Criteria [AIC]) are 
provided for models in their corresponding tables. These tests were used for Aim 2 only. 
It should also be noted that although many more models are created in the current 
study’s approach than with rmANOVA, the number of hypothesis tests are comparable, 
as rmANOVA main effects and lower-order interactions can largely be interpreted 
without regard to how one affects the other (e.g., a main effect test in rmANOVA is still 
interpreted as a main effect even if there is an interaction including the main effect factor 
in the same model) and therefore multiple hypothesis tests can be done using a single 
model. In contrast, there are many more models constructed in this study than in 
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equivalent studies using rmANOVA techniques, but fewer hypothesis tests per model 
(e.g., we do not interpret lower-order terms in models that contain a two-way interaction).  
Interaction follow-up testing plan. 
 Our plan for follow-up analyses on significant interactions (as indicted by the χ2 
and F-tests outlined in the previous section) involved both quantitative and graphical 
techniques.  First, it should be noted that only the highest-order interaction in a model 
was interpreted and subject to follow-up analyses unless otherwise noted. This is because 
interpretation of lower-order interactions in models with multiple levels of interactive 
effects is not recommended, especially if intending to interpret as an unconditional 
interaction (i.e., as if the higher-order interaction wasn’t in the model) (A. F. Hayes, 
2018; A. F. Hayes, Glynn, & Huge, 2012). This means that for models containing three-
way interactions, we did not interpret coefficients for two-way interactions in the same 
model.  
For two-way interactions that are equivalent to generalization gradients from prior 
work (i.e., a Stimulus dimension interacted with an individual difference), we generated 
two types of plots. The first plot depicts raw dependent variable values (i.e., actual 
values) on the y-axis graphed across the categorical Stimulus continuum on the x-axis, 
and the individual difference variable dichotomized (for graphing purposes only) into 
averaged high (above the median) and low (below the median) groups and represented 
with separate lines depicting point estimates at each Stimulus level. These plots resemble 
traditional generalization gradients and therefore both the overall shape (e.g., degree of 
departure of the slope from linearity) and specific slope segments (e.g., relative steepness 
or shallowness of the segment) are interpreted. The second plot involves fitted values 
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from the model containing the significant interaction, again plotted across the Stimulus 
dimension and for high/low averaged levels of the individual difference, but also with 
95% confidence intervals visualized for each plotted line. These plots accompany the 
generalization gradients for more precise interpretation of results in the context of an 
interaction with two continuous variables, which are what we test in the current 
dissertation’s multilevel models, as opposed to the two categorical variable interactions 
typically seen in the generalization literature using rmANOVA (e.g., anxiety disorder 
group x categorical stimulus dimension). More specifically, these fitted line plots depict 
the strength of the linear relationship between the continuous individual difference 
variable and the dependent variable as a function of change in stimulus value, with larger 
gaps between the plotted lines and their confidence intervals indicating stronger relations 
between the individual difference and the dependent variable. The traditional 
generalization gradients do not provide this level of nuance and ability to visualize linear 
change across the stimulus continuum due to the use of actual values (as opposed to fitted 
values) and relying on point estimates at each stimulus level. Of note, these fitted values 
plots are only useful to interpret generalization effects when used in conjunction with the 
generalization gradients, as the shape of the gradient is largely lost when a fitted line is 
visualized instead of actual values.  
 For three-way interactions (i.e., those resulting from APIC analyses, which 
contain Trait x Stimulus x Pavlovian variable interactions), we used a simple-slopes 
approach, modified to account for multilevel modeling techniques (Aiken et al., 1991; 
Bauer & Curran, 2005; Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2017), to decompose the 
interaction. Specifically, after identifying the significant interaction, the moderator of 
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interest was re-centered so that its new center was 1 standard deviation above the actual 
mean (i.e., 1 SD is added as a constant to all z-scored values) and the model was re-run. 
This was repeated for 1 standard deviation below the mean. These two additional models 
now contained a lower-order term with the non-moderating interaction variable that 
yields a simple slope coefficient which could be tested to determine if the high (+1SD) 
and/or low (-1SD) moderator slope is significant and contributing to the original 
significant interaction (as this lower-order term now represents the effect of the non-
moderating interactive variable at the zero-point of the re-centered moderator, which 
means the -1SD model provides a high zero-point/high simple slope and the +1SD model 
provides the low zero-point/low simple slope). The next step was visualization of the 
interaction, again using multiple types of plots to visualize the interaction at focal values 
for multiple predictors. The first type of plot was similar to the first type of plot used for 
two-way interactions, except that fitted values were used, the y-axis corresponded to 
avoidance (represented as a percentage), the x-axis corresponded to the Pavlovian 
response variable (startle or risk ratings), and separate plots for each stimulus level were 
generated. The individual difference variable (the moderator in APIC models) was again 
dichotomized into high/low groups based on the median. These plots included both a 
scatterplot component, with each point colored according to group designation, and two 
summary fit lines that were again coded by group. This combination provides both an 
estimation of the potential moderation effect at each stimulus level, as well as 
information about the overall Pavlovian x avoidance relationship (which can be seen in 
the overall pattern of the plotted points. Additionally, we generated separate plots 
visualizing the simple regression slopes described previously (each plot contained the +1 
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and -1 SD slopes) at the level of CS+ and GSs (i.e., the stimuli levels of interest for 
APIC). These simple slope plots allowed for interpretation of relative effect of the 
moderator on avoidance, as opposed to the absolute effect seen in the fitted value scatter 
plots (e.g., a potentially large moderating effect for the GS1 might be obscured in the 
scatterplot due to overall smaller range of avoidance values associated with the GS1). It 
should also be noted that we refrained from plotting the simple slope at the level of the 
mean, which is common for simple slopes analyses, because 1) it simplified visualization;  
2) only two values (e.g., high/low values) are needed to interpret a linear continuous 
moderator; and 3) there is not a unique meaning to an average level of most of the 
personality variables tested in this study. Both types of plots were interpreted to 
decompose three-way interactions, with the simple slopes plots prioritized if the summary 
fit lines or individual points in the scatterplots were ambiguous (e.g., difficult to 
distinguish between the lines or clusters of points) or if a visible outlier was present, but 
did not merit exclusion due to a lack of statistical evidence that the particular point was 
an outlier and unduly influenced results. It should also be noted that the scatterplots 
represent a more modest split of the continuous individual difference variable, whereas 
the simple slopes represent relatively extreme high/low values, which can lead to slight 
differences between the plots. Despite this, we contend that both types of plots were 
necessary to obtain an adequate visual summary of our results. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Manipulation checks. 
Pre-acquisition. 
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 In line with previous generalization work and our group’s previous study using 
the PIG, we did not find significant within-subject differences in startle (p = .41, ns) or 
risk ratings (p = .23, ns) at pre-acquisition (i.e., prior to conditioning). 
Acquisition. 
 See Figure 4 for graphed results. There was a significant main effect of Trial-
Type, F(2, 279) = 97.62 , p < .001, ω2 = .158, for startle data, reflecting potentiated 
startle to the CS+ compared with the oCS-, t(279) = 10.85, p < .001, and with the △CS-, 
t(279) = 11.71, p < .001; the difference between the oCS- and △CS-was not significant, 
t(279) = 1.01, p = .31. 
There was also a significant main effect of Trial-Type, F(2, 283) =  1326.96, p < 
.001, ω2 = .728 for risk rating data, reflecting higher ratings for the CS+ compared with 
the oCS-, t(283) = 38.37, p < .001, and with the △CS-, t(283) = 43.36, p < .001. The 
oCS- was also rated significantly higher than the △CS-, t(283) = 2.85, p = .004.  
 
Figure 4.	Average startle (left) and risk rating (right) responses to the triangular CS-, 
circular CS-, and CS+ during the acquisition phase. Startle responses are represented in t-
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score form (within-subject standardization). Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; RR = risk rating. 
Generalization.  
 Startle. 
 Potentiated startle to the CS+ relative to the safety stimuli persisted into the 
generalization phase (oCS-: t[287] = 16.88, p < .001; △CS-: t[287] = 16.94, p < .001). 
There was a main effect of Trial-Type, F(5, 287) = 315.73 , p < .001, ω2 = .515, which 
was consistent with generalization across the stimulus continuum. A significant quadratic 
trend, F(1, 287) = 280.61, p < .001, ω2 = .475, confirmed a generalization effect in the 
startle data. There continued to be no significant difference in startle potentiation between 
the oCS- and △CS-, t(287) = -0.63.94, p = .52). See Figure 5 for graphed generalization 
gradient. 
 Risk ratings. 
Elevated risk ratings to the CS+ relative to the safety stimuli persisted into the 
generalization phase (oCS-: t[287] = 55.51, p < .001; △CS-: t[287] = 54.59, p < .001). 
There was a main effect of Trial-Type, F(5, 287) = 1141.92 , p < .001, ω2 = .706, which 
was consistent with generalization across the stimulus continuum. A significant quadratic 
trend, F(1, 287) = 732.64, p < .001, ω2 = .570, confirmed a generalization effect in the 
risk rating data. The significantly higher risk ratings to the oCS- compared with the △CS- 
during acquisition did not persist into generalization, t(287) = -1.43, p = .15). See Figure 
5 for graphed generalization gradient. 
 Avoidance. 
Rate of avoidance for the CS+ was significantly higher compared with the safety 
stimuli (oCS-: t[287] = 26.34, p < .001; △CS-: t[287] = 26.35, p < .001), indicating 
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successful instrumental conditioning. There was a main effect of Trial-Type, F(5, 287) = 
504.48 , p < .001, ω2 = .497, which was consistent with generalization across the stimulus 
continuum. A significant quadratic trend, F(1, 287) = 441.16, p < .001, ω2 = .407, 
confirmed a generalization effect in the avoidance data. We did not find a significant 
difference in avoidance rate between the oCS- and △CS-, t(287) = -0.188, p = .85). See 
Figure 5 for graphed generalization gradient. 
 
Figure 5. Average startle (left), risk rating (center), and avoidance (right) responses to the 
triangular CS-, circular CS-, GSs, and CS+ during the generalization phase. Startle 
responses are represented in psychometric t-score form (within-subject standardization). 
Avoidance responses are represented in percentage, with 100% equal to always avoiding. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Av = avoidance; CS- = conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimuli; RR = risk rating. 
 
Interim summary of manipulation checks. 
 All manipulation checks were successful, and indicated that across all indices 1) 
participants did not have a differential response to the PIG stimuli prior to conditioning; 
2) learned the CS+/US contingency; 3) demonstrated discrimination between the CS+ 
and the safety stimuli and that this persisted from the acquisition phase to the 
generalization phase; 4) that the task successfully elicited generalization from the CS+ to 
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the GSs; and 5) that participants learned the instrumental association. Additionally, no 
differences were found between the two conditioned safety cues (oCS- and △CS-), with   
the exception of participants rating the oCS- as significantly more dangerous than the △CS- within the acquisition phase only; this effect did not persist into the generalization 
phase. These results are close to identical to those found in the initial study using the PIG 
paradigm (van Meurs et al., 2014), with the exception that the prior study found a trend 
towards greater startle to the oCS- compared with the △CS- during acquisition, and did 
not find a risk rating difference during this phase. 
Participant characteristics. 
 For descriptive statistics for scales analyzed in the current study, see Table 3. For 
an expanded set of tables that includes descriptive statistics for scales from the measures 
administered in this study, including those not used for analyses (e.g., Agreeableness and 
Openness/Intellect from BFAS, individual facets from PID-5) see Appendix B. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for broadband (BFAS, PID, PB) and narrowband 
measures (TF-44, IUSF, ASI, STAI-T). 
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max 
BFAS (trait)      
Neuroticism 2.7 0.72 1.15 2.67 4.6 
Conscientiousness 3.49 0.57 1.35 3.5 4.75 
Extraversion 3.51 0.64 1.7 3.52 4.8 
      
BFAS (aspect)      
(N) Withdrawal  2.82 0.75 1.1 2.8 4.6 
(N) Volatility 2.57 0.82 1 2.6 4.9 
(C) Industriousness  3.46 0.67 1.2 3.5 5 
(C) Orderliness 3.53 0.64 1.5 3.6 4.8 
(E) Assertiveness  3.38 0.71 1.6 3.4 5 
(E) Enthusiasm 3.65 0.77 1.1 3.7 5 
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Trait individual difference variables.  
 Table 4 contains correlations between all trait variables that were included in 
main analysis models. As can be seen, the majority of the trait variables significant 
correlated with the other trait variables measure, and therefore the magnitude of 
correlation is the more important information presented in Table 4. 
Task variables. 
Table 5 contains correlations between all variables (startle, risk ratings, and 
avoidance) at each stimulus level for the generalization phase.  As can be seen, most 
avoidance and risk rating indices significantly positively correlated with each other, 
PID-5 (trait)      
Negative Affectivity 0.9 0.42 0.12 0.86 2.11 
Disinhibition 1.01 0.37 0.28 0.96 2.33 
Detachment 0.74 0.44 0.04 0.67 2.17 
      
PID-5/BFAS (PB) composite      
Distress-PB 0 0.81 -1.34 -0.08 2.43 
Industriousness-PB 0 0.73 -2.88 0.13 1.35 
Orderliness-PB 0 0.87 -2.17 -0.01 2.3 
Assertiveness-PB 0 0.8 -1.93 0.05 2.04 
Enthusiasm-PB 0 0.75 -2.39 0.08 1.32 
      
Narrowband traits      
TF-44 62.08 21.78 0 62 122 
IUSF 31.07 8.99 12 31 59 
ASI 22.4 12.15 0 20 59 
STAI-T 41.95 9.94 24 41 70 
Notes: BFAS aspect labels are preceded by the corresponding higher-order trait. 
Component scales of PB variables are standardized prior to calculation, therefore means 
for all PB scales are zero. ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; BFAS = Big Five Aspect 
Scale; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; IUSF = Intolerance of Uncertainty – 
Short Form; PB = PID-5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; 
N = Neuroticism; STAI-T= State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait version; TF-44 = Trait 
Fear – 44 item. 
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whereas raw startle was not related to the other two task variables when the association 
was measured with simple Pearson correlations. 
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Table 4. Trait variable correlations. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. DE -                    
2. DI  .39* -                   
3. NA  .76*  .59* -                  
4. W  .51*  .31*  .69* - .                 
5. V  .31*  .39*  .63*  .66* -                
6. In -.39* -.47* -.46* -.52* -.43* -               
7. Or -.15* -.11 -.06 -.05 0  .50* -              
8. En -.72* -.12* -.39* -.37* -.18*  .34*  .23* -             
9. As -.33* .05 -.19* -.36* -.07  .36*  .23*  .49* -            
10. N  .44*  .38*  .72*  .90*  .92* -.51* -.03 -.30* -.23* -           
11. C -.32* -.34* -.31* -.34* -.25*  .87*  .86*  .33*  .34* -.32* -          
12. E -.61* -.05 -.34* -.42* -.15*  .41*  .26*  .87*  .85* -.30*  .39* -         
13. DPB  .64*  .42*  .90*  .87*  .65* -.49* -.05 -.33* -.27*  .82* -.32* -.35* -        
14. IPB -.41* -.86* -.55* -.37* -.39*  .76*  .43*  .19*  .13* -.42*  .69*  .19* -.45* -       
15. OPB .09  .23*  .22* .11  .19*  .31*  .87* .05  .19*  .17*  .67*  .14*  .16*  .19* -      
16. APB -.35* -.12 -.38* -.39* -.13*  .34*  .14*  .34*  .80* -.28*  .28*  .65* -.39*  .21* .05 -     
17. EPB -.95* -.32* -.64* -.41* -.23*  .33*  .17*  .83*  .34* -.35*  .29*  .68* -.49*  .33* -.06  .30* -    
18. STAIT  .60*  .33*  .73*  .80*  .58* -.46* -.06 -.36* -.28*  .75* -.31* -.37*  .84* -.39* .1 -.33* -.47* -   
19. IUSF  .42*  .19*  .52*  .48*  .41* -.17*  .22* -.26* -.14*  .48* .02 -.23*  .51* -.11  .36* -.22* -.38*  .48* -  
20. ASI  .34*  .29*  .53*  .51*  .43* -.27* 0 -.16* -.03  .51* -.16* -.11  .55* -.24*  .21* -.11 -.29*  .50*  .49* - 
21. TF44  .34* -.17*  .38*  .61*  .35* -.30* .04 -.36* -.55*  .52* -.16* -.52*  .53* .04 .07 -.49* -.32*  .54*  .51*  .38* 
Note: As = Assertiveness; APB = Assertiveness PID-BFAS; ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; C = Conscientiousness; DE = Detachment; DI = Disinhibition; 
DPB = Distress PID-BFAS; En = Enthusiasm; EPB = Enthusiasm PID-BFAS; E = Extraversion; In = Industriousness; IPB = Industriousness PID-BFAS; IUSF 
= Intolerance of Uncertainty Short Form; OPB = Orderliness PID-BFAS; Or = Orderliness; N = Neuroticism; NA= Negative Affectivity; STAIT = State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory – Trait version; TF-44 = Trait Fear – 44 item; W = Withdrawal; V = Volatility.  
* p < .05 
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Table 5. Task variable correlations. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Startle: CS- -                  
2 Startle: oCS-  .95* -                 
3 Startle: GS1  .94*  .94* -                
4 Startle: GS2  .91*  .95*  .94* -               
5 Startle: GS3  .83*  .87*  .87*  .91* -              
6 Startle: CS+  .81*  .84*  .84*  .87*  .95* -             
                    
7 RR: CS- -.06 -.06 -.05 -.06 -.08 -.09 -            
8 RR: oCS- -.08 -.07 -.04 -.05 -.08 -.11  .39* -           
9 RR: GS1 -.07 -.06 -.01 -.04 -.08 -.08  .37*  .68* -          
10 RR: GS2 -.04 -.02 .02 .02 0 -.03  .31*  .47*  .53* -         
11 RR: GS3 0 .03 .07 .08 .09 .04  .12*  .19*  .17*  .48* -        
12 RR: CS+ .03 .02 .08 .07 .08 .06  .14*  .14*  .14*  .26*  .41* -       
                    
13 Av: CS- .01 -.01 .01 -.01 -.03 -.02  .45*  .21*  .18*  .22*  .13* .1 -      
14 Av: oCS- -.01 0 .02 -.01 -.03 -.04  .26*  .34*  .41*  .30* .08 .09  .46* -     
15 Av: GS1 -.02 0 .03 0 .02 -.01  .35*  .37*  .49*  .39*  .14* .09  .46*  .73* -    
16 Av: GS2 .01 0 .06 .05 .05 .02  .24*  .32*  .36*  .48*  .34*  .21*  .47*  .55*  .69* -   
17 Av: GS3 0 0 .05 .04 .07 .06 .08  .12*  .15*  .23*  .40*  .28*  .22*  .20*  .30*  .48* -  
18 Av: CS+ .05 0 .07 .05 .09 .07 .05 .08 .1  .12*  .25*  .32*  .15*  .15*  .21*  .34*  .77* - 
Note: Av = Avoidance; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ - conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; RR = risk ratings.  
* p < .05 
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Main analyses 
Results are organized by the stated aims of this dissertation, and then further 
organized by dependent variable and type of personality variable.  For aims involving 
tests of specific effects (i.e., individual model coefficients), results are further organized 
by the specific personality trait. To maintain a semblance of brevity, we only report full 
statistics for significant hypothesis tests. Full model and hypothesis statistics for all 
models are available on request from the author. We report standardized coefficient 
values (β) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for each test when reporting results for 
individual effects (i.e., variance components). For generalized MLMs, we report βs in 
odds ratio (OR) form (for interpreting lower-order coefficients, OR values > 1 indicating 
increasingly greater chance of avoidance for each unit increase in the predictor, values < 
1 indicating an increasingly lower chance of avoidance for each unit increase in the 
predictor, and with OR = 1 equal chance; this interpretation changes for interaction 
coefficients).  
Aim 1 (A1): Identifying personality predictors of generalization. 
A1: Startle. 
 Testing of the null-model indicated a multilevel model is appropriate for these 
data (ICC = .67). Initial model fitting resulted in Model 2 (random-intercept, random-
slope for Stimulus dimension, fixed-effect for Stimulus2 dimension) as the most 
acceptable model for the following startle analyses based on our established criteria, with 
both the random-intercept and all Stimulus effects contributing significantly to the model 
and adjusted ICC = 0.72.  
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 Normative broadband individual differences. 
 Neuroticism and aspects. 
 Neuroticism was not found to be a significant predictor of startle, nor were any 
Neuroticism x Stimulus interactions significant. The equivalent models that separately 
modeled the Neuroticism aspects, Withdrawal and Volatility, also did not contain 
significant effects. Finally, for models in which both aspects were included, there were no 
significant Aspect x Stimulus or Aspect x Stimulus2 interactions. 
 Multi-trait. 
 The model containing Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion modeled 
simultaneously without interaction terms (i.e., main effects model) did not yield any 
significant Trait effects. For two-way interaction models, there was a significant 
Extraversion x Stimulus2 interaction while including Neuroticism x Stimulus2 and 
Conscientiousness x Stimulus2 terms and the associated interactions with the linear 
Stimulus term, β = 0.24, 95% CI [0.02 – 0.45], t(9720.91) = 2.10, p = 0.035. As can be 
seen in Figure 7, lower Extraversion is associated with an overall shallower decline from 
CS+, which appears to be driven by elevated responding to the GS2 to the oCS-.  
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Figure 6. Visual representation of the Extraversion x Stimulus2 (quadratic) interaction, 
with both actual startle EMG values (A) and fitted startle EMG values (B) represented in 
separate plots. For graphing purposes, 1) a median split was used to plot mean values for 
those with high or low Extraversion scores, and 2) startle values have been centered 
within cluster (CWC) so that all participants have a mean of zero. For the fitted values 
plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear 
slope and to determine (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope).  BFAS = 
Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS 
= generalization stimulus. 
 Multi-aspect. 
 The model containing Withdrawal and Volatility (Neuroticism aspects), 
Industriousness and Orderliness (Conscientiousness aspects), and Enthusiasm and 
Assertiveness (Extraversion aspects) modeled simultaneously without interaction terms 
(i.e., main effects model) did not yield any significant Aspect effects, nor were there any 
significant two-way (Aspect x Stimulus dimension) interactions.  
 Pathological broadband individual differences. 
 Negative Affectivity. 
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Negative Affectivity was not found to be a significant predictor of startle, nor 
were any Negative Affectivity x Stimulus interactions significant.  
 Multi-trait. 
The model containing Negative Affectivity, Disinhibition, and Detachment 
modeled simultaneously without interaction terms (i.e., main effects model) did not yield 
any significant Trait effects, no were there any significant Trait x Stimulus interactions.  
 Combined PID-5/BFAS “full-spectrum” broadband individual differences 
(PB). 
 Distress-PB. 
Distress-PB was not found to be a significant predictor of startle, nor were any 
Distress-PB x Stimulus interactions significant.  
 Multi-trait. 
 The model containing Distress-PB, Industriousness-PB, Orderliness-PB, 
Assertiveness-PB, and Enthusiasm-PB modeled simultaneously without interaction terms 
(i.e., main effects model) did not yield any significant Trait main effects. In the model in 
which linear and quadratic interaction terms were modeled together, there was a 
significant Assertiveness-PB x Stimulus2 interaction, β = 0.26, 95% CI [0.05 – 0.48], 
t(9721.41) = 2.37, p = 0.018l, which can be seen in Figure 8. This interaction appears 
similar to the documented Extraversion x Stimulus2 interaction in terms of greater 
responding to the GS2 through oCS- in those lower on Assertiveness-PB, which is 
expected given that the Assertiveness-PB variable is partially comprised of Extraversion 
variance. However, it appears that this interaction has resulted in an even shallower slope 
for those lower on Assertiveness-PB, as there appears to be a flatter response slope from 
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the CS+ to the GS3 associated with lower Assertiveness-PB. All other interactions in this 
model and all interactions in the linear only model were not significant.  
 
Figure 7. Visual representation of the Assertiveness-PB x Stimulus2 (quadratic) 
interaction, with both actual startle EMG values (A) and fitted startle EMG values (B) 
represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, 1) a median split was used to plot 
mean values for those with high or low Assertiveness-PB scores, and 2) startle values 
have been centered within cluster (CWC) so that all participants have a mean of zero. For 
the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best 
fitting curvilinear slope and to determine (visible as semi-transparent borders around each 
slope).  BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PB = PID-5/BFAS Composite; PID-5 = 
Personality Inventory for DSM-5. 
 Narrowband individual differences. 
 None of the main effect models for any of the tested narrowband individual 
differences (TF-44, ASI, IUSF, STAI-T) yielded significant Trait predictors. There was a 
significant TF-44 x Stimulus2, β = -0.01, 95% CI [0.02 – 0.00], t(9721.19) = -2.07, p = 
0.039, and a significant IUSF x Stimulus2 interaction, β = -0.30, 95%, CI [-0.50 – 0.11], 
t(9721.35) = -3.01, p = 0.003. Both interactions capture similar effects, as can be seen in 
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Figure 9 and Figure 10: there was a shallower decline from CS+ to GS1 in those higher 
on TF-44I/USF. The linear interactions for TF-44 and IUSF were not significant, as were 
all interaction terms for ASI and STAI-T.  
 
Figure 8. Visual representation of the TF-44 x Stimulus2 (quadratic) interaction, with 
both actual startle EMG values (A) and fitted startle EMG values (B) represented in 
separate plots. For graphing purposes, 1) a median split was used to plot mean values for 
those with high or low TF-44 scores, and 2) startle values have been centered within 
cluster (CWC) so that all participants have a mean of zero. For the fitted values plot, a 
curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope 
and to determine (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope).  CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; TF-
44 = Trait Fear 44-item. 
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Figure 9. Visual representation of the IUSF x Stimulus2 (quadratic) interaction, with both 
actual startle EMG values (A) and fitted startle EMG values (B) represented in separate 
plots. For graphing purposes, 1) a median split was used to plot mean values for those 
with high or low IUSF scores, and 2) startle values have been centered within cluster 
(CWC) so that all participants have a mean of zero. For the fitted values plot, a 
curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope 
and to determine (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope).  CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; 
IUSF = Intolerance of Uncertainty – Short Form. 
 
A1: Risk ratings.  
Testing of the null-model indicated a multilevel model is borderline appropriate 
for these data (ICC = .05). Initial model fitting resulted in Model 2 (random-intercept, 
random-slope for Stimulus dimension, fixed-effect for Stimulus2 dimension) as the most 
acceptable model for the following risk rating analyses based on our established criteria, 
with both the random-intercept and all Stimulus effects contributing significantly to the 
model and adjusted ICC = .21.  
Normative broadband individual differences. 
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 Neuroticism and aspects. 
Neuroticism was a significant predictor of risk ratings, β = 0.025, 95% CI 
[0.001 – 0.049], t(285.56) = 2.08, p = 0.038, with higher Neuroticism associated with 
higher risk ratings. There was a significant Neuroticism x Stimulus interaction, β = 0.012, 
95% CI [0.0001 – 0.0239], t(286.46) = 1.979, p = 0.049. As can be seen in Figure 11, 
those higher on Neuroticism have a slightly shallower decrease from the CS+ to the GS3, 
indicating a moderate degree of generalization associated with higher Neuroticism. The 
interaction with the quadratic Stimulus term was not significant. The equivalent models 
that separately modeled the Neuroticism aspects (Withdrawal and Volatility) did not 
contain significant main effects or interactions, nor did models that modeled the Aspects 
simultaneously.  
 
 
Figure 10. Visual representation of the Neuroticism x Stimulus interaction, with both 
actual risk rating values (A) and fitted risk rating values (B) represented in separate plots. 
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For graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low Neuroticism scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function 
(y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% 
confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; 
IUSF = Intolerance of Uncertainty – Short Form; RR = risk ratings. 
 Multi-trait. 
 The model containing Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion modeled 
simultaneously without interaction terms (i.e., main effects model) did not yield any 
significant Trait main effects. For two-way interaction models, there was a significant 
Neuroticism x Stimulus interaction while including the Extraversion x Stimulus and 
Conscientiousness x Stimulus terms in the model, β = 0.163, 95% CI [0.0035 – 0.0290], 
t(9720.91) = 2.5, p = 0.0013. This interaction was visually and statistically close to 
identical to the previously documented Neuroticism x Stimulus interaction in the model 
without the other personality variables, and therefore is not interpreted further in this 
section. All other interactions were not significant.  
 Multi-aspect. 
The model containing Withdrawal and Volatility (Neuroticism aspects), 
Industriousness and Orderliness (Conscientiousness aspects), and Enthusiasm and 
Assertiveness (Extraversion aspects) modeled simultaneously without interaction terms 
(i.e., main effects model) did not yield any significant Aspect effects, nor were there any 
significant two-way (Aspect x Stimulus dimension) interactions.  
 Pathological broadband individual differences. 
 Negative Affectivity. 
Negative Affectivity was not found to be a significant predictor of risk ratings, 
nor were any Negative Affectivity x Stimulus interactions significant.  
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 Multi-trait. 
The model containing Negative Affectivity, Disinhibition, and Detachment 
modeled simultaneously without interaction terms (i.e., main effects model) yielded a 
significant Negative Affectivity main effect, β = 0.0442, 95% CI [0.0019 – 0.0866], 
t(285.14) = 2.04, p = 0.042, with increases in Negative Affectivity associated with 
elevated risk ratings. There were no main effects of Disinhibition or Detachment. 
The Negative Affectivity x Stimulus interaction was significant, β = -0.021, 95% 
CI [0.0048 – 0.0469], t(286.56) = 2.41, p = 0.017. As can be seen in Figure 12, those 
higher on Negative Affectivity have a shallower decrease in responding from the CS+ to 
the GS3. The Detachment x Stimulus interaction was also significant, β = -0.0210, 95% 
CI [-0.0394 – -0.0026], t(286.27) = -2.2337, p = 0.026, which in Figure 13 is seen at the 
GS2 and GS1: those higher on Detachment were slightly elevated on the GS2 relative to 
those lower on Detachment, and this is reversed for the GS1, resulting in a slightly 
shallower decline from GS2 to GS1 for those higher on Detachment. However, the CIs in 
the fitted values plot overlap considerably, indicating that the shallowed decline seen in 
the actual values plot is potentially not evident in the fitted values. The Disinhibition x 
Stimulus and all interactions with the quadratic Stimulus term were not significant.  
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Figure 11. Visual representation of the Negative Affectivity x Stimulus interaction, while 
controlling for Detachment and Disinhibition, with both actual risk rating values (A) and 
fitted risk rating values (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, a 
median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or low Negative 
Affectivity scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) 
was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence 
intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). CS- = conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PID-5 = 
Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR = risk ratings. 
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Figure 12. Visual representation of the Detachment x Stimulus interaction while 
controlling for Negative Affectivity and Disinhibition, with both actual risk rating values 
(A) and fitted risk rating values (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, 
a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or low Detachment 
scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to 
fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence intervals (visible as 
semi-transparent borders around each slope). CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for 
DSM-5; RR = risk ratings. 
 Combined PID-5/BFAS “full-spectrum” broadband individual differences 
(PB). 
 Distress-PB. 
Distress-PB was not found to be a significant predictor of risk ratings, nor were 
any Distress-PB x Stimulus interactions significant.  
 Multi-trait. 
The model containing Distress-PB, Industriousness-PB, Orderliness-PB, 
Assertiveness-PB, and Enthusiasm-PB modeled simultaneously without interaction terms 
(i.e., main effects model) yielded a significant Distress-PB main effect, β = 0.0388, 95% 
 153 
CI [0.0069 – 0.0707], t(285.16) = 2.3809, p = 0.018, with increased Distress-PB 
associated with elevated risk ratings. For two-way interaction models, there was a 
significant Distress-PB x Stimulus interaction , β = 0.0213, 95% CI [0.0057 – 0.0368], 
t(286.96) = 2.6824, p = 0.008, which can be seen in Figure 14 as a subtly shallower 
decline from CS+ to GS3 in those higher on Distress-PB that resembles the previously 
documented Negative Affectivity and Neuroticism interactions. There was also a 
significant Enthusiasm-PB x Stimulus interaction, β = 0.0153, 95% CI [0.0016 – 0.0291], 
t(286.63) = 2.37, p = 0.0029, which resembled the previously documented Detachment 
interaction, with those lower on Enthusiasm-PB (i.e., those who are likely higher on 
Detachment) showing a shallower decline from GS2 to GS1 (see Figure 15). Also in line 
with the previously documented Detachment interaction, the CIs in the fitted values plot 
for Enthusiasm-PB overlap considerably, indicating that the shallowed decline seen in the 
actual values plot is potentially not evident in the fitted values. All other interactions 
were not significant.  
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Figure 13. Visual representation of the Distress-PB x Stimulus interaction while 
controlling for all other “PB” composite variables, with both actual risk rating values (A) 
and fitted risk rating values (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, a 
median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or low Distress-PB scores. 
For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the 
best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence intervals (visible as semi-
transparent borders around each slope). BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PB: 
PID-5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR = risk ratings. 
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Figure 14.Visual representation of the Enthusiasm-PB x Stimulus interaction while 
controlling for all other “PB” composite variables, with both actual risk rating values (A) 
and fitted risk rating values (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, a 
median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or low Enthusiasm-PB 
scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to 
fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence intervals (visible as 
semi-transparent borders around each slope). BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PB: 
PID-5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR = risk ratings. 
 Narrowband individual differences. 
 There was a significant main effect of TF-44, β = 0.0012, 95% CI 
[0.0001 – 0.0023], t(286.99) = 2.0945, p = 0.0037, and IUSF, β = 0.0034, 95% CI 
[0.0008 – 0.0061], t(286.54) = 2.5634, p = 0.0011, on risk ratings; for both effects the 
narrowband trait was positively related to risk ratings such that increased levels of the 
trait were associated with elevated risk ratings. The ASI and STAI-T main effects were 
not significant. There was a significant IUSF x Stimulus2 interaction, β = 0.0039, 95% CI 
[0.0005 – 0.0072], t(4103.47) = 2.2783, p = 0.0023, with those higher on IUSF showing a 
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slightly shallower decline in responding from CS+ to GS3 (see Figure 16). All other 
narrowband interactions were not significant.  
 
Figure 15. Visual representation of the IUSF x Stimulus2 interaction, with both actual risk 
rating values (A) and fitted risk rating values (B) represented in separate plots. For 
graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low IUSF scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) 
was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence 
intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). CS- = conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; IUSF = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty – Short Form; RR = risk ratings. 
A1: Avoidance. 
Normative broadband individual differences. 
 Neuroticism and aspects. 
Neuroticism alone was not a significant predictor of avoidance, however, there 
was a significant Neuroticism x Stimulus2 interaction, β = 1.0466, 95% CI 
[1.0054 – 1.0895], χ2 (1, N=10300) = 4.937, p = 0.026. As seen in Figure 17, this appears 
to reflect a non-generalization effect, with those higher on Neuroticism avoiding the CS+ 
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and GS3 at a higher rate than those lower on Neuroticism, but without a corresponding 
change in the grade of the decline from CS+ to GS3. All other interactions were not 
significant.  
The equivalent models that separately or simultaneously modeled the Neuroticism 
aspects (Withdrawal and Volatility) did not contain significant main effects. However, as 
can be seen in Figure 18, there was a significant Volatility x Stimulus2 interaction in the 
model that only included Volatility, β = 1.0481, 95% CI [1.0075 – 1.08903], χ2 (1, 
N=10300) = 5.4265, p = 0.020. All other Volatility interactions, as well as Withdrawal 
interactions, were not significant.  
 
Figure 16. Visual representation of the Neuroticism x Stimulus2 interaction, with both 
actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. 
For graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low Neuroticism scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function 
(y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% 
confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). Av = 
avoidance; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus. 
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Figure 17. Visual representation of the Volatility x Stimulus2 interaction, with both actual 
avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. For 
graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low Volatility scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function 
(y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% 
confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). Av = 
avoidance; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus. 
 Conscientiousness and aspects. 
Conscientiousness alone was not a significant predictor of avoidance, however, 
there was a significant Conscientiousness x Stimulus2 interaction, β = 0.9557, 95% CI 
[0.9176 – 0.9954], χ2 (1, N=10300) = 4.7606, p = 0.029. This appears to be driven by 
those who are higher on Conscientiousness showing a shallower decline from CS+ to 
GS3 (see Figure 19). The Conscientiousness interaction with the linear Stimulus term 
was not significant. The equivalent models that separately or simultaneously modeled the 
Conscientiousness aspects (Industriousness and Orderliness) did not contain significant 
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main effects. However, there was a significant Orderliness x Stimulus2 interaction in the 
model that only included Orderliness, β = 0.9539, 95% CI [0.9168 – 0.9924], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 5.4606, p = 0.019, which resembled the previously documented 
Conscientiousness x Stimulus2 interaction, as those  higher on Orderliness showed a 
shallower decline from CS+ to GS3; also notable is that those with higher Orderliness 
had overall higher avoidance rates at this segment of the response slope, whereas when 
looking at the trait level, lower Conscientiousness was related to overall higher avoidance 
rates for this segment (see Figure 20). All other Orderliness interactions, as well as 
Industriousness interactions, were not significant.  
 
Figure 18. Visual representation of the Conscientiousness x Stimulus2 interaction, with 
both actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate 
plots. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with 
high or low Conscientiousness scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing 
function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% 
confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). Av = 
avoidance; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus. 
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Figure 19. Visual representation of the Orderliness x Stimulus2 interaction, with both 
actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. 
For graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low Orderliness scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function 
(y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% 
confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). Av = 
avoidance; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus. 
 Extraversion and aspects. 
Extraversion or its aspects (Assertiveness, Enthusiasm) were not found to be a 
significant predictor of avoidance, nor were any interactions significant.  
 Multi-trait. 
The model containing Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion modeled 
simultaneously without interaction terms (i.e., main effects model) did not yield any 
significant Trait effects. For two-way interaction models, there was a significant 
Conscientiousness x Stimulus2 interaction while including the Conscientiousness x 
 161 
Stimulus interaction and both quadratic and linear interactions terms for Extraversion and 
Neuroticism in the model, β = 0.9539, 95% CI [0.9112 – 0.9986], χ2(1, N=10300) = 
4.0779, p = 0.0013. This interaction was visually and statistically close to identical to the 
previously documented Conscientiousness x Stimulus2 interaction in the model without 
the other personality variables, and therefore is not interpreted further in this section. The 
separate model that tested linear interactions only did not yield any significant 
interactions.  
 Multi-aspect. 
The model containing Withdrawal and Volatility (Neuroticism aspects), 
Industriousness and Orderliness (Conscientiousness aspects), and Enthusiasm and 
Assertiveness (Extraversion aspects) modeled simultaneously without interaction terms 
(i.e., main effects model) yielded two significant Aspect main effects.  In this model, 
Volatility significantly predicted increased avoidance, β = 1.4014, 95% CI 
[1.0446 – 1.8801], χ2(1, N=10300) = 5.0683, p = 0.0024, whereas Assertiveness 
significantly predicted decreased avoidance, β = 0.7325, 95% CI [0.5655 – 0.9487], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 5.5629, p = 0.0018. There were no significant two-way (Aspect x Stimulus 
dimension) interactions.  
 Pathological broadband individual differences. 
 Negative Affectivity.  
Negative Affectivity alone was not found to be a significant predictor of 
avoidance. Both the Negative Affectivity x Stimulus, β = 0.7668, 95% CI 
[0.5992 – 0.9814], χ2(1, N=10300) = 4.4483, p = 0.0035, and Negative Affectivity x 
Stimulus2 , β = 1.0436, 95% CI [1.0050 – 1.0836], χ2(1, N=10300) = 4.9346, p = 0.0026 
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were significant in the same model used to detect quadratic interactions. As seen in 
Figure 21, those higher on Negative Affectivity demonstrated a shallower decline in 
avoidance from CS+ to GS3, as well as from GS2 to oCS- (although CIs in the fitted 
values plot overlapped at this level, potentially indicating the observed pattern in the 
actual values plot is not reflected in the fitted values). The separate model testing the 
linear interaction alone was not significant.  
 
Figure 20. Visual representation of the Negative Affectivity x Stimulus2 interaction, with 
both actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate 
plots. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with 
high or low Negative Affectivity scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear 
smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to 
determine 95% confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each 
slope). Av = avoidance; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS 
= generalization stimulus; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5 
Disinhibition. 
Disinhibition alone was not found to be a significant predictor of avoidance, nor 
were any of the interaction terms significant.  
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Detachment. 
Detachment alone was not found to be a significant predictor of avoidance, nor 
were any of the interaction terms significant.  
 Multi-trait. 
The model containing Negative Affectivity, Disinhibition, and Detachment 
modeled simultaneously without interaction terms (i.e., main effects model) yielded a 
significant Negative Affectivity main effect, β = 1.5500, 95% CI [1.0615 – 2.2633], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 5.1474, p = 0.0023, with increases in Negative Affectivity associated with 
an increased chance of avoidance. There was also a significant Disinhibition main effect, 
β = 0.7639, 95% CI [0.5854 – 0.9968], χ2(1, N=10300) = 3.9350, p = 0.0047, with 
increases in Disinhibition associated with a decreased chance of avoidance (i.e., increased 
approach). The Detachment main effect was not significant. 
In the model with both linear and quadratic terms, the Negative Affectivity x 
Stimulus, β = 0.5147, 95% CI [0.3147 – 0.8418], χ2(1, N=10300) = 7.0007, p = 0.008, 
and Negative Affectivity x Stimulus2 interactions were significant, β = 1.1215, 95% CI 
[1.0416 – 1.2075], χ2(1, N=10300) = 9.242, p = 0.002. These interactions were visually 
and statistically close to identical to the previously documented Negative Affectivity 
interactions in the model without the other personality variables, and therefore is not 
interpreted further in this section. Additionally, the Detachment x Stimulus, β = 1.1215, 
95% CI [1.0456 – 2.5007], χ2(1, N=10300) = 7.657, p = 0.031, and Detachment x 
Stimulus2 interactions were significant, β = 0.9127, 95% CI [0.8555 – 0.9737], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 9.242, p = 0.006. As seen in Figure 22, those higher on Detachment show a 
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slightly shallower decline in responding from GS3 to GS2, as well as a more markedly 
shallow decline from GS2 to oCS-. 
 The Disinhibition x Stimulus interactions from this model and all interaction 
terms from the model which only includes linear interactions were not significant.  
 
Figure 21. Visual representation of the Detachment x Stimulus2 interaction while 
controlling for Negative Affectivity and Disinhibition, with both actual avoidance % 
values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing 
purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or low 
Detachment scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) 
was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence 
intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). Av = avoidance; CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; 
PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5 
 Combined PID-5/BFAS “full-spectrum” broadband individual differences 
(PB). 
Distress-PB. 
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Distress-PB alone was not found to be a significant predictor of avoidance. 
However, both the Distress-PB x Stimulus, β = 0.7359, 95% CI [0.5740 – 0.9435], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 5.9520, p = 0.0016, and Distress-PB x Stimulus2 , β = 1.0509, 95% CI 
[1.0116 – 1.0917], χ2(1, N=10300) = 6.5193, p = 0.0011, interactions were significant in 
the same model. As seen in Figure 23, those higher on Distress-PB showed a shallower 
decline in responding from the CS+ to GS3. The separate model testing the linear 
interaction alone was not significant.  
 
Figure 22. Visual representation of the Distress-PB x Stimulus2 interaction, with both 
actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. 
For graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low Distress-PB scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function 
(y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% 
confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). Av = 
avoidance; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = 
generalization stimulus; PB = PID-5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for 
DSM-5. 
 Multi-trait. 
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The model containing Distress-PB, Industriousness-PB, Orderliness-PB, 
Assertiveness-PB, and Enthusiasm-PB modeled simultaneously without interaction terms 
(i.e., main effects model) yielded a significant main effect of Distress-PB, β = 1.4065, 
95% CI [1.0618 – 1.8632], χ2(1, N=10300) = 5.6553, p = 0.0017, with increases in 
Distress-PB associated with an increased chance of avoidance. There was also a 
significant Enthusiasm-PB main effect, β =1.2991, 95% CI [1.0146 – 1.6634], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 4.3035, p = 0.0038, with increases in Enthusiasm-PB also associated with an 
increased chance of avoidance. All other main effects were not significant. 
In the model with both linear and quadratic interaction terms, the Distress-PB x 
Stimulus, β = 0.6321, 95% CI [0.4467 – 0.8944], χ2(1, N=10300) = 6.7070, p = 0.010, 
and Distress-PB x Stimulus2 interactions, β = 1.0718, 95% CI [1.0168 – 1.1298], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 6.6471, p = 0.010, were significant. These interactions were visually and 
statistically close to identical to the previously documented Distress-PB interactions in 
the model without the other personality variables, and therefore is not interpreted further 
in this section. Additionally, the Orderliness-PB x Stimulus2, β = 0.9582, 95% CI 
[0.9190 – 0.9991], χ2(1, N=10300) = 4.0104, p = 0.045, interaction was significant. As 
can be seen in Figure 24, those higher on Orderliness-PB showed a shallower decline in 
responding from CS+ to GS3. However, the CIs for the fitted plot substantially overlap at 
this point of the stimulus dimension, potentially indicating that this pattern seen in the 
actual values is not reflected in the fitted values. All other interactions from this model 
and all interaction terms from the model which only includes linear interactions were not 
significant.  
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Figure 23. Visual representation of the Orderliness-PB x Stimulus2 interaction while 
controlling for all other PB variables, with both actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted 
avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, a median split was 
used to plot mean values for those with high or low Orderliness-PB scores. For the fitted 
values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting 
curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent 
borders around each slope). Av = avoidance; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PB 
= PID-5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5. 
 Narrowband individual differences. 
There was a significant main effect of TF-44, β = 1.3352, 95% CI 
[1.0805 – 1.6500], χ2(1, N=10300) = 7.1641, p = 0.007, and IUSF, β = 1.2893, 95% CI 
[1.0503 – 1.5827], χ2(1, N=10300) = 5.9024, p = 0.015, on avoidance; for both effects, 
increases in the narrowband trait corresponded to increased avoidance. The ASI and 
STAI-T main effects were not significant.  
In the model with both linear and quadratic interaction terms, there were 
significant ASI x Stimulus β = 0.7527, 95% CI [0.5862 – 0.9666], χ2(1, N=10300) = 
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4.9573, p = 0.026, and ASI x Stimulus2, β = 1.0492, 95% CI [1.0098 – 1.0901], χ2(1, 
N=10300) = 6.0609, p = 0.014, interactions. As seen in Figure 25, this appears to reflect a 
non-generalization effect, with those higher on ASI avoiding the CS+ and GS3 at a 
higher rate than those lower on ASI, but without a corresponding change in the grade of 
the decline from CS+ to GS3. This figure also shows a slightly shallower decline in 
responding from GS2 to GS1 in those with higher values of ASI. In a separate model that 
also included linear and quadratic interaction terms, there were significant STAI-T x 
Stimulus, β = 0.7584, 95% CI [0.5913 – 0.9728], χ2(1, N=10300) = 4.7393, p = 0.029, 
and STAI-T x Stimulus2, β = 1.0499, 95% CI [1.0109 – 1.0903], χ2(1, N=10300) = 
6.3675, p = 0.012, interactions. As with ASI and seen in Figure 25, this appears to reflect 
a non-generalization effect, with those higher on STAI-T avoiding the CS+ and GS3 at a 
higher rate than those lower on STAI-T, but without a corresponding change in the grade 
of the decline from CS+ to GS3. All other narrowband interactions were not significant.  
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Figure 24. Visual representation of the ASI x Stimulus2 interaction, with both actual 
avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance % (B) represented in separate plots. For 
graphing purposes, a median split was used to plot mean values for those with high or 
low ASI scores. For the fitted values plot, a curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was 
used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope and to determine 95% confidence intervals 
(visible as semi-transparent borders around each slope). ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity 
Inventory; Av = avoidance; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; 
GS = generalization stimulus. 
 
 
Figure 25. Visual representation of the STAI-T x Stimulus2 interaction while controlling 
for all other PB variables, with both actual avoidance % values (A) and fitted avoidance 
% (B) represented in separate plots. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
plot mean values for those with high or low STAI-T scores. For the fitted values plot, a 
curvilinear smoothing function (y~x+x2) was used to fit the best fitting curvilinear slope 
and to determine 95% confidence intervals (visible as semi-transparent borders around 
each slope). Av = avoidance; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger 
cue; GS = generalization stimulus; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait.  
Interim summary for Aim 1. 
 See Table 6 for an overview of significant main effects and interactions for the 
analyses conducted to address Aim 1. In terms of main effects, results were moderately 
consistent across risk rating and avoidance analyses: Negative Affectivity, TF-44, and 
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IUSF all predicted greater responding on each outcome measure. Distress-PB was also a 
consistent positive predictor, however, this is likely due to the influence of the Negative 
Affectivity variance that is part of the variable. Of the other personality variables 
primarily reflecting negative affect, Neuroticism was only found to be a predictor of 
overall risk ratings, and ASI and STAI-T did not predict overall levels of risk ratings or 
avoidance. Taken together, it appears that the more pathological extremes of negative 
affect are most consistently linked with increased threat appraisal and avoidance. The 
only personality variables with a negative association with an outcome variable were 
Assertiveness and Disinhibition, as both predicted lower levels of avoidance. Given the 
similar conceptual domains of these variables (i.e., tendency towards action and 
approach) these results might be indicators of a single determinant that contributes to 
decreased threat appraisal and avoidance. Notably, no main effects were found when 
predicting startle. 
 For interactions, especially as they pertain to potential generalization effects and 
associated personality traits, interpretation is more complicated. No personality variable 
significantly interacted with the Stimulus dimension (linear or quadratic) consistently 
across all three outcome measures, and thus we summarize interaction results 
sequentially by outcome variable. In terms of interactions predicting startle, both 
Extraversion and Assertiveness-PB (which is partially comprised of Extraversion 
variance) strengthened the effect of the Stimulus2 predictor on startle. This can be 
interpreted as higher levels of Extraversion and Assertiveness-PB were associated with a 
stronger quadratic component, which corresponds to greater generalization for those 
lower on these dispositions. For both variables, this interaction appeared to be driven by a 
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shallower decline in startle from GS2 to GS1 for those with lower levels of the 
disposition; additionally, for Assertiveness-PB, lower levels were associated with a 
shallower decline from CS+ to GS3. The opposite relationship was observed for TF-44 
and IUSF: both variables weakened the effect of Stimulus2 predictor on startle, and 
therefore were associated with a weaker (more linear) quadratic relationship that 
corresponds to greater generalization. For both variables, this appears to be driven by 
shallower declines in startle potentiation from the CS+ to the GS1.  
 For interactions predicting risk ratings, Neuroticism, Negative Affectivity, 
Distress-PB (the composite comprised of items from both of the first two scales), and 
IUSF all strengthened the effect of the Stimulus (linear) predictor on risk ratings. This 
can be interpreted as higher levels of these variables were associated with a more linear 
decrease across the stimulus continuum (i.e., shallower decline), and therefore with 
greater generalization. For all of these variables, this interaction appeared to primarily be 
driven by a shallower decline in response from the CS+ to the GS3. Another personality 
predictor, Detachment, also strengthened the effect of the Stimulus predictor and was 
associated with greater generalization, but this particular interaction appeared to be 
driven by a shallower decline from GS2 to GS1, and not CS+ to GS3. Only one predictor 
was associated with less generalization of risk ratings: those higher on Enthusiasm-PB 
produced slightly more precipitous gradients than those lower on the variable. 
 There were some similarities in interaction results between risk rating and 
avoidance models. For interactions predicting avoidance, Negative Affectivity and 
Distress-PB also all predicted increased generalization, but in this case via an interaction 
with the Stimulus2 predictor, not the Stimulus predictor. Theses interaction resulted in a 
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weakening of the quadratic effect in avoidance responding and appear to be driven by 
slightly shallower declines in avoidance from CS+ to GS3, as well as from GS2 to oCS- 
for Negative Affectivity only. Also similar to risk rating interaction results: Detachment 
predicted increased generalization, again via an interaction with the Stimulus2 predictor 
that resulted in a weakening of the quadratic effect in avoidance responding. Dissimilarly 
to the Negative Affectivity/Distress-PB interactions, those higher on Detachment showed 
a shallower decline in avoidance from GS2 to oCS-; there was no observed difference in 
the CS+ to GS3 response slope. Additionally, and unique to prediction of avoid 
avoidance, Volatility, Conscientiousness, and Orderliness (a Conscientiousness aspect) 
weakened the quadratic effect in responding and therefore were associated with increased 
generalization. The same interaction was found for the Orderliness-PB variable. In all 
four interactions, those with higher levels of the personality variable demonstrated 
shallower declines in avoidance from the CS+ to GS3. Finally, significant Neuroticism x 
Stimulus2, ASI x Stimulus2 and STAI-T x Stimulus2 interactions were found but based on 
the graphed gradients did not appear to reflect a generalization process. 
Table 6. Summary table for Aim 1: Significant Main Effects and Interactions by 
Personality Variable 
 
 Main Effects  Interactions 
Personality Variable  
 
Startle 
Risk 
Ratings Avoidance 
 
Startle 
Risk 
Ratings Avoidance 
N   ↑    ↑ (L)b ↔ (Q)a 
W         
V    ↑a    ↑ (Q) 
C        ↑ (Q)b 
In         
Or        ↑ (Q) 
E      ↓ (Q)a   
As    ↓a     
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En         
         
NA   ↑a ↑a   ↑ (L)a ↑ (Q)b 
DE       ↑ (L)a ↑ (Q)a 
DI    ↓a     
         
DPB   ↑a ↑a   ↑ (L)a ↑ (Q)b 
IPB         
OPB        ↑ (Q)a 
APB      ↓ (Q)a  ↑ (Q)a 
EPB    ↑a   ↓ (L)a  
         
TF-44   ↑ ↑  ↑ (Q)   
IUSF   ↑ ↑  ↑ (Q) ↑ (L)  
ASI        ↔ (Q) 
STAI-T        ↔ (Q) 
         
Note: Only significant effects/interactions are explicitly documented in this table; a 
blank cell indicates a significant effect/interaction was not found. An upwards arrow (↑) 
indicates that the corresponding personality variable was positively associated with the 
dependent variable, or in the case of interactions, associated with increased 
generalization; the downwards arrow (↓) indicated the opposite (negative 
association/less generalization). A significant interaction marked with a left-right arrow 
(↔) indicates that although the interaction is significant, it does not appear to be driven 
by a generalization effect and the directionality is unclear. Interactions are marked as 
linear (L) or quadratic (Q) interactions, based on which model contained the significant 
interaction. All significant effects or interactions were p < .05. Composite traits refer to 
those derived from a combination of PID-5 and BFAS scales and are indicated with a 
suffix of "PB". As = Assertiveness; ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; APB = 
Assertiveness PID-BFAS; C = Conscientiousness; DE = Detachment; DI = 
Disinhibition; DPB = Distress PID-BFAS; En = Enthusiasm; EPB = Enthusiasm PID-
BFAS; E = Extraversion; In = Industriousness; IPB = Industriousness PID-BFAS; IUSF: 
Intolerance of Uncertainty – Short Form; OPB = Orderliness PID-BFAS; Or = 
Orderliness; N = Neuroticism; STAI-T: State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait; TF-44: 
Trait Fear 44-item; W = Withdrawal; V = Volatility.  
 
a significant in a model containing the other personality variables of the same type (i.e., 
BFAS, PID-5, or PB).  
b significant both when modeled separately and with other personality variables of the 
same type. 
 
Aim 2 (A2): Testing improved prediction of avoidance in APIC models. 
 174 
A2: Startle predicting avoidance. 
 Testing of the “base” APIC model that included startle as a fixed effect 
determined that a multilevel model continued to be appropriate for the data (ICC = .32). 
Initial model fitting resulted in the base model, Model 0 (random-intercept only, Stimulus 
modeled as a linear continuum only), as the only acceptable model for the following 
analyses based on our established criteria for APIC models; all models with a more 
complex random-effects structure (i.e., with at least one random slope) resulted in 
singular fits and were not appropriate for APIC analyses. The base model explained a 
significant proportion of variance in avoidance, RM2= .663.  
Normative broadband individual differences.  
 Neuroticism significantly improved model fit, χ2(1) = 6.9754, p = 0.008, RM2= 
.669, as did the Volatility aspect, χ2(1) = 8.9619, p = 0.001, RM2= .671, which was also a 
significant improvement on the Neuroticism model, χ2(1) = 1.9865, p < 0.001. 
Withdrawal did not significantly improve model fit. Conscientiousness did not 
significantly improve model fit, nor did the Industriousness and Orderliness aspects 
improve model fit when modeled separately. When modeled together, Industriousness 
and Orderliness significantly improved model fit, χ2(1) = 7.4907, p = 0.026, RM2= .670. 
Extraversion did not significantly improve model fit, nor did the Assertiveness and 
Enthusiasm aspects improve model fit when modeled separately or together. The multi-
trait model, which included Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion together, 
significantly improved model fit, χ2(3) = 10.543, p = 0.014, RM2= .672. This model did 
not significantly improve on the Neuroticism-only model, which was the only single-trait 
model that represented an improvement over the base model, and therefore indicates that 
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the improved prediction of the multi-trait model is largely driven by the influence of 
Neuroticism. The multi-aspect model, which included all six aspects (Withdrawal, 
Volatility, Industriousness, Orderliness, Assertiveness, and Enthusiasm), significantly 
improved model fit, χ2(6) = 19.064, p = 0.004, RM2= .680. This model significantly 
improved on all previous models (ps ≤ 0.036), with the exception of the Volatility-only 
model, which the multi-aspect model did not significantly improve on.  
Pathological broadband individual differences. 
 None of the models that included the pathological traits, both modeled 
individually and together, yielded significant improvements in model fit. 
Combined PID-5/BFAS “full-spectrum” broadband individual differences 
(PB). 
Distress-PB significantly improved model fit, χ2(1) = 6.9754, p = 0.008, RM2= 
.669. None of the other composite variables (Industriousness-PB, Orderliness-PB, 
Assertiveness-PB, Enthusiasm-PB) significantly improved model fit when modeled 
separately. The multi-trait model for composite variables also did not significantly 
improve model fit. 
Narrowband individual differences. 
 Three of the four tested narrowband individual differences significantly improved 
model fit when modeled separately: TF-44, χ2(1) = 12.572, p < 0.001, RM2= .671, IUSF, 
χ2(1) = 7.6594, p = 0.005, RM2= .667, and STAI-T, χ2(1) = 7.7381, p = 0.005, RM2= .669, 
all significantly improved model fit; ASI did not significantly improve model fit. TF-44 
represented a significant improvement in model fit over the models containing IU and 
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STAI-T separately; additionally, the STAI-T model significantly improved fit over the 
model containing the IU (all ps < .001). 
A2: Risk ratings predicting avoidance. 
Testing of the “base” APIC model that included risk ratings as a fixed effect 
determined that a multilevel model continued to be appropriate for the data (ICC = .31). 
As with the startle APIC model fitting, the initial model fitting resulted in the base model, 
Model 0 (random-intercept only, Stimulus modeled as a linear continuum only), as the 
only acceptable model for the following analyses based on our established criteria for 
APIC models; all models with a more complex random-effects structure (i.e., with at least 
one random slope) resulted in singular fits and were not appropriate for APIC analyses. 
The base model explained a significant proportion of variance in avoidance, RM2= .659. 
Normative broadband individual differences. 
 Neuroticism significantly improved model fit, χ2(1) = 4.3462p = 0.037, RM2= 
.662, as did the Volatility aspect, χ2(1) = 6.243, p = 0.012, RM2= .664, which was also a 
significant improvement on the Neuroticism model, χ2(1) = 1.9865, p < 0.001. 
Withdrawal did not significantly improve model fit. Conscientiousness did not 
significantly improve model fit, nor did the Industriousness and Orderliness aspects 
improve model fit when modeled separately or together. Extraversion did not 
significantly improve model fit, nor did the Assertiveness and Enthusiasm aspects 
improve model fit when modeled separately or together. The multi-trait model, which 
included Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion together, did not significantly 
improve model fit. The multi-aspect model, which included all six aspects (Withdrawal, 
Volatility, Industriousness, Orderliness, Assertiveness, and Enthusiasm), significantly 
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improved model fit, χ2(6) = 16.48, p = 0.011, RM2= .672. This model significantly 
improved on the Neuroticism-only model, χ2(5) = 12.133, p = 0.033, RM2= .672, but did 
not significantly improve on the Volatility-only model.  
Pathological broadband individual differences. 
 None of the models that included the pathological traits, both modeled 
individually and together, yielded significant improvements in model fit. 
Combined PID-5/BFAS “full-spectrum” broadband individual differences 
(PB). 
Assertiveness-PB significantly improved model fit, χ2(1) = 4.0381, p = 0.044, 
RM2= .663. None of the other composite variables (Distress-PB, Industriousness-PB, 
Orderliness-PB, Enthusiasm-PB) significantly improved model fit when modeled 
separately. The multi-trait model for composite variables also did not significantly 
improve model fit. 
Narrowband individual differences. 
 Three of the four tested narrowband individual differences significantly improved 
model fit when modeled separately: TF-44, χ2(1) = 10.748, p = 0.001, RM2= .666, IUSF, 
χ2(1) = 6.1403, p = 0.013, RM2= .662, and STAI-T, χ2(1) = 5.398, p = 0.022, RM2= .664, 
all significantly improved model fit; ASI did not significantly improve model fit. TF-44 
represented a significant improvement in model fit over the models containing IU and 
STAI-T separately; additionally, the IU model significantly improved fit over the model 
containing the IU (all ps < .001). 
Interim summary for Aim 2.  
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 See Table 7 for an overview of significant main effects and interactions for the 
analyses conducted to address Aim 2. Overall, results indicated that normative, but not 
pathological, broadband negative affect variables appeared to significantly improve 
prediction when included in APIC models. Unexpectedly, the Volatility aspect of 
Neuroticism appeared to drive Neuroticism-related model improvements. Further, there 
was limited evidence for Conscientiousness or Extraversion-related improvements, with 
the only significant improvements related to Industriousness and Orderliness (for APIC 
models including startle) or Assertiveness-PB (for APIC models including risk ratings). 
The strongest improvements for broadband normative traits for both startle and risk 
ratings models were associated with the multi-aspect models. Narrowband results were 
largely in line with predictions, with a primary finding that TF-44 is associated with the 
largest improvements in model fit, and STAI-T, but not ASI, unexpectedly improving 
model fit. Consistency between significant results for startle and risk rating APIC models 
was moderately strong, with the majority of the observed inconsistencies related to 
models involving aspect-level traits and composite variables. 
Table 7. Summary table for Aim 2: Significant Improvements in APIC Model Fit and 
Corresponding Effect Size (Marginal R2). 
  
Startle APIC  
(base RM2 = .663) 
Risk Ratings APIC 
(base RM2 = .659) 
   
Normative broadband 
(BFAS)   
N 0.669 0.662 
W   
V 0.671 0.664 
W, V   
C   
 In   
 Or   
In, Or 0.670  
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E   
 As   
 En   
As, En   
Multi-trait 0.672  
Multi-aspect 0.680 0.672    
Composite broadband (PB)   
DPB 0.669  
IPB   
OPB   
APB  0.663 
EPB   
Multi-trait   
   
Narrowband   
TF-44 0.671 0.666 
IUSF 0.667 0.662 
ASI   
STAI-T 0.669 0.664 
Note: Marginal R2 is only displayed for models that significantly improved on the base 
model (i.e., the APIC model without any personality variables included); a blank cell 
indicates the corresponding model was not a significant improvement. Significant 
model improvements were p < .05. Bolded numbers indicate this was the highest effect 
size (i.e., best fit) among the type of variable (normative or composite) for either 
startle or risk rating models. Due to a lack of significant model improvement involving 
pathological (i.e., PID-5 variables) variables, they are not included in this table. 
Composite traits refer to those derived from a combination of PID-5 and BFAS scales 
and are indicated with a suffix of "PB". Multi-trait indicates a model with all of the 
trait level variables included (model with all normative traits or a model with all 
compound traits); multi-aspect is unique to normative models and indicates a model 
that includes all of the aspects in a single model. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian-
Instrumental Covariation; As = Assertiveness; ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; APB 
= Assertiveness PID-BFAS; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; C = Conscientiousness; 
DE = Detachment; DI = Disinhibition; DPB = Distress PID-BFAS; En = Enthusiasm; 
EPB = Enthusiasm PID-BFAS; E = Extraversion; In = Industriousness; IPB = 
Industriousness PID-BFAS; IUSF: Intolerance of Uncertainty – Short Form; OPB = 
Orderliness PID-BFAS; Or = Orderliness; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; 
N = Neuroticism; RM2 = marginal R squared; STAI-T: State Trait Anxiety Inventory – 
Trait; TF-44: Trait Fear 44-item; W = Withdrawal; V = Volatility.   
 
Aim 3 (A3): Moderation of APIC by dispositional traits. 
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Analyses for this aim were done using the same base APIC models used in Aim 2, 
which were random-intercept only models that only included the linear Stimulus term. 
This applied to both startle and risk ratings analyses. Due to a large number of null 
results, we streamline organization in the following sections to highlight significant 
moderators. Additionally, interpretation of significant interactions is limited to a broad 
overview of the interaction; more specific interpretations related to APIC-G vs APIC-
CS+ and comparison between Pavlovian response variables are in the following sections 
as appropriate. 
A3: Startle predicting avoidance. 
We found a significant Orderliness x Startle x Stimulus effect, β = 1.2431, 95% 
CI [1.0214 – 1.5130], χ2 (1, N=1723) = 4.7145, p = 0.030, which is evidence of 
moderation of APIC by Orderliness at specific levels of the Stimulus dimension. As can 
be seen in Figure 26, higher Orderliness generally facilitated the positive relationship 
between startle and avoidance for the CS+ to the GS1, and to the same degree across 
these stimuli (seen in the relatively consistent simple slope steepness). Most importantly, 
the difference in simple slopes for lower Orderliness highlights the significant 
moderation effect identified in the model: for the CS+, lower Orderliness weakened the 
association between startle and avoidance, such that higher startle was associated with 
decreased avoidance, whereas for the GS2 and GS1, lower Orderliness facilitated the 
association. For GS3, simple slopes appear to indicate a modest moderation effect, with a 
flatter lower Orderliness slope at this level resulting in a relatively stronger association 
between startle and avoidance for those higher on Orderliness. Taken together, it appears 
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that Orderliness differentially affects APIC across the stimulus continuum. All other 
tested moderation effects involving other personality variables were not significant.  
 
Figure 26. A: visual representation of the Orderliness x Stimulus x Startle interaction that 
represents a form of APIC moderation. Each subplot displays the association between 
fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) startle at each Stimulus level. 
For graphing purposes, a median split was used to establish high and low Orderliness 
groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was then used to approximate a best fitting 
summary line for each group, which are then transposed on the scatterplot showing 
individual data points. B: simple regression slopes depicting the moderating effect of 
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Orderliness at the level of the GSs and the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of 
Orderliness. Avoidance is represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an 
increased probability for avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each 
stimulus class are calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent 
relative change (i.e., log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance 
rates for each stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph 
borders to help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) 
for high/low levels of the moderator. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental 
Covariation; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Inventory; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus. 
 
A3: Risk ratings predicting avoidance. 
 We found four significant moderation effects for risk rating APIC analyses; all 
significant results were three-way interactions that are evidence of moderation of APIC 
by the tested personality variable at specific levels of the Stimulus dimension. There was 
a significant Conscientiousness x Stimulus x Risk Rating interaction, β = 1.2431, 95% CI 
[1.0214 – 1.5130], χ2 (1, N=1723) = 4.7145, p = 0.030, as well as a significant 
Orderliness x Stimulus x Risk Rating interaction, β = 1.3486, 95% CI [1.0536 – 1.7264], 
χ2 (1, N=1728) = 5.6368, p = 0.018. As can be seen in Figure 28, higher 
Conscientiousness facilitated the positive relationship between risk ratings and avoidance 
at the level of the CS+, whereas lower Conscientiousness facilitated this relationship at 
the level of the GS2 and GS1; this same pattern was also seen with Orderliness (see 
Figure 29), likely indicating that the moderating effect of Conscientiousness is driven by 
the Orderliness aspect. Also of note for these interactions is the discrepancy between the 
fitted values and simple slopes plots for the GS1; this appears to be driven by a relative 
outlier which, although not unduly influential on the model (i.e., does not affect statistical 
results when removed), biases the visualized summary fit line, and therefore simple 
slopes are primarily used for interpretation. 
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Figure 27. A: visual representation of the Conscientiousness x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Conscientiousness groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) 
was then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Conscientiousness on risk ratings at the level of the 
GSs and the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Conscientiousness. 
Avoidance is represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased 
probability for avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus 
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class are calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative 
change (i.e., log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates 
for each stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph 
borders to help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) 
for high/low levels of the moderator. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental 
Covariation; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Inventory; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; RR = risk rating.  
 
 
Figure 28. A: visual representation of the Orderliness x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC moderation. Each subplot displays the 
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association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Orderliness groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Orderliness on risk ratings at the level of the GSs and 
the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Orderliness. Avoidance is represented 
in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for avoidance 
of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are calculated 
separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., log odds 
values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each stimulus, see A 
for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to help highlight the 
relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for high/low levels of the 
moderator. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental Covariation; BFAS = Big Five 
Aspect Inventory; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = 
generalization stimulus; RR = risk rating. 
 
 There was also a significant Extraversion x Risk Rating x Stimulus interaction, β 
= 1.3479, 95% CI [1.0490 – 1.7321], χ2 (1, N=1728) = 5.4456, p = 0.020, as well as a 
significant Assertiveness x Risk Rating x Stimulus interaction, β = 1.3138, 95% CI 
[1.0166 – 1.6979], χ2 (1, N=1728) = 4.3513, p = 0.037. As can be seen in Figure 30, 
lower Extraversion facilitated the positive relationship between risk ratings and 
avoidance for all GSs; this facilitation effect appeared to strengthen as the GS became 
more dissimilar from the CS+ (i.e., strongest for the GS1, weakest for the GS3); this 
same pattern was also seen with Assertiveness (see Figure 31), likely indicating that the 
moderating effect of Extraversion is driven by the Assertiveness aspect. Also of note for 
these interactions is the discrepancy between the fitted values and simple slopes plots for 
the GS1; this appears to be driven by the same relative outlier from the 
Conscientiousness/Orderliness plots. 
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Figure 29. A: visual representation of the Extraversion x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Extraversion groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Extraversion on risk ratings at the level of the GSs and 
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the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Extraversion. Avoidance is 
represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for 
avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are 
calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., 
log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each 
stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to 
help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for 
high/low levels of the moderator. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental Covariation; 
BFAS = Big Five Aspect Inventory; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; RR = risk rating. 
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Figure 30. A: visual representation of the Assertiveness x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Assertiveness groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Assertiveness on risk ratings at the level of the GSs 
and the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Assertiveness. Avoidance is 
represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for 
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avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are 
calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., 
log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each 
stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to 
help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for 
high/low levels of the moderator. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental Covariation; 
BFAS = Big Five Aspect Inventory; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; RR = risk rating. 
Interim summary for Aim 3.  
 When analyzing moderation of APIC broadly (i.e., not reducing the models to 
only test APIC-G or APIC-CS+), only normative traits functioned as significant 
moderators (see Table 8 for a summary of results from this section). Orderliness was the 
only personality dimension to moderate the APIC relationship for both risk ratings and 
startle, and in both cases lower levels of the aspect facilitated the positive relationship 
between the Pavlovian variable and avoidance at the level of the GS2 and GS1. 
Additionally, for both APIC models, higher levels of Orderliness facilitated the 
relationship at the level of the CS+. There were two differences between the two models: 
1) higher Orderliness appeared to moderate startle, but not risk ratings, at the level of the 
GS3 and 2) lower Orderliness facilitated a negative relationship between startle and 
avoidance at the level of the CS+, potentially indicating a non-linear moderation effect of 
Orderliness for the CS+.   
The remaining significant moderators were all moderators of the relationship 
between risk ratings and avoidance. Conscientiousness had a near identical pattern of 
moderation as Orderliness, with higher Conscientiousness facilitating the positive 
relationship between risk ratings at the level of the CS+, and lower Conscientiousness 
facilitating the relationship at GS2 and GS1. Finally, higher Extraversion and its aspect 
Assertiveness also demonstrated a near identical pattern of moderation, as lower levels of 
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both personality variables facilitated the positive relationship between risk ratings and 
avoidance for all GSs, with this moderating effect strengthening as the GS became more 
dissimilar from the CS+. Also of note for these interactions is the discrepancy between 
the fitted values and simple slopes plots for the GS1, which appeared to be driven be a 
relative outlier that did not affect the statistical models but biased the summary fit line. 
This potentially indicates that the method of dichotomization and summarization of the 
moderating variable had an outsized impact on visualization of these interaction, and that 
the observed GS1 moderation effects should be interpreted with caution. 
We did not find significant APIC moderation effects for any other normative 
variables, or pathological or composite personality variables. There were also no 
significant moderation effects for narrowband personality traits. 
Table 8. Summary table for Aim 3: Significant APIC Moderators 
  Startle  Risk Ratings 
Personality 
Variable  GS1 GS2 GS3 CS+  GS1 GS2 GS3 CS+ 
N           
 W           
 V           
C       ↓ ↓ - ↑ 
 In           
 Or  ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑↓  ↓ ↓ - ↑ 
E       ↓ ↓ ↓ - 
 As       ↓ ↓ ↓ - 
 En           
Note: Only significant moderating effects are documented in this table, blank cells 
indicate a significant moderation effect was not found for that particular variable and 
stimulus pair. As only variables from the BFAS were found to moderate APIC, only 
BFAS variables are included. An upwards arrow (↑) indicates that higher levels of the 
corresponding personality variable facilitated the APIC relationship (i.e., potentiated the 
positive relationship); the downwards arrow (↓) indicated that lower levels of the 
corresponding personality variable facilitated the APIC relationship. A dash (-) in a cell 
indicates that although the corresponding personality variable was found to overall be a 
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moderator, it did not appear to moderate APIC at this level of the stimulus dimension. 
Both arrows in the same cell (↑↓) indicated that both high and low levels of the 
corresponding personality trait moderated the relationship, but in different directions 
(i.e., one facilitated the positive relationship, one attenuated the relationship) and is 
indicative of a non-linear moderation effect. All significant three-way interactions that 
indicated a moderation effect were p < .05. APIC = Aversive Pavlovian-Instrumental 
Covariation; As = Assertiveness; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; C = 
Conscientiousness; En = Enthusiasm; E = Extraversion; In = Industriousness; Or = 
Orderliness; N = Neuroticism; W = Withdrawal; V = Volatility.   
 
Aim 4 (A4): Specific APIC-G and APIC-CS+ effects. 
Analyses for this aim were based on the same APIC models used in Aims 2 and 3, 
with modifications made to specifically test for APIC-G and APIC-CS+ as detailed in the 
Method section. This applied to both startle and risk ratings analyses. As we continued to 
use the basic APIC model for this aim we started to observe singular fits in our MLMs, 
which is due to these modified models using a reduced Stimulus dimension to probe 
APIC-G and CS+ separately and therefore having less within-subjects variation 
contributing to the model. Comparisons of these models to standard GLM models (i.e., 
logistic regressions) with the same model specifications (other than the random-intercept) 
revealed that the multilevel models yielded uniformly better model fits (lower Deviance 
and AIC statistics for generalized linear mixed models vs GLMs). We therefore 
continued to use an MLM approach for these analyses to allow for more straightforward 
interpretation of these results with results from other sets of analyses that use MLM.  The 
overall ramifications of this issue on interpretation and our decision to continue using 
non-optimal multilevel models is reviewed in the Discussion section.  
 As with Aim 3, we streamline organization in the following sections to highlight 
significant moderators. We also highlight if significant moderators reflect a previously 
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identified moderation in the overall APIC analyses, or if they are unique to APIC-
G/APIC-CS+ analyses. 
A4: APIC-G: Startle predicting avoidance. 
 Notably, the Orderliness x Startle x Stimulus interaction seen in the overall startle 
APIC analyses was not significant for equivalent APIC-G analyses. Overall, we did not 
find any significant startle APIC-G moderators. 
A4: APIC-G: Risk ratings predicting avoidance. 
 Of the significant risk rating APIC moderators, only Extraversion continued to be 
a significant moderator for risk rating APIC-G, as evidenced by an Extraversion x Risk 
Rating x Stimulus interaction, β = 2.5523, 95% CI [1.2275 – 5.3071], χ2 (1, N=1152) = 
6.2935, p = 0.012. As can be seen in Figure 32, moderation of APIC-G was evident for 
the GS1 and GS2, but not GS3, with lower Extraversion facilitating the positive 
relationship between risk ratings and avoidance for these stimuli. Unique to APIC-G 
compared with APIC, the Enthusiasm x Stimulus x Risk Rating interaction was also 
significant, β = 2.7104, 95% CI [1.3179 – 5.5746], χ2 (1, N=1152) = 7.3441, p = 0.007, 
with the same pattern of moderation for the GSs as seen for Extraversion (see Figure 33). 
Additionally, higher Enthusiasm facilitated the relationship between risk ratings and 
avoidance for the GS3. As with the previous APIC analyses, a relative outlier biased the 
summary fit line, resulting in simple slopes being used as the primary method of 
interpretation. 
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Figure 31. A: visual representation of the Extraversion x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC-G moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Extraversion groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Extraversion on risk ratings at the level of the GSs and 
the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Extraversion. Avoidance is 
represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for 
avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are 
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calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., 
log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each 
stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to 
help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for 
high/low levels of the moderator. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental 
Covariation during Generalization; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Inventory; CS- = 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; RR 
= risk rating. 
 
 195 
Figure 32. A: visual representation of the Enthusiasm x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC-G moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Enthusiasm groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Enthusiasm on risk ratings at the level of the GSs and 
the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Enthusiasm. Avoidance is represented 
in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for avoidance 
of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are calculated 
separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., log odds 
values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each stimulus, see A 
for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to help highlight the 
relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for high/low levels of the 
moderator. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental Covariation during 
Generalization; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Inventory; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; RR = risk rating. 
 
 In terms of non-normative personality variables, Negative Affect was found to be 
a significant moderator, as evidenced by a Negative Affect x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction, β = 0.4436, 95% CI [0.2229 – 0.8827], χ2 (1, N=1152) = 5.3601, p = 0.021. 
As can be seen in Figure 34, moderation of APIC-G was evident for the GS1 and GS2, 
with higher Negative Affectivity facilitating the positive relationship between risk ratings 
and avoidance for these stimuli. Additionally, in contrast to the other GSs, lower 
Negative Affectivity appears to facilitate the risk rating and avoidance relationship at the 
level of the GS3. 
  There was also evidence of Detachment functioning as an APIC moderator, with a 
significant Detachment x Stimulus x Risk Rating interaction, β = 0.4749, 95% CI 
[0.2317 – 0.9731], χ2 (1, N=1152) = 4.1387, p = 0.042, showing a near identical pattern 
of moderation as seen for Negative Affectivity (see Figure 35), with higher Detachment 
facilitating the positive relationship between risk ratings and avoidance for GS2 and GS1, 
but lower Detachment facilitating the relationship for the GS3. 
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Figure 33. A: visual representation of the Negative Affectivity x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC-G moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Negative Affectivity groups, and a linear smoothing function 
(y~x) was then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are 
then transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression 
slopes depicting the moderating effect of Negative Affectivity on risk ratings at the level 
of the GSs and the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Negative Affectivity. 
Avoidance is represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased 
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probability for avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus 
class are calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative 
change (i.e., log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates 
for each stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph 
borders to help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) 
for high/low levels of the moderator. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental 
Covariation during Generalization; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR 
= risk rating. 
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Figure 34. A: visual representation of the Detachment x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC-G moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Detachment groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Detachment on risk ratings at the level of the GSs and 
the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Detachment Avoidance is represented 
in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for avoidance 
of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are calculated 
separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., log odds 
values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each stimulus, see A 
for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to help highlight the 
relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for high/low levels of the 
moderator. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental Covariation during 
Generalization; CS- = conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = 
generalization stimulus; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR = risk rating. 
 Finally, two PID-5/BFAS composite variables were significant moderators. The 
Assertiveness-PB x Stimulus x Risk Ratings interaction was significant, β = 2.4583, 95% 
CI [1.2643 – 4.7800], χ2 (1, N=1152) = 7.028, p = 0.008. As can be seen in Figure 36, 
moderation of APIC-G was evident for the GS1 and GS2, with lower Assertiveness-PB 
facilitating the positive relationship between risk ratings and avoidance for these stimuli. 
The other PB variable related to Extraversion, Enthusiasm-PB, was also a significant 
moderator, as the Enthusiasm-PB x Stimulus x Risk Ratings interaction was significant, β 
= 2.7104, 95% CI [1.3179 – 5.5746], χ2 (1, N=1152) = 7.3451, p = 0.007. As can be seen 
in Figures 37, the moderating effect of Enthusiasm-PB resembles that of Assertiveness-
PB at the level of the GS1, with lower Enthusiasm-PB facilitating the positive 
relationship between risk ratings and avoidance for these stimuli. However, in contrast to 
Assertiveness-PB, the faciliatory effect of Enthusiasm-PB at the level of the GS1 is less 
clear; the simple slope plot shows a slight moderation effect due to the lower-level slope, 
but this is not reflected in the summary fit lines show in the equivalent fitted values plot, 
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potentially indicating the simple slopes plot is reflective of a moderating effect only at 
extremely low levels of Enthusiasm-PB. Also in contrast to Assertiveness-PB, 
Enthusiasm-PB appears to moderate the GS3 relationship, with higher levels of 
Enthusiasm-PB facilitating the risk rating and avoidance relationship for this stimulus. 
 
Figure 35. A: visual representation of the Assertiveness-PB x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC-G moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
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ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Assertiveness-PB groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) 
was then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Assertiveness-PB on risk ratings at the level of the GSs 
and the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Assertiveness-PB. Avoidance is 
represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for 
avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are 
calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., 
log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each 
stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to 
help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for 
high/low levels of the moderator. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental 
Covariation during Generalization; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PB = PID-
5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR = risk rating. 
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Figure 36. A: visual representation of the Enthusiasm-PB x Stimulus x Risk Rating 
interaction that represents a form of APIC-G moderation. Each subplot displays the 
association between fitted avoidance values and centered within cluster (CWC) risk 
ratings at each Stimulus level. For graphing purposes, a median split was used to 
establish high and low Enthusiasm-PB groups, and a linear smoothing function (y~x) was 
then used to approximate a best fitting summary line for each group, which are then 
transposed on the scatterplot showing individual data points. B: simple regression slopes 
depicting the moderating effect of Enthusiasm-PB on risk ratings at the level of the GSs 
and the CS+ at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of Enthusiasm-PB. Avoidance is 
represented in log odds, such that the higher values represent an increased probability for 
avoidance of that associated stimulus. Simple slopes for each stimulus class are 
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calculated separately, and therefore all avoidance values represent relative change (i.e., 
log odds values correspond to different absolute predicted avoidance rates for each 
stimulus, see A for absolute avoidance values). Slopes are extended to graph borders to 
help highlight the relative strength of the moderator effect (i.e., the interaction) for 
high/low levels of the moderator. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian Instrumental 
Covariation during Generalization; BFAS = Big Five Aspect Scale; CS- = conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; GS = generalization stimulus; PB = PID-
5/BFAS composite; PID-5 = Personality Inventory for DSM-5; RR = risk rating. 
 
A4: APIC-CS+: Startle predicting avoidance 
Although there was a clear moderation effect for Orderliness on startle at the level 
of the CS+ for APIC analyses, we did not find a significant APIC-CS+ moderation effect 
for Orderliness. Overall, we did not find any significant risk rating APIC-CS+ 
moderators. 
A4: APIC-CS+: Risk ratings predicting avoidance. 
As with the startle models, we did not find any significant APIC-CS+ moderators 
for risk rating models. These null findings are despite clear moderation effects for 
Conscientiousness and Orderliness on risk ratings at the level of the CS+ for APIC 
analyses, as well as a less clear, but still notable, moderation effect for Assertiveness on 
risk ratings at the level of the CS+ for APIC analyses. 
Interim summary for Aim 4.  
In line with APIC analyses, we also found significant normative personality 
moderators of APIC-G; however, in contrast to APIC analyses we also found significant 
pathological and composite personality moderators (see Table 9 for summary of 
significant moderation effects for APIC-G). Additionally, all identified moderators were 
related to risk ratings. The only identified moderator of APIC that was also found for 
APIC-G was Extraversion. For APIC-G, lowered Extraversion facilitated the positive 
relationship between risk ratings and avoidance for the GS1 and GS2, but not the GS3. 
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This differed from the Extraversion moderation effect observed for APIC, which also 
included a facilitative effect of lower Extraversion at the level of the GS3. Additionally, 
the Assertiveness facet of Extraversion was found to be a significant APIC moderator, 
but was not a significant APIC-G moderator. Instead, Enthusiasm, the other Extraversion 
aspect, was a significant APIC-G moderator and demonstrated close to the same pattern 
of moderation as Extraversion. Additionally, and differing from Extraversion, higher 
Enthusiasm facilitated the relationship between risk ratings and avoidance for the GS3. 
This appears to be due to an overall steeper slope for those higher on Enthusiasm across 
the Stimulus continuum, which resulted in a more distinct moderation effect for the GS3 
compared with the same effect for Extraversion.  
Extraversion and Enthusiasm were the only normative personality variables to 
significantly moderate APIC-G. Negative Affectivity and Detachment were identified as 
significant pathological personality moderators of APIC-G, with both demonstrating a 
facilitating effect of the risk rating and avoidance relationship for the GS1 and GS2 at 
higher levels of the trait and for GS3 at lower levels of the trait. In terms of composite 
variables, both of the variables related to Extraversion, Assertiveness-PB and 
Enthusiasm-PB, were significant APIC-G moderators, with lower levels of both variables 
facilitating the risk rating and avoidance relationship at the level of the GS1, lower levels 
of Assertiveness-PB (and potentially Enthusiasm-PB, but there is some discrepancy in the 
summary fit lines versus the simple slopes) facilitating the relationship at the level of the 
GS2, and higher levels of Enthusiasm-PB facilitating the relationship at the level of the 
GS3. 
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Despite notable moderation effects observed at the level of the CS+ for APIC 
analyses, formal APIC-CS+ analyses (i.e., models only including the △CS- and CS+) did 
not identify any significant moderators. We also did not find significant moderation 
effects for any other broadband personality variables. There were also no significant 
moderation effects for narrowband personality traits. 
Table 9. Summary table for Aim 4: Significant APIC-G Moderators 
  Risk Ratings 
Personality 
Variable  GS1 GS2 GS3 
N     
   W     
   V     
C     
   In     
   Or  - ↑ ↓ 
E  ↓ ↓ - 
   As     
   En  ↓ ↓ ↑ 
     
NA  ↑ ↑ ↓ 
DE  ↑ ↑ ↓ 
DI     
     
DPB     
IPB     
OPB     
APB  ↓ ↓ - 
EPB   ↓ ↓ ↑ 
Note: Only significant moderating effects are documented in this table, blank cells 
indicate a significant moderation effect was not found for that particular variable and 
stimulus pair. As only broadband personality variables were found to be significant 
APIC-G moderators, and only for models involving risk ratings, narrowband variables 
and startle models are excluded from this table. An upwards arrow (↑) indicates that 
higher levels of the corresponding personality variable facilitated the APIC relationship 
(i.e., potentiated the positive relationship); the downwards arrow (↓) indicated that lower 
levels of the corresponding personality variable facilitated the APIC-G relationship. A 
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dash (-) in a cell indicates that although the corresponding personality variable was 
found to overall be a moderator, it did not appear to moderate APIC-G at this level of 
the stimulus dimension. All significant three-way interactions that indicated a 
moderation effect were p < .05. APIC-G = Aversive Pavlovian-Instrumental Covariation 
during Generalization; As = Assertiveness, APB = Assertiveness PID-BFAS, C = 
Conscientiousness, DE = Detachment, DI = Disinhibition, DPB = Distress PID-BFAS, 
En = Enthusiasm, EPB = Enthusiasm PID-BFAS, E = Extraversion, In = 
Industriousness, IPB = Industriousness PID-BFAS, OPB = Orderliness PID-BFAS, Or = 
Orderliness, N = Neuroticism, W = Withdrawal, V = Volatility. 
  
Discussion 
 Overall, this study replicated the results of prior work from our group using the 
PIG paradigm (van Meurs et al., 2014) which found both Pavlovian and instrumental 
avoidance generalization effects. Crucially, we expanded on these findings by rigorously 
testing the relations between a broad range of personality individual differences and these 
generalization effects, and then extend this work by testing how these personality 
variables potentially improve prediction of and, in certain cases, moderate the covariation 
between Pavlovian fear and instrumental avoidance. Given the large number of analyses 
and the complexity of the results, we next present in-depth interpretations of results 
organized by the relevant aim and then the associated set of hypotheses, as well as an 
additional section discussing unaddressed results that were not related to specific 
hypotheses. These interpretations are then followed by a synthesis of all results. 
Aim 1: Identifying personality predictors of generalization. 
 Overall, analyses for Aim 1 identified a number of predictors of generalization 
across different outcome measures. One notable pattern across the analyses for this aim 
was the lack of physiological generalization findings (i.e., when operationalized with 
fear-potentiated startle). Despite the relatively large sample size used for these analyses, 
it is not surprising that the fewest significant effects were found for startle, as the EMG 
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measurement of the eyeblink that is used to index startle is statistically noisier than 
behavioral measurements, and inconsistent results across personality traits were observed 
in the only comparable study that used startle eyeblink in relation to personality traits in a 
large sample (Gazendam et al., 2014). We address this issue in the overall synthesis of 
results that follows the more specific discussion for each aim, and instead focus on 
interpreting results for Aim 1 in psychological terms. 
A1.H1. 
Contrary to predictions, Withdrawal (a Neuroticism aspect) was not associated 
with greater generalization in any outcome measures. However, Neuroticism was 
associated with greater threat estimation generalization (as indexed by a shallower 
decline in risk ratings from CS+ to GS3), and Volatility (the other Neuroticism aspect) 
was associated with increased avoidance generalization (as indexed by a shallower 
decline in avoidance decisions from CS+ to GS3) when the other aspects of interest were 
held constant (i.e., included in the same model). These results provide tentative support 
for a role of higher, but normative, levels of negative affect in generalization. 
Neuroticism’s relationship with increased threat estimation to the GS3 resembles that 
seen in studies of disorders associated with extreme levels of Neuroticism, such as PTSD 
(e.g., Kaczkurkin et al., 2016) or GAD (e.g., Lissek et al., 2014), but with a notably 
weaker generalization effect (i.e., a steeper decline from CS+ to GS3 than that seen in the 
anxiety disorder groups). The Volatility generalization effect is also modest, but an 
appropriate comparison study is not available due to the lack of research related to 
avoidance generalization. Overall, it is not clear why we did not find Withdrawal effects, 
but instead found a Neuroticism and Volatility effect for different outcomes. One 
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possibility is that both aspects of Neuroticism are determinants of Pavlovian 
generalization, despite Withdrawal nominally being the “anxiety” aspect, and that when 
modeling the aspects separately their predictive power was weakened. Another 
possibility is that the item content in Withdrawal related to depression is as prominent as 
the anxiety-related content, and thus attenuates the relationship between the anxiety-
related variance and Pavlovian generalization. There is some support for this in the 
current results, as Withdrawal is positively associated with a state measure of depression 
used in this study, r = .55. This does not help explain why Volatility predicted avoidance 
generalization, however. From one point of view, the finding appears quite contradictory 
to expectations given that Volatility is conceptualized as an aspect representing emotional 
lability and anger (DeYoung et al., 2007), especially considering the intuitive appeal of 
and empirical support for anger as the “approach” emotion (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 
2009; Harmon-Jones, Peterson, Gable, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). One possibility is that 
the observed Volatility finding does not reflect a direct anger effect, and that PIG task is 
not activating an in-moment experience of anger in those higher on Volatility and 
therefore not explicitly activating approach motivation, but that the finding is instead 
capturing a tendency towards frustration in a subset of high-Volatility participants that 
find the reward to not be equivalent to the effort needed to obtain it (e.g., the act of 
winning is not worth the shock) and disengage to downregulate their activation. This 
tendency might then be most activated during the (likely) most challenging situation in 
the task: determining if the GS3 is dangerous. This is plausible given evidence that 
frustration is associated with avoidance as well as approach (e.g., Adelman & Maatsch, 
1956; McNaughton, DeYoung, & Corr, 2016), but to avoid overinterpretation we 
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consider this to be an explanation that perhaps cannot be further clarified or supported 
using the data from this study. 
A1.H2.  
 Our hypothesis that Negative Affectivity and Distress-PB (a Neuroticism + 
Negative Affectivity composite) would be associated with greater generalization was 
supported; both traits significantly predicted generalized threat evaluation and avoidance 
when accounting for the effects of the other variables of the same type (i.e., Detachment 
and Disinhibition for Negative Affectivity, the other PB variables for Distress-PB). The 
explanation that these variables are approximations of the disorders previously associated 
with generalization appears valid, especially given that the gradients resemble those 
findings from samples with pathology, but to a more modest degree. It is also important 
to note that these do not necessarily reflect separate findings, given that Distress-PB is 
partially comprised of Negative Affectivity items, and perhaps overall provides initial 
support for the utility of dimensional models in the study of generalization, as both 
pathological and “full-spectrum” variables were associated with generalization.  
A1.H3.  
 Our hypothesis that Conscientious and its two aspects, Industriousness and 
Orderliness, would be differentially associated with avoidance generalization was 
partially supported: Orderliness was associated with increased avoidance generalization, 
whereas Industriousness did not have a significant effect. Further, Conscientiousness 
reflected the Orderliness effect and was also significantly associated with increased 
avoidance generalization. The association between Orderliness and generalization as 
indexed by shallower declines from the CS+ to the GS3 is understandable when viewing 
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the GS3 as an ambiguous approach-avoidance conflict, and the CS+ as a less ambiguous 
situation. Someone higher on Orderliness might not necessarily avoid the CS+ more than 
those lower on the aspect (which is reflected in our results) because in less-ambiguous 
approach-avoidance situations, the optimal outcome is clearer and behavior is less 
determined by individual differences (i.e., a strong situation; Lissek, Pine, & Grillon, 
2006). However, during GS3 trials, Orderliness might promote increased avoidance 
because of a tendency towards closely following the rules, even when maladaptive 
(Hewitt & Flett, 2007), and implicitly constructing an avoidance “rule” for the GS3 based 
on its increased similarity to the CS+. Put another way, if the rule for the CS+ is to avoid, 
then that rule generalizes to the GS3 for those higher on Orderliness. It should also be 
noted that the pathological extension of Orderliness, the Orderliness-PB composite trait, 
significantly predicts generalization in a similar pattern to Orderliness, but to perhaps an 
even greater degree. However, we refrain from continued interpretation of this interaction 
due to overlapping CIs for the Orderliness-PB fitted lines. 
Given that the Conscientiousness results resemble those for Orderliness, it is 
likely that the variance associated with Orderliness is the driving predictive element of 
the trait, and that Industriousness (i.e., the Conscientiousness variance that isn’t 
accounted for by Orderliness) has little effect on generalization. There is also the 
possibility that our manipulation is not well suited to elicit Industriousness effects, as the 
contingencies and decision-making aspects of the PIG are fairly simple, and 
Industriousness is perhaps more reflective of how people persevere in service of a distal 
goal or stay focused during a complex task (e.g., Hickman, Stromme, & Lippman, 1998).  
A1.H4. 
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 Our hypotheses for Extraversion and its aspect, Assertiveness, to be associated 
with decreased avoidance generalization were not supported: although lower 
Assertiveness was associated with overall increased levels of avoidance, there was no 
evidence of this being related to generalization. This is potentially related to the relatively 
low value of the reward in the PIG (a “win”), as it is possible that this reward is not 
sufficient for those higher on Extraversion/Assertiveness to increase their approach 
during an ambiguous situation (i.e., GS3) above and beyond their baseline level of 
approach. For example, someone higher on Assertiveness might generally respond to any 
approach-avoidance challenge with an increased rate of approach regardless of the 
associated reward (i.e., a tendency towards increased agency and desire for achievement 
across situations; e.g., Depue & Collins, 1999), but would not necessarily approach at a 
relatively higher rate during risk unless the reward value supersedes the potential cost. 
Further, those higher on Assertiveness are not necessarily fearless or at an extremely low 
level of fear and other relevant negative affect traits that we would expect Assertiveness 
to clearly capture differences in generalization related to a lack of fear and anxiety.  That 
said, Assertiveness (and the superordinate Extraversion trait) are generally anticorrelated 
with Neuroticism and fear measures (rs for Assertiveness correlations in the current study 
range from -.23 [Neuroticism] to -.55 [TF-44], also see DeYoung, Carey, Krueger, & 
Ross, 2016; Quilty, DeYoung, Oakman, & Bagby, 2014), so it is possible that 
Assertiveness genuinely tracks lower fear as well as higher overall approach, but that this 
not result in a significant association with experimental outcomes for another reason. For 
example, as previously noted, Extraversion and subordinate factors are not perfect 
analogues for approach motivation, or even the broader positive affect construct (Depue 
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& Collins, 1999; Quilty et al., 2014), and that the socially-relevant content included in 
most measures, including the BFAS, is an imperfect fit for the PIG task, which has an 
extremely limited social component in the form of the video game context involving a 
farmer. We also did not explicitly measure social aspects of motivation during the PIG 
(e.g., “how much was your decision to avoid the short road related to your desire to not 
see the farmer embarrassed or hurt?”), making a more in-depth analysis of this aspect of 
the task difficult, if not impossible. 
A1.H5. 
 Our hypotheses regarding narrowband variables were partially supported: trait 
fear and IU were significant predictors of Pavlovian generalization, although only IU 
significantly predicted both physiological and behavioral (i.e., risk ratings) 
generalization. The physiological generalization gradients for trait fear and IU are 
perhaps the most reminiscent findings of those seen in generalization studies with anxiety 
patient samples, with higher trait fear/IU associated with an overall shallower decline in 
responding and a notably shallower decline from the CS+ to the GS3. The IU, but not 
trait fear, association with behavioral generalization is unexpected. One possible 
explanation is related to the specific trait fear measure used, the TF-44. This measure was 
constructed and optimized using a biobehavioral approach that emphasizes a biological 
criterion, in this case the startle reflex, which operationalized in a similar fashion to the 
method used for the current study (Kramer, Patrick, Krueger, & Gasperi, 2012; Kramer et 
al., 2019). The risk ratings used in the current study are, at best, an indirect measure of 
fear, and are better conceptualized as a cognitive appraisal of threat. Therefore, the TF-44 
might not be optimized to predict differences in generalization as measured by risk 
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ratings. This is also consistent with conceptualizations of the trait fear construct, which 
revolve around defensive responding to acute threat. Conversely, it could also be argued 
that IU is particularly well-suited to predicting behavioral generalization as 
operationalized by risk ratings, which are essentially a form of predicting uncertain 
outcomes. Thus, those who associate greater uncertainty with more risk and distress (i.e., 
those higher on IU) are likely also those who would demonstrate increased 
generalization. 
 The lack of association between IU or trait fear with avoidance generalization, but 
significant main effects of both on avoidance (consistent with prior work on IU and 
instrumental avoidance, Flores, López, Vervliet, & Cobos, 2018), is also unexpected. The 
main effect, in which higher levels of the trait are associated with overall increased 
avoidance, is a logical extension of both traits: IU and trait fear both capture content 
related to avoidance and reduced approach, and those higher on these traits are likely 
those who report higher daily avoidance in response to threat and uncertainty. The same 
logic, however, would also suggest that those higher on these traits are more likely to 
generalize their avoidance to a greater a degree, yet the current results do not support this. 
A possible explanation is related to one of the overarching tenets of this study: approach-
avoidance conflict has both fear and non-fear determinants, and maladaptive resolution of 
these conflicts is not solely determined by fear-related factors. Thus, it is possible that the 
variance captured by the IU and trait fear measure is too specific to the fear and anxiety 
domain and not to the other important factors that predict avoidance generalization. This 
also might help explain contradictory fear conditioning results in the IU literature (e.g., J. 
T.-H Chen & Lovibond, 2016; Chin, Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016; Nelson, 
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Weinberg, Pawluk, Gawlowska, & Proudfit, 2014) – if IU represents a very 
circumscribed form of fear and anxiety variance, its predictive strength might be 
decreased if other motivational factors are, intentionally or not, activated in an 
experimental task. 
 Finally, it should also be noted that the remaining narrowband traits of interest, 
trait anxiety and anxiety sensitivity, were both components of interactions with the 
Stimulus dimension that significantly predicted avoidance, but plotted generalization 
slopes and fitted lines did not support an interpretation consistent with generalization. 
More specifically, the statistical interactions appeared to be driven by a shallower decline 
in responding across the stimuli more distal from the CS+ (GS2 to oCS-) for those higher 
on the traits, however, overlapping CIs for these portions of the gradient indicated this 
was likely not a replicable association and did not represent a generalizable result. It is 
possible that this is a genuine effect, but weak enough that statistical uncertainty remains.  
Additional findings and Aim 1 summary. 
 In addition to the findings discussed above, there were a number of intriguing 
secondary findings that were either components of models containing multiple 
personality variables or exploratory analyses. The majority of these findings related to 
Extraversion, its aspects, and pathological extensions or manifestations of the trait. 
Perhaps most noteworthy is that Detachment was a significant predictor of increased 
behavioral fear generalization and avoidance generalization in a model that also 
contained Negative Affectivity and Disinhibition (all three are PID-5 traits). Detachment 
is a pathological personality trait capturing extreme disinterest, anhedonia, and social 
withdrawal that was included as a pathological correspondent to Extraversion, with lower 
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Extraversion corresponding to the lower-end of the Detachment distribution (which is 
observed in our sample as a correlation of r = -.61 between Detachment and 
Extraversion). It is reasonable to predict that Detachment would be related to worse 
discrimination on the task due to generally less engagement (i.e., those higher on 
Detachment are not motivated to expend energy to rigorously learn the task 
contingencies) and higher avoidance during danger due to lower reward motivation that 
could buffer against risk aversion. Behavioral generalization (i.e., risk rating) results 
appear to indicate that higher Detachment is associated with increased generalization 
from the GS2 to the GS1, which might be driven by poorer discrimination between these 
similar stimuli. However, we are cautious to extensively interpret this interaction due to 
1) a lack of explanation for why poorer discrimination wouldn’t be evident for the 
response slope from the GS2 to the GS3 and GS2) the CIs between the fitted lines for this 
interaction overlap, indicating that this result is potentially limited to our sample and not 
generalizable to the population. More interpretable is the interaction effect indicating 
Detachment is associated with generalized avoidance, which is evident as a shallower 
slope from GS3 to oCS- associated with higher Detachment. This appears to indicate that 
as the approach-avoidance conflict associated with each stimulus becomes clearer (i.e., 
less similar to the most ambiguous approach-avoidance conflict situation, the GS3), the 
tendency for those high on Detachment to not engage with reward becomes increasingly 
evident. Consistent with Detachment’s conceptualization as a pathological trait, this lack 
of engagement in the context of the stimuli that more resemble the safety cue than the 
danger cue can be considered an index of increasingly maladaptive avoidance. That said, 
we cannot be sure that this effect is driven by the pathologically lower positive affect in 
 215 
Detachment, as there is still a significant negative affect component to Detachment 
(Negative Affectivity and Detachment are highly correlated, r = .76). However, the fact 
that the Detachment interaction is significant in a model that also includes a significant 
Negative Affectivity interaction is notable, as this indicates that at least some of the 
negative affect-related variance in Detachment has been accounted for by the Negative 
Affectivity interaction.  
 The significant Enthusiasm-PB interaction predicting decreased behavioral fear 
generalization can be interpreted similarly to the Detachment interaction, as lower 
Enthusiasm-PB conceptually aligns with higher Detachment, and the interaction is 
defined by those lower on Enthusiasm-PB generalizing at the GS2 and GS1 levels, 
whereas those higher on the trait do not. In fact, it appears these interactions are 
graphically identical. Give that 1) Enthusiasm-PB is comprised of multiple facets that 
contribute to Detachment scores (e.g., Anhedonia, Intimacy Avoidance) and the resulting 
extremely high correlation between the two scales (r = .95 when aligning both scales so 
that higher scores = more extreme pathology) and 2) that again we see overlapping CIs in 
the fitted lines which limit confidence in this effect, it does not appear that further 
interaction of this particular interaction is warranted. However, the lack of a 
corresponding avoidance generalization effect for Enthusiasm-PB, along with the 
complete lack of Extraversion (and its aspects) effect on avoidance generalization, 
support the notion that normative levels of Extraversion and related dispositions are not 
inherently protective against maladaptive avoidance, and that the pathogenic capacity of 
Detachment to increase avoidance generalization is likely not related to its shared 
variance with Extraversion. 
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Although we did find avoidance generalization effects, lower Extraversion and 
Assertiveness-PB significantly predicted physiological fear generalization, with lower 
Extraversion associated with a modest degree of generalization limited to the stimuli 
more distal from the CS+ (GS2 and GS1), and Assertiveness-PB associated with a greater 
degree of generalization across the continuum. This is consistent with the 
conceptualization of Extraversion representing normative variation and Assertiveness-PB 
extending into the pathological tail of the Extraversion distribution, and that therefore the 
Assertiveness-PB is serving in the “full-spectrum” capacity that served as the theoretical 
rationale for using these composite variables. To enhance interpretation, it is worthwhile 
to reiterate what differentiates Extraversion from Assertiveness-PB: both contain the 
Assertiveness items from the BFAS, but Extraversion is also comprised of the 
Enthusiasm aspect, whereas Assertiveness-PB also includes Submissiveness, a 
pathological facet that is part of the PID-5. Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that the 
shared features between the two interactions (generalization at the level of the GS2 to the 
GS1) are related to their shared variance (i.e., the Assertiveness aspect), and that the 
addition of pathological Submission variance (conceptually opposing Assertiveness, r = -
.27 in the current sample) is related to the stronger generalization effects that extend to 
the GS3 seen in the Assertiveness-PB interaction. A possibility is that introducing the 
pathological variance of Submissiveness enhances the Assertiveness trait so that it is 
more related to higher negative affect (which is consistent with correlations from this 
study, as negative correlations between Assertiveness-PB and the negative affect-related 
variables are uniformly stronger than those between Assertiveness alone and those same 
variables), which in turn appears more related to fear generalization from the CS+ to the 
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GS3. In that case, it is likely there are multiple determinants for the observed 
generalization effect: generalization for stimuli more resembling the CS+ is more related 
to high negative affect, generalization for stimuli less similar to the CS+ (or, 
alternatively, more similar to the CS-) is more related to low positive affect. A possible 
explanation for this latter effect is that those who have a higher threshold for activation of 
unnecessary defensive responding (i.e., lower “false alarm” rate during safety) are more 
assertive in their environments due to a lower rate of inhibitory signaling, and that this 
would be one of the determinants for higher scores on the Assertiveness scale. This is 
partially supported by evidence that those higher on Extraversion or related traits show 
overall decreased defensive reactivity compared with those lower on Extraversion (e.g., 
Corr, 2002), as well as by evidence of increased threat discrimination (as indexed by 
enhanced extinction) in those higher on Extraversion (S. L. Rauch et al., 2005) and 
decreases in acquired fear maintenance in those lower on the Activity facet of 
Extraversion (Pineles et al., 2009). That said, this does not explain why Extraversion is 
related to physiological generalization, but not Assertiveness alone, especially if we 
propose that Assertiveness is the aspect driving the observed generalization effect. This 
discrepancy could be neatly resolved if low Enthusiasm was strongly related to 
Submissiveness, but this is not the case (r = -.05), nor is it expected given how the 
composite scales were constructed (i.e., based on factor analytic techniques aimed 
towards optimizing the discriminant validity of each factor in regards to the other factors; 
DeYoung, Carey, Krueger, & Ross, 2016). Another possible, if tenuous, explanation is 
one focusing on an equifinal system in which low Assertiveness alone is not sufficient to 
elicit generalization effects, and that an additional source of variation related to increased 
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negative affect is needed, but that the particular form of generalization is differentially 
related to the source negative affect. In this case, it is possible that the low Enthusiasm 
which contributes to the lowest Extraversion scores is providing that negative affect 
(Enthusiasm is consistently anticorrelated with the negative affect traits to a greater 
degree than Assertiveness), but that, in contrast to Submissiveness, this source of 
negative affect variance is not sufficient to elicit the form of generalization most 
commonly linked to pathology (generalization from the CS+ to the GS3). This 
explanation is, of course, quite preliminary and would require substantial follow-up 
analyses and investigations to substantiate.  
Overall, Aim 1 results confirm that we can predict fear and avoidance 
generalization using continuously modeled personality variables. The exact nature of 
these relations is complex, but a few overall trends can be extracted from the amassed 
results. First, in terms of normative personality, the Neuroticism and Conscientiousness-
related effects all indicate that higher levels of these dispositions contribute to 
generalization in some fashion, but that the exact form of generalization differs, which 
also suggests that the underlying mechanisms also differ. This statement is also 
somewhat weakened by inconsistent findings across fear and avoidance generalization for 
these variables. Second, Extraversion-related effects suggest that higher levels are 
protective and buffer against fear, but not avoidance, generalization. Third, personality 
variables that capture pathological variance (both broadband and narrowband) were 
consistently linked with fear generalization, but narrowband measures were not 
associated with generalized avoidance, potentially indicating that the broader measures 
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contain content more associated with avoidance. Taken together, these results are 
intriguing, but require further investigation and replication. 
Aim 2: Testing improved prediction of avoidance in APIC models 
 As stated, Aim 2 revolves around the question of whether we can further improve 
our avoidance prediction once we know someone’s level of fear or threat estimation. The 
answer appears to this appears to be “yes”, as we found generally consistent evidence that 
both broadband and narrowband traits can be added to predictive models to improve 
explained variance. Interpretation within this aim is limited given potential redundancy 
with interpretations for effects found for other aims.  
A2.H1. 
Our hypotheses regarding negative affect traits were partially supported: 
Neuroticism significantly improved model fit when added to both types of APIC models 
(physiological and behavioral Pavlovian indices), and Distress-PB significant improved 
model fit for the APIC model with startle, but not risk ratings. Unexpectedly, we also 
found that Volatility significantly improved model fit for both types of APIC models, and 
to a significantly greater extent than Neuroticism. This is partially reflecting the finding 
from Aim 1 that Volatility predicts avoidance and therefore including it in an APIC 
model overall improves the predictive power of the model, but also suggests that 
Volatility is adding uniquely predictive variance above and beyond the Pavlovian 
predictor. Further, Volatility is not significantly related to the Pavlovian responding, 
either overall or generalized. Therefore, it seems reasonably to conclude that Volatility is 
reflecting a separate source of variation that strongly relates to avoidance but is not 
related to Pavlovian responding or APIC. One possibility is that those higher on 
 220 
Volatility are also those most likely to avoid as a form of defiance or refusal to participate 
in the “rules” of the video game. To some degree, this aligns with Volatility containing 
emotional lability and vulnerability variance, which is commonly associated with 
antagonistic traits and externalizing problems (e.g., DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; 
Wright & Simms, 2014). Even more speculative is that Volatility is tracking narcissistic 
qualities in a subset of participants (Volatility as measured on the BFAS has been 
previously linked to narcissistic personality dimensions, e.g., Oltmanns & Widiger, 2018) 
and that those participants do not emotionally identify with or care about the farmer 
getting to his crops. Either of these explanations might account for the improved 
predictive properties of the APIC models with Volatility without any corresponding 
relationship to Pavlovian responding, but at this time these explanations remain 
speculative.  
A2.H2. 
 Although Conscientiousness itself did not improve APIC model fit, our 
hypothesis that Industriousness and Orderliness included in the same model would result 
in a significant improvement in model fit was supported when Pavlovian responding was 
operationalized with startle. Further, when examining the corresponding coefficients 
from the model with both aspects, there was a negative predictive relationship between 
Industriousness and avoidance (β = -0.2579) and a positive predictive relationship 
between Orderliness and avoidance (β = 0.3464). It appears that the expected suppression 
effect occurred and thus we can observe the expected relations between the two aspects 
and avoidance. This suggests that even above and beyond modeling APIC, there is added 
utility when including both Industriousness and Orderliness to predict avoidance. Put 
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another way, this model suggests that even if we know a person’s level of fear, we can 
still refine our avoidance prediction if we know both their levels of Industriousness and 
Orderliness. Given the lack of any other Industriousness effect found in this dissertation, 
this finding suggests that Industriousness and its hypothesized enhancement of approach 
tendency is only apparent when accounting for multiple other sources of variation, and is 
therefore a subtle and potentially weaker effect. Finally, the fact that this effect was only 
evident for APIC models including startle complicates interpretation, and within the 
framework of the Aim 2 analytic technique (i.e., model comparisons using LRTs) 
suggests that Orderliness and Industriousness provide added predictive power only when 
accounting for physiological Pavlovian responding, or conversely, these aspects do not 
enhance prediction when a person’s threat estimation (risk ratings) is known. Risk ratings 
represent a more volitional, cognitively-mediated form of Pavlovian responding (e.g., 
Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013; Boddez et al., 2013). Similarly, 
Conscientiousness, the superordinate trait for Orderliness and Industriousness, is 
frequently defined by and related to substituting volitional, organized responses for 
prepotent, automatic responses (e.g., Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002; McCrae & 
Löckenhoff, 2010). Therefore, it is possible that the information provided by risk ratings 
is partially redundant with that provided by the Conscientiousness aspects, and results in 
a lack of significant model improvement.  
A2.H3. 
 Contrary to our hypotheses, adding Extraversion or its aspects to APIC models 
did not significantly improve prediction of avoidance. However, an additional finding for 
which we did not have specific predictions might help explain this lack of findings: 
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Assertiveness-PB significantly improved prediction for the APIC model that included 
risk ratings. This suggests that pathological, but not normative, forms of Extraversion 
improve APIC prediction. That said, we limit our interpretation at this point in the 
dissertation to avoid redundancy with interpretation of multiple Extraversion-related 
APIC findings in the next session. 
A2.H4. 
 As with our prediction for broadband negative affect traits, our prediction 
regarding narrowband traits was partially supported. Both IU and trait fear significantly 
improved model fit for APIC models whether operationalizing Pavlovian responding with 
startle or risk ratings. As both of these variables were associated with increases in overall 
avoidance while also related to either overall or generalized Pavlovian responding, it is 
likely that they represent one of the most predictive variables in this endeavor and that 
their inclusion in APIC models improved model fit despite some overlap with Pavlovian 
variance. More interesting is that trait anxiety also significantly improved model fit for 
both APIC models, but anxiety sensitivity did not. A clear and parsimonious explanation 
for this discrepancy is not readily apparent. A more speculative possibility is that ASI, 
our measure of anxiety sensitivity, is along with the IUSF one of the more narrowly 
circumscribed narrowband measures used in this dissertation, but unlike the IUSF, the 
ASI does not contain items measuring avoidance or escape (Reiss et al., 1986). 
Therefore, it might be too specialized to improve avoidance prediction, but also not broad 
enough to capture variance that is distinct from the other predictors in the model. 
Additional findings and Aim 2 summary. 
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 In addition to the above discussed results, we found that APIC models containing 
all the aspects of interest (referred to as a “multi-aspect” model), as opposed to the 
aspects modeled separately or in pairs, resulted in significant model improvements. 
Further, these multi-aspect models yielded the largest increases in variance explained by 
the model compared with the base model whether the Pavlovian predictor was risk 
ratings or startle. This is likely partially due to these multi-aspect models containing more 
variables than the other models (5 more than trait/single aspect models, 4 more than the 
models containing both aspects, 3 more than the models containing all traits), which 
inevitably results in an increase in our R2 metric, although the marginal R2 used for the 
multilevel models in the current study is relatively robust to this issue (Nakagawa & 
Schielzeth, 2013). It is therefore also likely that part of this improvement reflects a 
genuine advantage of including multiple personality predictors in an APIC model to 
improve avoidance prediction. Further, this lends support to the notion that using aspects 
instead of higher-order traits allows more precise prediction of behavioral outcomes, and 
that absence of findings in prior studies might be related to only using trait-level variables 
(as documented in Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). 
 Overall, the value of these results appears to primarily be as a “proof-of-concept”:  
the approach used in Aim 2 holds promise as a tool for answering preliminary questions 
related to personality variables and APIC. The exception to this conclusion is that we can 
start to see broad, but interpretable, patterns emerge from these results when considered 
as a whole, particularly as it relates to what types of personality variables (as opposed to 
which specific variables), most improve the predictive properties of APIC models. From 
that point of view, it appears that the relatively more narrowband variables (if considering 
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the aspects as representing narrowband variables relative to the traits) provide the greatest 
increase in prediction while still maintaining an acceptable level of model parsimony. 
Aims 3 and 4: Moderators of APIC, APIC-G, and APIC-CS+ 
 Due to their conceptual and statistical overlap, we discuss Aims 3 and 4, and the 
limited number of significant moderators identified, in the same section. These are 
perhaps the most difficult results to interpret due to APIC moderation being 
operationalized with a three-way interaction (Trait x Stimulus x Pavlovian variable) that 
statistically has notable limitations (discussed in a later subsection). Therefore, we 
consider these the most preliminary findings in this study, and thus those that are 
interpreted with the most caution. As with Aim 1, but to a greater extent, significant 
effects involving startle were largely absent. 
A3.H1/A4.H1. 
 Contrary to our hypotheses, there was no evidence of significant APIC 
moderation by Neuroticism or Distress-PB. However, a significant moderation effect was 
evident for Negative Affectivity for APIC-G when operationalized with Pavlovian 
reactivity with a behavioral measure (risk ratings). This appears to partially support our 
assertion that the conversion of generalized Pavlovian responding to generalized 
avoidance when a genuine threat is absent is a pathological process, as the only negative 
affect measure we found to be related to APIC-G is specifically one that captures 
pathological variance; those purportedly containing normative variance (Neuroticism, its 
aspects, and Distress-PB) were not associated with APIC-G. On the surface, this appears 
to be the first evidence that broadly defined, pathological negative affect enhances the 
APIC-G process (i.e., is a risk factor for an increased maladaptive fear-avoidance 
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relation), and that is largely true based on a broad interpretation of this finding. However, 
more in-depth interpretation is needed to qualify this finding. First, individual analysis of 
each GS within the APIC-G analysis revealed that higher Negative Affectivity clearly 
facilitated the GS1 and GS2 Pavlovian-Instrumental association, which is consistent with 
our prediction. However, at the level of the GS3, the moderation effect was smaller in 
magnitude and appeared to be in the opposite direction, with lower Negative Affectivity 
facilitating the association. There appear to be multiple components that explain this 
unexpected result. First, the significant interaction term is clearly driven by those higher 
on Negative Affectivity, both in terms of statistical and graphed results – this can be seen 
in the simple slopes plot, in which the slopes for high, but not low, Negative Affectivity 
varies as a function of Stimulus. The high Negative Affectivity slope at the level of the 
GS3 is flatter than those for GS2 and GS1; the slopes for low Negative Affectivity 
remain the same across all stimuli. Closer inspection of this plot and the accompanying 
scatterplot reveal that the flatter high Negative Affectivity slope for GS3 corresponds to a 
cluster of participants who were predicted to avoid at a higher rate (e.g., 25% to 45%) 
despite relatively lower predicted risk ratings (e.g., the mean to 1 standardized unit below 
the mean). This means that a subset of participants with higher Negative Affectivity were 
avoiding at a relatively high rate despite their relatively low threat estimation, and 
potentially indicates that, for stimuli most similar to the danger cue, Negative Affectivity 
exerts its pathological influence through increased generalized avoidance without regard 
to threat estimation (i.e., the false alarm or “better to be safe than sorry” response). In 
other words, higher levels of Negative Affectivity might be associated with reflexively 
avoiding a stimulus that appears dangerous without considering the actual danger posed 
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by the cue, even if in previous encounters with this stimulus it has been learned that the 
stimulus is unlikely to be dangerous (i.e., overgeneralization). Related to this, Negative 
Affectivity was associated with both generalized risk ratings and avoidance in non-APIC 
models, and with both showing shallower declines from CS+ to GS3 associated with 
higher Negative Affectivity, potentially indicating that Negative Affectivity separately 
influences fear and avoidance generalization, but not the association between the two at 
the level of the GS3. That said, there is also a statistical interpretation that might help 
better explain these disparate results. The positive association between GS3 avoidance 
and risk ratings is relatively strong across all participants (r = .33), which is consistent 
with the GS3 eliciting considerably higher risk ratings and avoidance rates than the GS2; 
this is also where the “drop” is seen in most generalization gradients. Therefore, the 
experimental effect is perhaps too strong at this point in the stimulus dimension (i.e., the 
stimulus predictor accounts for the majority of the outcome variance), as the GS3 is the 
closest approximation to the CS+ and the majority of participants continue to rate it as 
non-benign and avoid it at a rate similar to their CS+ avoidance rate (as seen in the 
graphed generalization gradients presented as part of manipulation check analyses). If 
this is true, then there would be less between-subjects variance to predict at the level of 
the GS3. This possibility, combined with the subsample of higher Negative Affectivity 
participants that avoided at a substantially higher rate than expected based on their risk 
ratings, also suggests that there is a non-linear process occurring at the level of the GS3, 
and that additional parameters would be needed to adequately test the APIC relationship 
at the level of the GS3.  
 227 
Also relevant to this interpretation is that the Negative Affectivity variable is 
fairly broad in terms of content, and includes items related to anxiety, depression, 
emotional lability, interpersonal insecurity, and other content with relevance to negative 
emotionality (Krueger et al., 2012). The structure of the variable and our analytic strategy 
precludes assignment of mechanistic significance to the fear and anxiety-related variance 
that is part of Negative Affectivity. It is therefore likely that the observed moderation 
effect is primarily a reflection of the higher sensitivity of Negative Affectivity to 
generally maladaptive processes, but that this also comes at the cost of specificity. That 
said, dismissing Negative Affectivity as too coarse to provide insight into more specific 
or complex processes is likely premature. Generalization processes (including, but not 
limited to, fear and avoidance generalization) are a hallmark of different types of 
internalizing psychopathology (e.g., Carver, 1998; Leung & Wong, 1998). For example, 
those with high levels of depressive symptoms might overgeneralize from an 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain a positive outcome, feel increased helplessness during 
incidentally similar situations, and subsequently not put in effort to obtain a reward that 
could have come at little to no cost (consistent with experimental accounts of learned 
helplessness and its generalization components; Mikulincer & Nizan, 1988; Seligman, 
1972). Negative Affectivity is highly associated with internalizing pathology (Sleep, 
Hyatt, Lamkin, Maples-Keller, & Miller, 2018; Veith, Russell, & King, 2017). Therefore, 
it is possible that the moderation effect associated with Negativity Affectivity observed in 
this study is reflective of its covariation with the tendency towards conversion of 
generalized emotional reactions to maladaptive behavior, as opposed to an anxiety and 
fear-specific quality of the Negative Affectivity trait.   
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A3.H2/A4.H2. 
 Our hypotheses regarding Conscientiousness and its Orderliness aspect were 
largely supported, whereas we did not find any support for Industriousness as a 
moderator. In terms of the significant effects found, we exclusively interpret Orderliness 
over Conscientiousness, as 1) it was notably the only personality variable to moderate 
APIC when Pavlovian responding was operationalized either physiologically or 
behaviorally and 2) the moderating effect of Conscientiousness for the APIC model 
including risk ratings was close to identical to the Orderliness moderating effect for the 
same model, and therefore it is likely that the Orderliness aspect is driving the effect seen 
in the Conscientiousness results. 
The moderating effect of Orderliness was most consistently seen at the levels of 
the GS1 and GS2, with lower levels of Orderliness facilitating APIC for these stimuli. In 
contrast, those higher on Orderliness show facilitated APIC for the GS3 (for startle only) 
and CS+. Further, the only instance of a personality trait attenuating APIC is seen for 
Orderliness, with those lower on the trait demonstrating a negative relationship between 
startle and avoidance. To briefly summarize, it appears that as Orderliness decreases there 
is an increase in the strength of APIC for the stimuli most resembling oCS-, and that as 
Orderliness increases there is an increase in the strength of APIC for the stimuli most 
resembling the CS+. One plausible explanation for this effect is that those lower on 
Orderliness might have also been the participants least likely to efficiently track the 
“rules” of the task and misidentify safety stimuli as having been previously paired with 
shock, believe that there were separate reinforcement parameters governing the CS+ and 
the different CS-s (e.g., CS+ reinforced 100%, CS- reinforced 10%), or to apply an 
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idiosyncratic rule to the task that was not consistent with the available information (e.g., 
mistakenly assuming that shock is dependent on if you receive a startle probe or what 
level of risk rating you provide on a previous trial). This then might lead to an 
overcorrection on instrumental trials in which those lower on Orderliness are still unsure 
about the signal value of the GSs and are more likely to avoid even if their emotional 
response or appraisal of threat does not strongly suggest avoidance is required.  
That said, the above explanation does not help us understand why lower 
Orderliness is associated with weakened APIC. Perhaps a more parsimonious and 
comprehensive explanation is that the observed moderation effect represents higher 
Orderliness being associated with generally the same APIC relationship across all stimuli 
(i.e., low variation between simple slopes), and lower Orderliness associated with less 
consistent APIC across stimuli (i.e., high variation between simple slopes). This implies 
that those higher on Orderliness are generally applying a more rigid rule in their 
avoidance decisions that results in avoidance responses more commensurate with 
Pavlovian responding, whereas those lower on Orderliness are either over or 
underutilizing their Pavlovian responses in the decision-making process while also 
relying on idiosyncratic rules or tendencies to inform their decision. This explanation is 
compatible with the previously outlined explanation for why those lower on Orderliness 
show stronger APIC for the GS1 and GS2, and also potentially helps explain why we see 
diverging APIC moderation relations between low and high Orderliness for the CS+ 
when Pavlovian responding is operationalized with startle: those higher on Orderliness 
continue to apply their consistent rule regarding avoidance decisions, but those lower on 
Orderliness are using other information or motivations to govern their decision when 
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encountering the CS+. This naturally leads to the question of why the CS+, compared 
with the other stimuli evokes a markedly different APIC relationship in those lower on 
Orderliness. If we consider that 1) there is evidence that Orderliness, and 
Conscientiousness more generally, covaries with tendencies towards controlling the 
internal and external environment to increased preparedness for negative emotionality 
and/or reduce it in the moment (Bartley & Roesch, 2011; N. T. Carter et al., 2016; 
Jackson et al., 2010); 2) as a corollary, those lower on Orderliness are less likely to have 
this motivation and other, competing, motivations could dictate behavior when faced with 
an aversive stressors; and 3) the CS+ is consistently eliciting the strongest Pavlovian 
responding across participants. Taken together, we might conclude that those lower on 
Orderliness are not motivated to control or downregulate distress when it passes a certain 
threshold, and that other motivations are primary during these situations. One possible 
motivation relevant to the CS+ is the motivation to confront and master one’s fear, which 
in turn leads to an approach response when afraid (Putwain, Symes, & Wilkinson, 2017; 
Rachman, 2004), and might explain the finding that as startle increased, those lower on 
Orderliness were less likely to avoid for CS+ trials.  
The final unaddressed element regarding Orderliness’ role as a moderator is the 
finding that higher Orderliness facilitates APIC (operationalized with startle) at the level 
of the GS3. This appears to be readily explainable using the previously articulated logic: 
those higher on Orderliness might use a consistent or rigid rule of making avoidance 
decisions that align with their fear response, so if fear has generalized from the CS+ to 
the GS3, it then leads to avoidance.  Although this rule leads to an adaptive decision on 
CS+ trials (avoiding a real threat), it becomes maladaptive on GS3 trials (forgoing a 
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reward when there is no actual threat), and therefore provides some evidence that the 
adaptiveness of a trait is dependent on the situation, and appears to reflect theoretical and 
empirical accounts of how extremely high Conscientiousness can become maladaptive 
and lead to pathology associated with overly rigid cognitions and behaviors that interfere 
with functioning (N. T. Carter et al., 2016; Samuel & Widiger, 2011).  
A3.H3/A4.H3. 
 Results largely supported our hypotheses regarding Extraversion, its aspects, and 
APIC-G: those lower on Extraversion demonstrated facilitated APIC (Pavlovian 
responding indexed by risk ratings only) for the GSs, but not the CS+. More specifically, 
as the stimulus became less similar to the CS+, lower Extraversion moderated APIC 
more strongly (as seen in the increasingly steeper slopes for lower Extraversion in the 
corresponding simple slopes plots). Assertiveness moderated APIC in an identical 
fashion, indicating it is likely the aspect within Extraversion that is driving the observed 
APIC moderations. This leads us to conclude that as level of Assertiveness (and, more 
generally, Extraversion) decreases, maladaptive threat estimation (i.e., predicting harm 
when there is a safety signal) is more likely to convert into an avoidance decision that, 
given the context, is also maladaptive due to the unnecessary loss of reward. This can 
also be interpreted as higher Assertiveness functioning as a protective factor against 
maladaptive threat estimation converting into maladaptive avoidance. It is important to 
emphasize that those higher on Assertiveness did not necessarily never estimate any 
threat related to the GSs, as we can see in the data there were indeed some participants 
higher on Assertiveness who rated the GSs as somewhat dangerous (i.e., some risk of 
shock) – the protective element of Assertiveness appears to be that these threat 
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estimations did not result in a corresponding avoidance decision. This finding and its 
relation only to the GSs also helps establish Assertiveness as an adaptive trait in this 
context, as higher Assertiveness was not associated with a weaker APIC relationship for 
the CS+, indicating Assertiveness did not influence adaptive avoidance and, perhaps, that 
those higher on Assertiveness were able to appropriately inhibit their increased approach 
motivation to avoid harm. This might also explain why Extraversion is found to be a 
protective factor against pathological anxiety (Bienvenu et al., 2004; Jylhä & Isometsä, 
2006), as those who are protected against maladaptive avoidance through increased 
approach behavior would likely not see reduction in valued activities, which would 
continue to reinforce their adaptive approach decisions and provide opportunities to 
further reduce residual anxiety association with fundamentally safe activities. It should 
also be noted that the lack of an Extraversion or Assertiveness moderating effect for 
APIC at the level of the CS+ potentially reflects that the majority of the variation seen in 
these scales in this study is normative and largely does not reflect the maladaptive 
extremes of Extraversion that are associated with taking dangerous risks and 
externalizing pathology (D. Watson, Stanton, Khoo, Ellickson-Larew, & Stasik-O’Brien, 
2019; D. Watson et al., 2015). That said, it is also possible that the reward used in this 
study was not sufficiently hedonically salient to elicit the maladaptive approach patterns 
that are associated with pathological extremes of Extraversion. 
 The more specific APIC-G analyses align with the APIC findings to a certain 
degree, as those lower on Extraversion continue to demonstrate stronger APIC (when 
Pavlovian responding is indexed by risk ratings) at the levels of the GS1 and GS2; 
however, the moderating effect for the GS3 is not reflected in the APIC-G model. This 
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discrepancy is difficult to explain without partially ascribing some of the difference to the 
statistical approach used and its drawbacks: the APIC-G model includes a reduced 
stimulus dimension (only the GSs and the △CS-), which results in a random intercept that 
is less informative than the one in the full APIC model. This has two primary 
ramifications for the current endeavor: the APIC-G model is overall an inferior fit for the 
data than the APIC model (and therefore our parameters, including the conditional effects 
we examine for moderation analyses, are estimated with increased error) and we are no 
longer accounting for CS+ responding in our model. A possible consequence is that the 
individual intercept that is estimated for each participant no longer accounts for what is 
likely a participant’s maximal level of responding (i.e., the CS+ response), and therefore 
the intercepts now might be underestimating those with higher CS+ responding and 
overestimating those with lower CS+ responding for the GS3, which would potentially 
reduce variability in the GS3 APIC response and obscure the moderation effect seen in 
the full APIC model if CS+. Put more simply, when lacking the information provided by 
the CS+ in a model, it is more difficult to precisely estimate the GS3, which affects the 
ability to detect relations among the experimental indices and individual difference 
variables. 
 An additional discrepancy between the APIC and APIC-G models is that instead 
of Assertiveness appearing to drive the Extraversion moderation effect, as seen in the 
APIC model, we instead see the other aspect, Enthusiasm, with a pattern of moderation 
similar to Extraversion. The exception to this pattern is that higher Enthusiasm facilitates 
APIC at the level of the GS3, which is unique to these analyses and inconsistent with all 
other APIC/APIC-G models incorporating Extraversion or its aspects. This could also be 
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due to the previously outlined statistical difference in APIC vs APIC-G models and its 
possible consequences. Another potential explanation that is more psychologically-
oriented is that, similar to our interpretation for Negative Affectivity, those lower on 
Enthusiasm are predisposed to avoid (perhaps due to lower reward sensitivity) and when 
faced with a more ambiguous threat situation (such as the GS3) they default to avoidance 
without consideration of other signals or information (i.e., their estimation of risk). 
It should also be noted that both pathological extensions of Extraversion, 
Assertiveness-PB and Enthusiasm-PB, were significant APIC-G moderators with lower 
levels of the traits having similar facilitatory effects at the levels of the GS1 and GS2, and 
higher Enthusiasm-PB continuing to show the somewhat perplexing facilitatory effect for 
GS3. This appears to support the overall finding that traits with pathological variance 
emerge as more related to the GSs/generalization and APIC-G. It is difficult to provide a 
substantive interpretation of these effects that is distinct from the previous interpretations 
of Extraversion-related effects, given the previously discussed statistical limitations with 
the APIC-G model and the discrepancies between APIC and APIC-G Extraversion 
findings, and we therefore limit our conclusion of these effects to suggesting that this 
provides additional, but not meaningfully distinct, evidence for pathologically low 
Extraversion-related functioning as a risk factor for maladaptive decisions that result in 
unnecessary loss of reward. 
A3.H4. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, none of the tested narrowband personality traits 
significantly moderated either APIC model. Considering that three narrowband traits 
(trait fear, IU, trait anxiety) significantly improved overall APIC model fit (which only 
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represents an increase in proportion of avoidance responding accounted for by the model, 
and does not specifically indicate a moderation effect) but did not function as significant 
moderators, we have preliminary evidence that the narrowband traits in this study are 
generally predictive of avoidance when taking into account the Pavlovian response, but 
do not moderate the APIC relationship.  
Aims 3 and 4 summaries. 
 When considering the APIC and APIC-G results together, instead of the 
individual components of each separate analysis, a pattern begins to emerge. First, 
Extraversion and related variables are the most consistently linked to APIC/APIC-G. This 
is overall consistent with the notion that the PIG paradigm places participants in an 
approach-avoidance conflict and that to predict performance during approach-avoidance 
conflict we can use a combination of variables related to both avoidance and approach for 
optimal explanatory power (Pittig & Dehler, 2018; Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018). In a 
sense, Extraversion and related variables are providing the approach-related variable that 
has largely been missing from prior studies of fear generalization and avoidance that have 
largely focused on negative affect variables. Second, Conscientiousness and Orderliness, 
which are also not primarily linked with or defined by negative affect, were also 
significant moderators of APIC overall, but not APIC-G. This further supports the 
assertation that traits that are not explicitly negative affect related provide important 
information related to approach-avoidance decisions. Also, although we did not find any 
significant APIC-CS+ moderators, we observed that Orderliness moderated the APIC 
effect at the level of the CS+ in the APIC model. Taken together, we have preliminary 
evidence that Extraversion and related variables are most associated with protection from 
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maladaptive fear-avoidance relations that result in a loss of reward (i.e., maladaptive 
avoidance), whereas Conscientiousness (through Orderliness) is associated with 
protection from maladaptive fear-avoidance relations whether the outcome is maladaptive 
avoidance or maladaptive approach. In contrast, pathological Negative Affectivity and 
Detachment facilitated maladaptive fear-avoidance relations. To a large degree, this 
outcome is consistent with theoretical and empirical accounts of these traits and their 
relation to psychopathology: both Extraversion and Conscientiousness are well-
established as protective factors in relation to Neuroticism and other negative affect traits, 
which are found to be risk factors for psychopathology (Andersen & Bienvenu, 2011; 
Kotov et al., 2010; Stanton & Watson, 2014). Further, it is sensible that Extraversion 
protects from maladaptive avoidance, but not maladaptive approach, as those higher on 
Extraversion (and, likely more importantly, its lower-level aspects and facets more 
closely related to approach motivation and reward salience) would likely be those more 
likely to seek reward despite high cost. This leaves Conscientiousness (through 
Orderliness) as the most consistently protective trait in this investigation. However, as 
opposed to Extraversion and the “more is better” relationship observed, it appears 
Conscientiousness findings are supporting a Yerkes-Dodson “inverted-U” view of the 
trait (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), in which the high and low extremes are both associated 
with maladaptive outcomes (in this study, high Orderliness related to maladaptive APIC 
for the GS3, and low Orderliness associated with maladaptive APIC for the CS+, GS2, 
and GS1), but moderate levels of the trait are most consistently adaptive. That said, this 
relationship has also been observed for Extraversion (with extremely high Extraversion-
related traits associated with mania and externalizing behavior, extremely low 
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Extraversion-related traits associated with depression and internalizing; Watson, Stasik, 
Ellickson-Larew, & Stanton, 2015), and it is likely that the PIG task (with its weak 
hedonic reward) is not well-suited to eliciting the pathological processes of high 
Extraversion. 
Overall Synthesis of Results 
 The goal of this section is to consider the broader pattern of results that have 
emerged from our analyses for the three overarching personality dimensions measured 
(Neuroticism/negative affect, Conscientiousness, Extraversion) and then synthesize this 
with the literature. We begin with a qualifying statement: this endeavor represents a first 
step towards rigorous investigation of personality as it pertains to fear and avoidance 
generalization. As will be discussed in following sections, there are numerous 
improvements in methodology and analytic strategy that need to be taken before strong 
conclusions can be made, especially given that many of the effects of interest are 
complex and difficult to detect. What follows is, all things considered, a preliminary and 
cautious synthesis of results.  
Broadband and narrowband negative affect traits. 
 The current study provides the first evidence of continuously-measured negative 
affective traits being positively associated with fear and avoidance generalization 
phenomena. Further, the traits with a greater focus on psychopathological extremes (e.g., 
Negative Affectivity, Distress-PB, the narrowband variables) were more consistently 
linked with generalization. This supports the theoretical and empirical models of 
generalization that propose it as a mechanism underlying anxiety and trauma-related 
conditions (Dymond, Dunsmoor, et al., 2014; Lissek, 2012). There is also evidence that 
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the scope of the negative affect measure matters in terms of the strength and form of the 
association with generalization phenomena: for example, trait fear and IU, which are 
conceptually closely related to anxiety pathology, were consistently associated with fear 
generalization, whereas Negative Affectivity and Distress-PB were associated with both 
fear and avoidance generalization, and also helped explain increases in maladaptive 
APIC. This suggests that multiband approach used in the current study can yield results 
that would not be possible to obtain if investigators focus only broad or narrowband 
measures. 
 In terms of alignment with prior work, current results indicating negative affect 
traits are associated with fear generalization contradicts previous studies that do not find 
associations between Neuroticism or trait anxiety and fear generalization (Arnaudova, 
Krypotos, et al., 2017; Torrents-Rodas et al., 2013). As previously stated in our review of 
these studies earlier in this dissertation, these prior studies did not use appropriate sample 
sizes or analytic techniques for continuous personality traits, and we therefore suggest 
that the difference in methodology between these prior studies and the current study is 
likely a determinant in the difference in results. As stated convincingly by Lonsdorf and 
Merz (2017), prior work in the fear conditioning field has not been optimized for precise 
individuals difference work, and we therefore contend that the current study represents an 
improvement over prior studies and presents evidence for “real” negative affect effects 
that is stronger than the evidence provided in other studies that these are null effects. 
 That said, we recognize that the negative affect findings are mostly confirmatory 
and less novel than other findings from the current study. Although necessary to test and 
report, we do not think that the insights afforded by the current findings will considerably 
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contribute to new theory and questions related to fear, anxiety, and other negative affect 
individual differences as they pertain to generalization. Put another way, considerable 
evidence and prominent theories already suggested that those with greater degrees of 
negative affect and internalizing traits show greater levels of fear generalization and 
avoidance (Dunsmoor & Paz, 2015; Lissek & van Meurs, 2014; Mineka, 1979; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006; Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018), and the current study primarily serves as 
framework for future investigations that will expand this line of work, as opposed to 
providing findings that expand our understanding of the psychological phenomena. The 
exception to this is our results related to the Volatility aspect, which are novel (and 
potentially contradict well-established theories related to emotional lability and anger; 
e.g., Harmon-Jones, Peterson, Gable, & Harmon-Jones, 2008) and suggest a need for 
more work clarifying the role of negative emotional traits and states that are distinct from 
fear and anxiety, such as anger and frustration.  
Conscientiousness and related variables. 
 The current study emphasizes the need to incorporate individual differences 
variables that are not typically included in fear conditioning studies into future studies. 
The findings regarding Conscientiousness, its aspects, and the related composite 
variables, are a large part of this assertion. The findings related to the Orderliness aspect 
and APIC in particular are particularly compelling in this regard: we found what appears 
to be a non-linear relationship between Orderliness level and adaptive fear-avoidance 
relations, with both the higher and lower ends of Orderliness related to an increased 
chance of a maladaptive outcome depending on the context (i.e., the presented stimulus). 
As has been emphasized throughout this dissertation, what has in the past been 
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statistically and, sometimes, conceptually treated as error in prior generalization studies is 
partially comprised of psychological meaningful variance, and we now have evidence 
that we can “recover” some of that meaningful variance. Even if an investigator is not 
primarily interested in Conscientiousness, Orderliness, or similar constructs, there is still 
an argument to be made that, due to their differential influence on generalization and 
APIC processes, these variables should be measured and statistically accounted for in 
future studies. To illustrate this, consider if a researcher is interested in studying the 
generalized fear-avoidance relationship in PTSD using a military veteran sample. 
Evidence suggests that veterans with PTSD can be classified into latent profiles with 
distinct symptom patterns, some of which greatly differ on levels of Conscientiousness 
(Contractor et al., 2016). One of the most notable distinctions between the identified 
latent profiles is those with the overall strongest PTSD symptoms are those relatively 
lower on Conscientiousness and also have stronger externalizing tendencies, and those 
with less severe PTSD symptoms and with primarily reexperiencing and avoiding 
symptoms were relatively higher on Conscientiousness. Based on past studies and current 
study’s results, and assuming higher Conscientiousness somewhat corresponds to higher 
Orderliness for some of the veterans (a reasonable assumption given that many of those 
who have military careers score highly on measures related to Orderliness, such as self-
discipline; Bilgiç & Sümer, 2009), we might see similar generalization results but 
differing APIC results: participants with PTSD will demonstrate greater fear 
generalization, but perhaps those low on Conscientiousness will show enhanced APIC as 
the stimulus increases in similarity to the CS-, and those higher on Conscientiousness will 
exhibit a more inflexible APIC relationship across the stimulus continuum. If this 
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Conscientiousness effect does exist in the data but the trait is not measured, it functions 
as noise and complicates interpretations due to increase heterogeneity within a 
purportedly homogenous group. This issue is not resolved even if switching to a 
dimensional approach, as the strength of the relation between continuously modeled 
PTSD symptoms and APIC will be attenuated by a confounding effect (i.e., the classic 
“third-variable problem”; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Although this is 
clearly an oversimplification and does not take into account that there is likely a more 
complex and dynamic relationship between PTSD symptom severity, Conscientiousness, 
and generalization variables than articulated here, the point remains that we can reduce 
statistical noise by measuring and modeling relevant personality variables. 
 The current results also add to the literature on Conscientiousness and its effect on 
behavior, both in conditioning and non-conditioning studies. In terms of conditioning 
studies, the prior study by Pineles et al. (2009) found divergent associations between 
Conscientiousness facets and Pavlovian fear responsivity. Although we did not directly 
test differential fear response as in Pineles et al. (2009), nor did we find 
Conscientiousness or related variables were associated with Pavlovian response, it is 
interesting that in both that study and our study that lower-level variables within 
Conscientiousness demonstrate a heterogenous pattern association with behavioral 
criterion. In contrast to Pineles et al. (2009), the study by Martínez and colleagues (2012) 
found that overall Conscientiousness negatively correlated with discrimination fear 
learning, which is again not reflected in our findings. It is noteworthy that the paradigms 
used in the two cited studies did not contain an approach-avoidance component, which 
possibly modulated fear responding in a dynamic fashion (e.g., decreased after 
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confirmation one can avoid the shock) and lead to results discrepant from past studies. 
Also notable is that both the prior studies and this study operationalize the fear response 
differently, which contributes to the difficulty in interpreting results across studies that 
has been noted by Lonsdorf and Merz (2017). In terms of non-conditioning studies, the 
association between Orderliness and maladaptive outcomes is somewhat consistent with 
studies that find Conscientiousness is negatively correlated with effective decision-
making performance, both while under explicit duress (e.g., Byrne, Silasi-Mansat, & 
Worthy, 2015) and when asked to transfer prior learning to a new context (e.g., Studer-
Luethi, Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, & Perrig, 2012). This potentially indicates that our results are 
reflecting an aberration in the decision-making process that is activated for those with 
higher levels of Orderliness when completing challenging or complex tasks. That said, 
we are cautious regarding our comparisons between the current results and the reviewed 
literature due to methodological differences, most pertinently that the majority of the 
previous studies examine Conscientiousness only at the trait level, and we cannot assume 
trait-level Conscientiousness results will replicate at the aspect or other lower-order level. 
Extraversion and related variables. 
 As with Conscientiousness, Extraversion and related variables appear to help 
clarify noise and convert it into viable signal. We found, as expected, that including 
dispositional variables more attuned to reward and approach than fear and avoidance 
helped predict task outcomes, and that the tested variables generally operated as 
protective factors. This was consistently seen for Extraversion, as higher levels were 
associated with decreased physiological fear generalization and APIC/partial APIC-G, 
and the effects of its aspects largely aligned with this pattern (with the notable exception 
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for Enthusiasm discussed previously). Further, the pathological inverse of high 
Extraversion, Detachment, was associated with generalization and increased APIC, 
further underlining the protective role of Extraversion. This leads to a fairly intuitive 
conclusion: a stronger disposition towards reward and approach buffers against 
maladaptive approach-avoidance outcomes. This empirically-supported conclusion also 
might facilitate an increase in depression-focused or relevant fear and avoidance 
conditioning research, which is sorely needed when considering the overlap of anxiety 
and depression (L. A. Clark & Watson, 1991; D. Watson, 2005) and that GAD and 
PTSD, two disorders frequently associated with comorbid major depression (Kaufman & 
Charney, 2000), are also two of the disorders most theoretically and empirically 
associated with overgeneralization (Dymond, Dunsmoor, et al., 2014; Kaczkurkin et al., 
2016; Lissek et al., 2014; R. A. Morey et al., 2015).  
 The only prior conditioning study to find a significant relationship between an 
Extraversion-related personality variable and a conditioning outcome reported that two 
facets aligning somewhat with Enthusiasm and Assertiveness were associated with 
enhanced fear responding (Pineles et al., 2007). The other two comparable prior studies 
did not find Extraversion to be associated with a fear conditioning variable (Martínez et 
al., 2012; Otto et al., 2007). This puts our results at odds with the literature. We contend 
that, as suggested in reviews on the subject (e.g., Pittig, Treanor, LeBeau, & Craske, 
2018), the lack of a reward-related experimental manipulation in the prior studies did not 
create a situation in which Extraversion-related individual differences in performance 
would emerge, and therefore that direct comparison between our results and these prior 
studies is not entirely productive.  
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Across-personality trends. 
A pair of patterns in the data emerged that were generally related to individual 
differences, but not to one personality variable in particular. The first of these is that the 
overwhelming majority of our significant results are related to an effect that is driven by 
or localized to a non-CS+ stimulus. This is of course by design in the PIG, which is 
intended to study phenomena that are not exclusive to the CS+, but it also is consistent 
with the “strong situation” perspective of threat (based on “trait by situation” or “person 
by situation” perspectives from the social personality literature (Endler, 1977; Meyer, 
Dalal, & Hermida, 2010; Mischel, 1999) and its relation to fear and anxiety (Lissek et al., 
2006), which posits that individual differences in fear-related responses are less likely to 
emerge during unambiguously threatening situations due to the activation of a normative 
and adaptive fear-response that is relatively uniform across individuals. The CS+ is likely 
a strong situation for fear, especially in the context of the PIG, and therefore the 
condition in which the fewest fear-related individual differences emerge. In contrast, the 
GSs are “weaker situations”, as the signal value of a GS is more ambiguous. In these 
weaker situations, there are fewer objective determinants to fear responding, so 
subjective factors, such as personality dispositions, determine responding to a greater 
degree than in strong situations. This pattern has been well documented in previous 
conditioning work (for reviews, see Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013; 
Lissek, Pine, & Grillon, 2006; Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017), yet the vast majority of these 
studies involve patient-control differences. Patient-control differences are a valid 
example of how weaker situations lead to individual differences, of course, but are also 
constrained by the weaknesses related to using categorical diagnoses and relying on 
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measures of central tendencies for inferential analyses that were outlined in the 
introduction of this dissertation. The current study therefore represents an incremental 
step forward for improved trait by situation work in the conditioning field. 
 The second pattern of note to emerge was, with a few notable exceptions, our 
significant results all involved the behavioral Pavlovian response variable, risk ratings, 
either as a dependent variable or as a predictor in an APIC model. If viewing this as a 
testament to the positive qualities of risk ratings, as opposed to problematic aspects of 
using eyeblink startle measurement (which can be found in the limitations section that 
follows), we can then consider why a behavioral measure of Pavlovian responding was 
frequently related to the personality variables tested in this study. One explanation is that 
online have high reliability due to a limit number of response options (3 in our study) and 
there are fewer sources of error than other, more complex forms of measurement, such as 
psychophysiological assessment. Another is that the personality variables in this study are 
more sensitive to the construct operationalized by risk ratings, threat 
evaluation/expectancy, than startle. This is plausible, as potentiation of the startle reflex 
is a valence specific measure that is mediated by the amygdala and, in the context of our 
experimental manipulation, reflects fear responding (Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, 
& Davis, 1991). This is more circumscribed (i.e., likely has fewer determinants) than 
volitional threat evaluation (as measured through behavioral ratings), which receives 
input from a number of different neural circuits and cognitive processes (e.g., Boddez et 
al., 2013; Drabant et al., 2011; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011, 2013; Mathews, Mackintosh, & 
Fulcher, 1997). We can also consider that some of the traits measured in this study, such 
as Conscientiousness, contain content that is centered around self-control and regulation 
 246 
(DeYoung et al., 2007; Roberts, Lejuez, Krueger, Richards, & Hill, 2014), which might 
be more strongly related to a behavioral response such as risk ratings than startle, as 
participants could potentially downregulate a prepotent response and provide a risk rating 
that is modulated by a reasoning process, but would not be able to do the same with their 
startle response. Finally, we also consider that unlike startle, there is a “right” or 
“optimal” response for risk ratings (i.e., “no risk” for all stimuli other than the CS+), and 
that this 1) might elicit a competitive performance motivation from some participants 
who want to correctly predict shock and internalize this as their primary task for the PIG, 
which might relate to some of the traits tested in the study; and 2) risk ratings might be 
more sensitive to maladaptive responding in general due to a natural “threshold” for what 
constitutes a maladaptive response, whereas maladaptive potentiated startle is always 
defined relatively (i.e., based on response to another stimulus or group of stimuli). This 
quality of risk ratings also potentially leads to ceiling effects for the CS+; we did not 
observe this as a problem in our data but it remains a possibility that there is a subtle 
ceiling effect for a subsample of participants with similar personality profiles that could 
affect results in an unforeseen fashion. 
Benefits of a multi-trait, multi-level approach. 
 As a final part of our synthesis, we note that both single-trait and multi-trait 
analyses, for both broader and narrower sets of dispositional variables, yielded significant 
and potentially meaningful results. Further, although there was some redundancy, 
different model and variable types generally yielded different results with different 
interpretations and implications. This represents a general improvement over the prior 
work in the field, which typically exclusively relies on single-trait models (for review, 
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see Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). That said, due to both the analytic approach used and the 
overall heterogeneity in our results, it is not feasible at this time to determine if single-
trait or multi-trait, broadband or narrowband, is a superior approach. We instead suggest 
that inclusion of models with multiple traits that represent different levels of personality 
structure should function as the default for future studies, with single-trait analyses 
conducted only with the backing of a strong scientific rationale. This type of approach is 
highly consistent with ongoing efforts to improve classification and measurement of 
psychopathology (Kotov et al., 2017), and the current results suggest it is a feasible and 
potentially fruitful approach for future conditioning work. 
Limitations 
 As with any study, this one contains a number of limitations of different degrees 
that we highlight so that future studies can improve on and correct these limitations. 
Given the ambitious nature and multiple novel components of this study, there are also a 
fair number of limitations that merit discussion. We therefore subdivide limitations into 
three broad categories: those related to the PIG and experimental procedures, those 
related to the statistical analyses, and those related to the choice of sample and individual 
difference measurements.  
Experimental limitations. 
The PIG paradigm and experimental approach for this study had a number of 
limitations. One of the most notable limitations is that the design of the PIG, which 
contains interspersed Pavlovian and instrumental trials as opposed to the blocked design 
(Pavlovian block → instrumental block) used in prior studies (Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2008; Y. Xia et al., 2019), prevents testing of a direct causal relationship in which 
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Pavlovian responding affects subsequent instrumental avoidance. Because of this 
limitation, we test for covariation between Pavlovian and instrumental responses, instead 
of a direct causal relationship between the two. This also creates the possibility that 
instrumental responses and the outcome affected future Pavlovian responding. For 
example, if a participant continuously avoids GS3 due to its resemblance to the CS+ they 
will engage in fewer opportunities to learn the GS3 is not dangerous, which might in turn 
continue to maintain or even exacerbate fear towards the GS3 (similar to the cyclic nature 
of fear and avoidance proposed in two-factor theory, Mowrer, 1951). In contrast, 
participants who choose to approach at a higher rate on GS3 trials might quickly learn its 
safety value and show a reduction in Pavlovian responding that is above what might be 
expected based on the US reinforcement schedule. Although this is a viable possibility, 
we contend that 1) this instrumental-to-Pavlovian effect, is present, is somewhat 
mitigated by continued reinforcement of the CS+ during the generalization phase, which 
likely prevents total extinction; and 2) that the benefits of the interspersed trial structure 
(less predictability, prevention of extinction, possibility of dynamic reinforcement 
learning) outweigh the possibility of the described effect. Also related to this issue is that 
higher rates of avoidance corresponded to a lower total number of shocks received, and 
therefore participants did not all receive the same number of shocks, which potentially 
introduces error related to levels of sensitization to the shock US, a non-associative 
process that could interfere with conditioning processes (e.g., Çevik, 2014; Greenwald, 
Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1998). A potential solution to this would be to include total 
number of shocks received for each participant in our models as a level 2 variable (i.e., 
individual difference); however, this also introduces the possibility of criterion 
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contamination in models predicting avoidance, as number of shocks received will 
strongly covary with avoidance rate.  
Another notable limitation is related to the reward component of the PIG, both in 
terms of the form of the reward and the static nature of the conditions required to obtain 
the reward and its association with the stimuli. As the original intent behind the design of 
the PIG was to elicit Pavlovian and instrumental avoidance generalization in the same 
task (van Meurs et al., 2014), the requirement for a reward was simply that it did not 
overpower or render the shock irrelevant. For the current investigation, however, this 
limits our ability to draw strong inferences regarding the effects of reward motivation and 
how they relate to candidate personality variables. For example, questions regarding if 
there is a certain level or threshold of reward intensity or likelihood that will buffer 
against maladaptive avoidance are not answerable with the current data. Further, a recent 
study has established that experimental tasks can elicit reward generalization gradients in 
participants (Andreatta & Pauli, 2019), and deficiencies in reward generalization have 
been linked to internalizing pathologies (Radell, Beck, Gilbertson, & Myers, 2017; 
Rouhani et al., 2018), suggesting that there are reward generalization processes that could 
be relevant to the current study (and potentially a determinant for some of the observed 
effects) but are not testable with the current data. Additionally, our conceptualization of 
the PIG paradigm as involving a risk-reward decision and potentially providing insight 
into decision-making processes is somewhat hampered by the constant nature of the 
award, as a static reward probability does not allow us to test hypotheses related to risk or 
loss aversion, which have great relevance to the personality traits tested in this study and 
psychopathology (e.g., Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Kishida, King-Casas, & Montague, 
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2010; Lauriola & Levin, 2001). It is also likely that the reward was not hedonically 
salient enough to probe for maladaptive approach behaviors that might be associated with 
Extraversion (D. Watson et al., 2019).  
A further issue for the current study related to the PIG paradigm is that, as a 
generalization task, the PIG requires a relatively large number of different trial types 
(e.g., stimulus, Pavlovian vs instrumental) and permutations of trial type parameters (e.g., 
Pavlovian trials in which risk ratings are assessed or not), which results in a need to 
reduce the number of trials per type. Further, the upper limit of total number of trials is 
not only determined by concerns about participant performance declines due to boredom 
or fatigue, but that over time the startle reflex will habituate until the signal is not 
detectable (Blumenthal et al., 2005). This results in the PIG containing a large number of 
trial types, but a relatively small number of instances of each trial type. This had two 
consequences relevant to the current study. First, even one trial of missing startle data 
potentially created reliability issues for the associated trial type (Lieberman et al., 2017). 
This was somewhat mitigated by the robustness of MLMs regarding missing data (C. 
Krueger & Tian, 2004), but encouraged us to take a conservative approach to missing 
data (i.e., pair-wise removal). Second, it prevented us from using a three-level MLM to 
model the time component of the PIG (that is, Time/Trial would be nested within 
Stimulus Type, which would continue to be nested within Person), which would afford 
insight into the temporal dynamics underlying generalization and avoidance (and allow 
comparison to previous work on reinforcement learning as it relates to psychopathology, 
e.g., Mkrtchian, Aylward, Dayan, Roiser, & Robinson, 2017).  
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 In terms of more general limitations that extend beyond the PIG parameters, a 
substantial number of datasets were removed prior to final analyses. Some data loss is to 
be expected in any empirical endeavor, and studies using psychophysiological 
measurement are perhaps more prone to data loss than many other forms of experimental 
testing (Cacioppo et al., 2007). That said, it is important to differentiate between those 
cases which could not be analyzed compared with those that potentially could be 
analyzed (i.e., our statistical models would fit the data), but raised concerns regarding the 
reliability or validity of their performance data. The majority of excluded cases were of 
the former type, but the latter type of exclusion is worth considering as a potential area 
for improvement and reassessment. Evidence suggests that performance-based exclusions 
can substantially alter interpretation of data and that rules for performance-based 
exclusions differ across research groups (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017), and we want to 
emphasize that the exclusion criteria used in the current study could be further optimized. 
 Startle eyeblink assessed via EMG has been a fruitful technique for generalization 
work and for studies of emotion and psychopathology in general (Dymond, Dunsmoor, et 
al., 2014; Grillon & Baas, 2003). It also has documented reliability concerns (Larson, 
Ruffalo, Nietert, & Davidson, 2000), its elicitation requires the introduction of another 
aversive element to the experimental task (e.g., white noise burst, air puff), and 
individual-level startle data is typically not interpretable or useful. Although we contend 
that the benefits of startle (valance specificity, relatively easy and cheap to implement, 
well-mapped at the neural and behavioral levels) outweigh the drawbacks, it is fair to 
consider its limitations and how they might have affected the current study. Our primary 
concern is one of statistical power in relation to the ability to detect individual difference 
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effects in startle data. This concern is not unique to the current study; scientists have 
previously discussed the potential limitations of startle as it pertains to individual 
differences work (Grillon & Baas, 2002; Kaye, Bradford, & Curtin, 2016) and there are a 
number of published studies that did not find expected individual differences in fear 
processes as indexed by startle (for review, see Grillon & Baas, 2003). Although the 
current study has followed best practices for collection (Blumenthal et al., 2005) and 
quantification (raw startle magnitude used in our primary analyses, as recommended by 
Bradford, Starr, Shackman, & Curtin, 2015), we are cognizant of the possibility that type 
II errors occurred in relation to our startle data.  
Statistical limitations. 
 Although the current study represents a continuation of a trend towards more 
sophisticated statistical methodology in the conditioning field, there are still limitations 
related to the statistical approach used. Some of these are more generally related to 
modeling generalization gradients, and some are more related to the individual difference 
aspect of the current study. Perhaps the most notable issue is related to the latter type of 
limitation: concerns about overfitting and interpretation prevented us from including a 
large number of personality variables, as well as personality variables from different 
measures, in the same model. A partial solution was the creation of the composite “PB” 
variables, but this was far from ideal. Even taking a relatively conservative approach, we 
contend that current statistical methodology was not ideal and that the issue of having a 
large number of models that are difficult to compare with each other strongly suggests 
that additional statistical techniques could have been used in conjunction with MLM to 
yield more parsimonious results. A combination of a linear and generalized multilevel 
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latent variables (e.g., multilevel structural equation modeling [SEM]) approach appears to 
be the ideal solution to this issue, especially given that these techniques allow for 
complex mediation and path analyses that can be modeled across different levels in the 
hierarchy (Hox, 2013; Mehta & Neale, 2005; Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010; Rabe-
Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004). An alternative to a latent variable approach would 
be to use regression techniques that minimize multicollinearity issues and assist with 
model selection (e.g., elastic net; Zou & Hastie, 2005) or to quantify the effect of leaving 
out individual or sets of individual difference variables and then manually decide on 
which predictors to include after obtaining an overview of the potential costs (e.g., the 
"Left Out Variable Error" approach; Mauro, 1990). However, we highly recommend the 
multilevel SEM approach be used in expansions of the current study, given the 
advantages afforded by the SEM framework and the substantial literature establishing 
latent factor models of psychopathology (e.g., Eaton et al., 2013; Rosellini & Brown, 
2011). 
 Another set of limitations are related to the technique that we used to asses APIC-
G. On a more technical level, the structure of the PIG resulted in an uneven number of 
individual risk rating measurements (18) compared with startle and avoidance 
measurements (36), which necessitated a reduced data structure in which the average of 
each trial type for each measurement was modeled, instead of individual trial data. This 
resulted in a poor fit for a random-slopes model, and therefore the APIC models do not 
contain random-slopes. The other limitation is related to our operationalization of what 
constituted APIC-G moderation (a three-way interaction that included the individual 
difference variable, the stimulus dimension limited to the △CS- and the GS, and the 
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Pavlovian variable) might be overly restrictive and have led to an increase in type II 
errors. This is because that, as constructed, there must be variation within the GSs for the 
interaction term to be significant. Thus, this de facto requires a significant APIC-G 
moderation to involve differentiated moderation effects at each level of the GS 
continuum, or at one level of the continuum in comparison with the other two GSs. Given 
that we found significant APIC-G moderators when using this more complex definition, 
it is likely that there exist additional personality moderators of APIC-G overall (i.e., 
across the GSs cumulatively, as opposed to individual moderating effects for each GS). 
One option for future analyses is to include an averaged GS term in the APIC-G model. 
However, there is concern about further reducing the stimulus dimension in MLMs to 
facilitate APIC-G analyses, due to the associated reduction in the number of available 
observations per level-1 cluster. This is also a possible explanation for the lack of 
significant APIC-CS+ moderators. A reasonable alternative might be to model each GS 
separately (which also provides additional information for fitting the random intercept 
and, if statistically prudent, a random slope) and include the average of the Pavlovian 
response to the △CS- as a level-2 predictor to function as a between-subjects covariate 
and control for baseline Pavlovian responding. 
 Another limitation is related to the hypothesis testing strategy used in the current 
study. The drawbacks of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and p-values are 
detailed extensively in the writings of many prominent statisticians and quantitative 
psychologists (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016), and those drawbacks 
apply here. It is also important to note that there are additional concerns about using 
NHST in the context of MLM (Gelman & Hill, 2006) above and beyond the standard 
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objections. These concerns are most focused on NHST for testing of individual 
coefficients, and include concerns about bias related to the maximum likelihood 
technique used to obtain parameter estimates, lack of consensus regarding appropriate 
degrees of freedom, and relatively arbitrary decision-making heuristics (e.g., not 
interpreting “nonsignificant” coefficients) reducing model utility. Compounding this 
issue, the interpretation of interaction terms in MLM is still an ongoing subject of debate 
and continued improvement among statisticians (Aguinis & Culpepper, 2015; McCoach, 
2018). The current study used a technique that represented a compromise between the 
recommendations of the statistics community to move away from NHST, and the 
psychology community’s reliance on NHST and the simple slopes method of 
decomposing and probing complex interactions, as well as allowed for the specific aims 
of the study that related to testing precise interactions and limited the utility of model fit 
comparison methods of significance testing. Further analyses and investigations would 
benefit from more robust significance testing approaches (e.g., region of significance 
testing; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) or moving to a Bayesian approach of modeling 
and evaluating data, which has seen strong support in the MLM community (Gelman & 
Hill, 2006; Hox, 2013) and is generally more robust and has fewer of the limitations seen 
in frequentist approaches to multilevel modeling (e.g., Gelman, Hill, & Yajima, 2012; 
Stegmueller, 2013). 
Another potential limitation is related to the technique used to model the stimulus 
dimension. It is true that a categorically modeled and conceptualized stimulus dimension 
has substantial limitations, yet moving to a continuously-defined gradient might represent 
an overcorrection. It is possible that an ordinal dimension is the best fit for the goals of 
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generalization studies, as generalization researchers have specific hypotheses related to 
exact manifestations of the stimulus dimension (e.g., a close approximation to the CS+, 
but one that is still minimally perceptually distinguishable from the CS+, will elicit the 
greatest generalization of responding) but also conceptualize a meaningful order within 
the stimulus dimension (i.e., the GS3 elicits more generalization than the GS2, which 
elicits more generalization than the GS1, etc.). Techniques for representing ordinal 
variables in regression are established in the literature (Helwig, 2017) and represent an 
important next step for generalization research.  
 In the current study, we only used up to a second-order polynomial (i.e., quadratic 
function) in our models. This is consistent with the methods used and the results reported 
in prior generalization studies (see Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche, & Hermans, 
2014; Vanbrabant et al., 2015). It also might not be sufficient for precise analyses of 
individual differences in generalization, as a third-order polynomial (i.e., cubic function) 
might be the best fit for generalization data and therefore best suited to individual 
differences work. Consider the generalization gradients shown in this study and the vast 
majority of the cited references that represent empirical work on generalization: the 
gradients typically do not demonstrate a perfect curve from the danger cue to the safety 
cue. In most cases, there is a “bump” or elbow at some point in the continuum that 
represents the GS after which responding drops off precipitously. This suggests that 
incorporating cubic functions might be a worthwhile endeavor. Alternatively, inflection 
point techniques that identify the point in which the gradient begins its precipitous drop 
(e.g., Buss, Davis, Ram, & Coccia, 2018) could also be used and would likely provide 
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great utility without the increased difficulty in interpretation related to interpreting 
polynomial coefficients. 
Sample and individual difference-related limitations 
 The most notable limitation related to the testing of individual differences is that 
we did not test models that included trait by trait18 interactions, which de facto means we 
did not compare if trait by trait interactions were stronger predictors of generalization or 
APIC than non-interacted personality variables (whether modeled individually or 
additively). Although our hypotheses did not hinge on trait by trait interactions and we 
were able to sufficiently accomplish our state aims without incorporating them in our 
models, this is still far from ideal if the overall goal is to move individual differences 
work in the conditioning field forward. Copious evidence supports the benefits of testing 
Big Five trait by trait interactions in the prediction of a variety of performance outcomes 
(e.g., McFatter, 1994; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & O’Connor, 2009; Witt, 2002; 
Witt, Burke, Barrick, & Mount, 2002). More relevant to the current topic, it is a 
particularly valuable technique for predicting and characterizing psychopathological 
dimensions and their behavioral or biological correlates (L. A. Clark & Watson, 1991; 
Corr, 2002; Dinovo & Vasey, 2011; Jorm et al., 2000; L. C. Morey et al., 2002; Naragon-
Gainey & Simms, 2017; Vasey et al., 2013, 2014). For example, consider that three trait-
level dimensions highlighted in this work, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and 
Extraversion are found to interact such that higher levels of Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion can buffer against the development of clinical disorders in those with higher 
 
 
18 “Trait by trait” reflects the common nomenclature in the literature; here we are referring to personality 
traits as a whole and not just the BFAS and PIF-5 trait-level variables. 
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levels of Neuroticism (e.g., Naragon-Gainey & Simms, 2017). This complex, but 
informative, interaction broadly aligns with the pattern of findings in the current study 
and suggests a need to incorporate this form of interaction testing in fear and avoidance 
generalization work. Modeling these types of interactions provides a method to 
approximate clinical disorders, even if not explicitly recruiting a clinical sample or over-
sampling for higher levels of psychopathological traits. For example, the measure of 
maladaptive personality used in the current study, the PID-5, was developed as an 
assessment tool to accompany the DSM-5 and to assist in measuring combinations of 
traits that contribute to personality disorder diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; Krueger et al., 2012; Waugh et al., 2017). For example, antisocial personality 
disorder can be represented primarily with elevations of the Antagonism and 
Disinhibition traits and a selection of their component facets. These combinations of PID-
5 dimensions can be statistically parameterized via interactive terms and tested as 
predictors of generalization phenomena in the current and future studies. This technique 
is not just limited to personality disorders, as the disorders that are frequently linked to 
generalization and conditioning abnormalities overall (anxiety disorders, PTSD) can be 
adequately defined with combinations of Big Five traits as well (Kotov et al., 2010). 
Another limitation was our statistical approach to potential gender differences, 
which was to include gender as a covariate in every model. There are numerous gender 
effects noted in the literature underlying the current study, including fear and anxiety 
traits (McLean & Anderson, 2009), internalizing psychopathology (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2012), personality (Feingold, 1994), and conditioning processes (Rosenbaum et al., 
2015). By statistically accounting for gender differences, we lose our ability to draw 
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conclusions about how gender influences the relationship between personality and fear 
and avoidance generalization, which could potentially improve our understanding of the 
gender discrepancy in diagnostic rates for anxiety disorders (McLean & Anderson, 2009). 
It is also possible that including gender as a covariate removed personality variation that 
is relevant to the current study but also is known to significantly covary with reported 
gender (e.g., select BFAS aspects; Weisberg, DeYoung, & Hirsh, 2011), suggesting an 
alternative approach might be required. 
In terms of other non-tested variables that merit discussion, we did not include 
variables related to Agreeableness or Openness/Intellect, the last two traits of the Big 
Five, in our analyses. This was motivated by a lack of clear hypotheses or theoretical 
overlap with these traits and the experimental paradigm used, as well as concerns about 
an excessive number of tested predictors. That said, the Openness/Intellect trait, either 
overall or via one of its aspects, has been related to problem solving and working 
memory ability (DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005; DeYoung, Shamosh, Green, 
Braver, & Gray, 2009), as well as psychological flexibility, emotion regulation, and 
mindfulness (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Gross, 2011; Kashdan 
& Rottenberg, 2010). All of these constructs have been evaluated as being negatively 
impacted by increased state or tonic anxiety and fear (Balderston et al., 2017; M. W. 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; S. C. Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & 
Strosahl, 1996; Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006), and some of this work has 
been conducted in the context of conditioning studies (R. M. Carter, Hofstötter, Tsuchiya, 
& Koch, 2003; Haaker et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2018; Lissek et al., 2007). Taken 
together, it appears plausible that Openness/Intellect and associated subdimensions would 
 260 
predict unique variation in one or more performance measures from the current study, 
and perhaps help clarify contradictory effects that could be related to deficits in cognitive 
abilities or flexibility. 
Another notable omission is that we did test a scale that can more directly assess 
reward approach and sensitivity, and thus could function as a positive affect equivalent to 
the narrowband variables used (which were related to the negative affect domain). An 
obvious selection for this would be the Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS) of the 
BIS/BAS framework (Carver & White, 1994), which works well in conjunction with Big 
Five measures to further flesh out reward-related variance with both normative and 
pathological relevance (S. L. Johnson, Turner, & Iwata, 2003; Smits & Boeck, 2006). It 
is also a key conceptual pillar of theories addressing approach-avoidance conflict (e.g., 
Corr, 2013).  
Future Directions 
 One of the most important contributions of this dissertation is to the further 
development of experimental studies of fear and avoidance generalization. Both the 
significant results and the limitations of this study can helpfully inform that development, 
and the following represents our recommendations for the next steps in this line of work. 
Optimizing the PIG. 
The story of the fear conditioning field is, in part, a story of paradigmatic shift via 
improved experimental techniques (e.g., Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 
2013; LeDoux, Moscarello, Sears, & Campese, 2017). Each investigation yields an 
opportunity to improve our methodology. In that spirit, the following is a list of potential 
changes or additions to the PIG that would further optimize the task for future work. 
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 First, incorporation of a continuous measure of avoidance would provide more 
flexibility regarding analytic technique, as it would allow for movement away from use 
of the binomial distribution, yield increase response variation, and could be more 
naturally correlated with the ratio or ordinal-level Pavlovian responses measures. 
Examples of possibly relevant techniques can be found in the reward and effort-based 
decision making literature, and include speeded button press, repeated button press, or an 
effortful physical movement such as sustained grip intensity (e.g., Bonnelle et al., 2015; 
Hsu et al., 2015; Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012; Treadway, Buckholtz, 
Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009). In addition to conceptually aligning with the fact 
that avoidance motivation has many different behavioral manifestations and degrees, a 
continuous measure would also allow for parameterization avoidance in terms of both the 
decision to avoid (i.e., if the avoidance behavior is enacted at all) and the effort that is 
invested in avoidance (i.e., the effort invested in the behavior). Another advantage is that 
approach behavior can also be measured continuously using the same measure, 
depending on the specifics of the paradigm. As previously mentioned, manipulation of 
reward saliency or probability could also help diversify approach/avoidance responses, 
and when combined with continuously measured approach/avoidance data there are many 
possibilities for more nuanced and sophisticated analyses. 
 Second, we strongly argue for continued use of modern statistical techniques that 
are better suited for modeling individual variation than ANOVA techniques. This 
suggests that our experimental paradigms should be designed with the strengths and 
limitations of these statistical techniques as guiding principles. Accordingly, if using the 
MLM framework, we recommend that each level-1 predictor (i.e., within-subjects 
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measurement) have the same number of observations (e.g., same number of risk rating 
and startle measurements for each trial type). Ideally, each permutation of each trial type 
would also have the same number of observations (e.g., same number of risk rating and 
startle trials for each CS+, CS-, and GS), but this might not be feasible. Adhering to these 
recommendations would increase homogeneity across different models that include 
different Pavlovian or other level-1 predictors, which is crucial to ensuring the same 
random-effects structure is used for all models. On a similar note, reducing the number of 
distinct stimuli (e.g., moving from 3 GS classes to 2) while simultaneously increasing the 
number of trials per stimulus type would also likely result in superior model fit and 
cohesion across models. Further, this would likely avoid the situation in which certain 
stimuli are associated with low multivariate variance and therefore contribute a small 
amount of information to the model (as can be seen to an extent with the GS1 and oCS- 
in this study). An added benefit of reducing the number of distinct stimuli is that it would 
render the PIG more suitable for advanced computational modeling techniques used to 
asses temporal dynamics (Gershman & Daw, 2017; Mkrtchian et al., 2017) and allow 
testing of how these dynamics influence on task performance and provide a link to the 
influential literature that formally parameterizes the dynamics of Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning (Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). 
 Another possible area for improvement is to consider the parameters of the US 
that are employed in the fear conditioning process and how this relates to potential strong 
or weak situations (Lissek et al., 2006). For example, if continuing to use shock as the 
US, establishing a relatively “low” and “high” level of shock for each participant and 
administering both using different reinforcement rates might allow for more precise 
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elicitation of fear and anxiety related individual differences as they relate to PIG outcome 
variables. Preliminary evidence indicates that this is an effective technique for capturing 
obsessive-compulsive individual differences in avoidance rates during a modified PIG 
paradigm (Hunt, Degeneffe, Bixby, Fleig, & Lissek, 2018). Shock is also not the only 
viable US, of course, and USs that are more aligned with specific traits of interest might 
help calibrate the PIG task so that it is optimally parameterized to elicit and detect 
individual differences effects. For example, social USs (e.g., negative faces and 
comments; Lissek et al., 2008) to probe effects related to Extraversion/Detachment, 
might be a fruitful next step to answer questions related to psychopathology with elevated 
fear to social stimulus (e.g., social anxiety disorder).  
 Finally, we note that we make an inherent assumption that participants are largely 
similar regarding individual motivations and learned rules during completion of the PIG, 
whereas the reality could be that there is a meaningful quantity of idiosyncratic variance 
that we are neglecting to measure. For example, some participants who have recently 
completed or are currently taking a psychology course might be primed to think about the 
role deception has played in famous, yet controversial, research studies that also use 
shock administration (Milgram & Gudehus, 1978), and assume that the PIG will involve 
some form of creative deception related to their avoidance decision (e.g., their 
performance affects another student completing a similar task). This, in turn, might bias 
their avoidance decisions and might also be related to some of the personality traits we 
test (e.g., Neuroticism), potentially introducing an unmeasured confound. Performance-
based exclusions (e.g., exclude anyone rating the oCS- as riskier than the CS+) help with 
this to some degree, but are likely an overcorrection and contribute to an ongoing issue 
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related to inconsistently applied performance-based exclusion criteria across fear 
conditioning studies (Lonsdorf & Merz, 2017). One straightforward option to help 
resolve this issue is to simply ask participants open-ended questions regarding their 
motivations, beliefs, and learned rules in relation to the task. This could occur during the 
task if titrated appropriately, or via a more systematic interview that follows the task 
completion. Concerns about open-ended qualitative date are alleviated by the copious 
number of sophisticated techniques that exist to satisfactorily analyze these data 
(Silverman, 2016; Weston et al., 2001). 
Incorporating additional measures. 
In addition to optimization of the conditioning techniques and paradigm used in 
the current study, future work could benefit from additional measurement techniques to 
help clarify effects and answer more complex scientific hypotheses. One logical next step 
is to incorporate additional neurobiological measures, specifically functional 
neuroimaging. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
electroencephalography (EEG) are the two most common functional neuroimaging 
techniques used in the conditioning field (Büchel & Dolan, 2000; Lonsdorf et al., 2017), 
and both would provide valuable insights to future studies in this area. From an 
experimental point of view, the temporal resolution afforded by EEG is particularly 
attractive, as it could provide increased understanding of the rapid perceptual, attentional, 
and decision-making processes and that underlie approach or avoidance decisions and the 
feedback mechanisms that maintain or alter these decisions (e.g., Kessels, Ruiter, 
Wouters, & Jansma, 2014; Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009). That said, fMRI remains 
increasingly popular and advantageous for fear and anxiety work (Etkin & Wager, 2007; 
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Fox & Shackman, 2017), as well as personality science (DeYoung et al., 2010), and is 
perhaps best suited to measure the fear and reward mechanisms that underlie performance 
on the PIG paradigm, given that fMRI’s spatial resolution is conducive to accurate 
measurement of the subcortical circuits that are implicated in normative and pathological 
fear and anxiety (LeDoux, 2000). Technical differences aside, either functional 
neuroimaging technique would also yield more information regarding reward processes 
during fear and avoidance generalization, which is not possible when only using fear-
potentiated startle. It should also be noted that if neuroimaging techniques are not 
available that there are other options for assessing biological correlates of reward that do 
not require expensive equipment and can be used in conjunction with the methodology 
described in the current study. Options include measurement of the postauricular reflex, a 
vestigial, evolutionarily conserved reflex in humans that pulls the ears back which no 
longer serves a behavioral function but is potentiated in the presence of pleasant or 
appetitive stimuli (Benning, 2011; Benning, Patrick, & Lang, 2004; Sandt, Sloan, & 
Johnson, 2009). Like the eyeblink startle reflex, the postauricular reflex is activated by 
quick acoustic probes, therefore making it an ideal measure to pair with fear-potentiated 
startle if interested in both fear and reward responding. Another option is to measure 
spontaneous blink rate, which has been used as an index of striatal dopamine-related 
activity (Groman et al., 2014; Peckham & Johnson, 2015) and could provide a tonic 
measure of reward responsivity. Both techniques could be applied in the same study as 
well. 
 Another possible area of improvement is in the techniques used to assess 
psychopathology. Future studies that seek to compare their results to the large and 
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established work on DSM disorders might seek to include methods from that literature, 
such as structured or semi-structured clinical interviews (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
Williams, 2002). These techniques are valuable even if adhering to a dimensional model 
of psychopathology, as they allow for more direct comparison to prior work and, if 
desired, the opportunity to demonstrate the empirical merit and advantages of a 
dimensional approach through this direct comparison. Additionally, there are advantages 
in using a specialized interview for specific symptoms, such as those associated with 
PTSD (e.g., Clinician Administered PTSD Scale; Blake et al., 1995), due to their added 
reliability and validity over self-report measures and ongoing work that uses interview-
derived indices to identify dimensional models of PTSD that likely better represent the 
underlying pathology and relations amongst symptoms than the traditional DSM category 
(e.g., Armour et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2012). These types of interviews also frequently 
include questions that yield information about idiographic forms of fear and avoidance 
generalization (e.g., distress and avoidance in relation to boats, water, and any dizzying 
motion after nearly drowning following a boat crash), which could be used as external 
validity criterion to determine if experimental indices of fear and avoidance 
generalization align with personal, individualized experiences of the phenomena. 
Implications for Clinical Science and Intervention 
A primary proximal goal of the current research is to provide tools and knowledge 
that facilitate the next step in understanding generalization phenomena and their 
mechanistic relationship with normative and psychopathological dimensions of 
personality, particularly those related to anxiety, fear, and trauma. Our hope is that this 
work directly informs studies of intervention and change mechanisms, which in turn 
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inform formal treatment trials. Thus, the ultimate goal of this research is to facilitate 
translational efforts that eventually lead to improvement in the treatment of distress and 
impairment related to maladaptive fear and avoidance. We conclude this dissertation with 
a discussion of how the current research could ultimately inform clinical interventions. 
The development, implementation, and optimization of exposure therapy, a family 
of interventions designed to reduce fear and avoidance through repeated exposure to 
feared stimuli in the absence of negative outcomes (e.g., Abramowitz, Deacon, & 
Whiteside, 2019), is one of the great success stories in the scientific tradition of clinical 
psychology. It is a story of ongoing and sustained effort to translate empirically-based 
animal models to human models (Jones, 1924; Pavlov, 1927; J. B. Watson & Rayner, 
1920; Wolpe & Lang, 1964), which are then leveraged into an effective family of 
treatments for a range of psychopathology, most notably the anxiety and trauma-related 
disorders. In short, it is a sign that the “bench to bedside”19 model of translational science 
works (Starke, Fineberg, & Stein, 2019). It also continues to be a field of intervention in 
which basic psychological science work, especially those using conditioning techniques, 
can continue to contribute to meaningful improvements (e.g., Craske, Hermans, & 
Vervliet, 2018; Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014), but also one that 
requires some catch-up: the conditioning community largely ignoring avoidance 
phenomena for decades, and thus there was a lack of work that could be translated for 
clinical usage (LeDoux et al., 2017). Our study is part of a current wave of research to 
correct this imbalance (Pittig, Treanor, et al., 2018), and our results suggest multiple 
possibilities for improved intervention. That said, we acknowledge that considerable 
 
 
19 In the context of clinical psychology, “science to session” is perhaps a more apt term 
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additional work that replicates and expands on our results is required before this work can 
provide a meaningful impact on the applied side of the scientific process. 
First, we consider the construction of exposure hierarchies, in which situations 
that the client is avoiding are ordered from most to least distressing, is an important part 
of many exposure protocols. The organization of these hierarchies is typically not 
determined by anything more systematic than a self-reported rating of distress for each 
type of situation. It should also be noted that exposure hierarchies can be conceptualized 
as form of generalization gradient, as after client and therapist collaborate to generate 
situations, they are then ranked and re-rank according to level of distress, and then fine-
tuned by increasing or decreasing the associated distress with a situation by slightly 
modifying the parameters of the situation (e.g., going to the mall alone or with a trusted 
friend). If we return to our example of the child and the Rottweiler, we can imagine that a 
therapist working with him would create an exposure hierarchy that contains situations 
such as “walking by a house with a dog at the window”, “watching dogs play in a dog 
park from outside the enclosure”, “being in the same room as a dog”, “petting a dog”, and 
so forth (Choy et al., 2007). The distress associated with each of these situations could be 
perhaps modified by specifying if the child is with their parent, or if the dog in question is 
dissimilar to the Rottweiler (e.g., the poodle) or more similar to the Rottweiler (e.g., the 
Doberman). Again, the key (and only) variable employed in this technique is subjective 
distress. Based on the current results, we might propose that a multidimensional system 
that is more sensitive to the personality traits and motivations that inform avoidance be 
used when indicated (e.g., for more complex clinical presentations). This system could 
take into account subjective distress, but for every avoided situation could also assess the 
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client’s threat evaluation (e.g., estimating the chance that the feared consequence could 
occur in numerical units – a technique that is already used in CBT protocols; e.g., Beck, 
Davis, & Freeman, 2015), potential reward or valued outcomes related to the situation 
and the expected chance of the positive outcome occurring, and their belief of what “the 
right” way to handle the situation or what rules one is required to follow in this situation. 
These questions, in conjunction with formally (e.g., objective personality testing) or less 
formally (e.g., therapist-client interaction) obtained knowledge regarding the client’s 
personality could help to anticipate and correct roadblocks in the exposure process before 
they occur. For an example, based on the finding of Extraversion protecting against APIC 
for the GSs most similar to the CS-, but not the CS+, we can imagine that the child from 
the ongoing example has been observed/measured to have a moderate level of 
Extraversion relevant to the population, and is indicating a large amount of distress and 
expected threat for the situations that are relatively dissimilar to the original harmful 
encounter with the Rottweiler, such as walking past a house with a dog that stays by the 
window, but also has listed a valued component of this activity, such as taking that route 
to arrive at a friend’s house. The child has placed this activity relatively high on his 
hierarchy (i.e., will not be addressed until later in therapy due to the perceived challenge 
of the situation). Based on this combination of variables, we might conclude that 
although the child 1) reports strong distress associated with this situation and 2) it is quite 
dissimilar to the original incident itself, there is also a valued component involve, and 
that this situation should be moved down the hierarchy (e.g., completed earlier in 
treatment) because the child does not have a level of Extraversion that confers risk for 
increased avoidance. In other words, increased knowledge of the “trait by situation” 
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variables (e.g., Tett & Guterman, 2000) involved allows the therapist to more precisely 
assist in constructing the exposure hierarchy, which could ultimately lead to a decrease in 
dropout or poor exposure treatment outcomes. This is of course largely speculative and 
requires much more empirical work to substantiate, but the possibility of this type of 
multidimensional system for exposure being implemented is an on intriguing one. It 
should also be noted that many of the described concepts are familiar to CBT 
practitioners, but not formally applied to exposure work, which for many clients is the 
most potent mechanism of positive change (e.g., Boettcher & Barlow, 2018), and that a 
more rigorous exposure hierarchy construction that adds additional parameters might be 
particularly beneficial for those who do not see sufficient initial response to treatment. 
Finally, we move outside the framework of exposure therapy and consider other 
interventions and psychotherapeutic approaches. Fundamentally, the current study 
represents an effort to 1) link a broad set of individual difference variables with clinically 
meaningful processes, even those individual differences not typically studied in the fear 
conditioning and behavioral exposure literature (e.g., negative affect traits); and 2) infer 
how different combinations of traits and processes could be considered adaptive or 
maladaptive based on the context (with context operationalized in the current study 
through the different experimental phases and trial types). This tracks with a goal of 
relatively newer psychotherapies to more thoroughly incorporate context and personal 
values into case formulation, such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; S. C. 
Hayes, 2004; S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011), which centers on a “person as 
context” approach. The general framework of the current study aligns with this approach, 
as personality traits can be viewed as conferring information about personal values (e.g., 
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someone higher on Extraversion likely values extensive social interaction to some 
degree) and the experimental conditions create variation in context and “adaptiveness” of 
an outcome.  
In terms of results from the current student and their relation to contextual 
therapies, it is notable that one of our sets of findings was related to Orderliness, which at 
its pathological extreme is anticorrelated with psychological flexibility (Hewitt & Flett, 
2007). Psychological flexibility is an individual difference that is posited as a higher-
level determinant of health that protects against psychopathology and is proposed as a 
dimension that cuts across diagnoses and treatment disciplines (e.g., S. C. Hayes, 2002; 
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010; Latzman & Masuda, 2013). ACT and similar therapies 
purportedly confer therapeutic benefits through increased psychological flexibility, as 
opposed to the symptom reduction model that typically underlies exposure and CBT-
based techniques. A highly speculative, but intriguing, idea based on the current results is 
that employing ACT or a similar approach to improve psychological flexibility in those 
extremely high on Orderliness might subsequently attenuate the covariation of 
problematic fear and avoidance in the client’s life. Clearly, this is conjecture at this point 
and would require extensive study to substantiate, yet we propose there is value in 
“thinking outside the box” and invoking a more creative mindset regarding experimental 
conditioning and individual differences work, and that innovation does not need to be 
limited to exposure techniques. 
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 The increased push towards personalized medicine in the clinical psychology and 
psychiatry fields (e.g., Ozomaro, Wahlestedt, & Nemeroff, 2013; Schneider, Arch, & 
Wolitzky-Taylor, 2015) likely requires improved classification and delineation of 
individual variation in multiple domains to be successful – human complexity practically 
demands it. This, in turn, requires that experimental psychopathologists continue to 
investigate individual difference dimensions that cut across different diagnoses and 
meaningfully relate to maladaptive experimental outcomes that have relevance outside of 
the laboratory (Conway et al., 2019; Ruggero, 2018). Taken together, we are optimistic 
that the current study, and more generally the methodological and conceptual approach 
used herein, represents one such investigation that is vital to make the push towards 
personalized intervention into a reality. A further hope for this type of work is that it does 
not just inform improvements in exposure therapy and treatments for fear- and anxiety-
based pathologies, but also contributes to the development of a wide range of effective 
personalized treatments that both acknowledge the complexity of psychopathology as it 
exists within the framework of human personality and leverages it into more effective 
treatment. 
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Appendix A 
Table A. Summary of predictors and models tested for Aim 1. 
 DVs: Startle and Risk Ratings 
 N (W,V) C (In, Or) E (As, En) Multi-T 
(norm) 
Multi-A NA DE DI Multi-T 
(path) 
DPB Multi-T (PB) 
1 N 
  
N,C,E W,V,In,Or,As,En NA 
  
NA, DE, DI DPB DPB, IPB, OPB, 
EPB,APB 
2 W,V 
          
3 W 
          
4 V 
          
 DV: Avoidance 
 N (W,V) C (In, Or) E (As, En) Multi-T 
(norm) 
Multi-A NA DE DI Multi-T 
(path) 
DPB Multi-T (PB) 
1 N C E N,C,E W,V,In,Or,As,En NA DE DI NA, DE, DI DPB DPB, IPB, OPB, 
EPB,APB 
2 W,V In,Or As,En 
        
3 W In As 
        
4 V Or En 
        
Note: Each column corresponds to a conceptually-linked set of analyses (e.g., those related to Neuroticism and its aspects), and each row corresponds to a 
series of 3 models that allow testing of main effects (1 model), Trait x Stimulus interactions (1 model), and Trait x Stimulus2 interactions (1 model). Row 
numbers are arbitrary and are only included for organizational purposes. Cell content indicates which trait(s) are being tested, and models with multiple traits 
separated by commas are modeled simultaneously. Aspects for corresponding BFAS trait are listed in parentheses. Composite traits refer to those derived from 
a combination of PID-5 and BFAS scales, and are indicated with a suffix of "PB". Startle and Risk Rating models were constructed separately for each DV. As 
= Assertiveness, APB = Assertiveness PID-BFAS, C = Conscientiousness, DE = Detachment, DI = Disinhibition, DPB = Distress PID-BFAS, En = 
Enthusiasm, EPB = Enthusiasm PID-BFAS, E = Extraversion, In = Industriousness, IPB = Industriousness PID-BFAS, OPB = Orderliness PID-BFAS, Or = 
Orderliness; Multi-A = Multi-aspect;  Multi-T (path) = Multi-trait (pathological); Multi-T (PB) = Multi-trait (PID-BFAS composite); Multi-T (norm) = Multi-
trait (normative);  N = Neuroticism, W = Withdrawal, V = Volatility. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Descriptive statistics for all BFAS scales. 
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max 
Neuroticism 2.7 0.72 1.15 2.67 4.6 
  Withdrawal (BFAS) 2.82 0.75 1.1 2.8 4.6 
  Volatility 2.57 0.82 1 2.6 4.9 
Agreeableness 3.99 0.56 1.5 4.05 5 
  Compassion 4.05 0.67 1.5 4.15 5 
  Politeness 3.93 0.59 1.5 4 5 
Conscientiousness 3.49 0.57 1.35 3.5 4.75 
  Industriousness 3.46 0.67 1.2 3.5 5 
  Orderliness 3.53 0.64 1.5 3.6 4.8 
Extraversion 3.51 0.64 1.7 3.52 4.8 
   Assertiveness 3.38 0.71 1.6 3.4 5 
   Enthusiasm 3.65 0.77 1.1 3.7 5 
Openness/Intellect 3.68 0.51 1.7 3.7 4.8 
  Openness 3.7 0.61 1.8 3.7 5 
  Intellect 3.66 0.64 1.4 3.7 5 
Note: Subordinate aspects follow the corresponding trait. Withdrawal is marked with "BFAS" 
to differentiate it from a scale on another questionnaire with the same label. BFAS = Big Five 
Aspect Scale. 
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Table B2. Descriptive statistics for all PID-5 scales. 
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max 
Facets      
Anhedonia 0.83 0.59 0 0.75 2.62 
Anxiousness 1.33 0.73 0 1.22 3 
Attention Seeking 1.11 0.69 0 1 3 
Callousness 0.38 0.44 0 0.21 2.57 
Deceitfulness 0.79 0.56 0 0.75 2.4 
Depressivity 0.51 0.57 0 0.29 2.57 
Distractibility 0.99 0.66 0 0.89 2.78 
Eccentricity 0.85 0.78 0 0.62 3 
Emotional Lability 1.05 0.76 0 0.86 3 
Grandiosity 0.65 0.56 0 0.5 2.5 
Hostility 0.82 0.55 0 0.7 2.9 
Impulsivity  0.8 0.64 0 0.67 3 
Intimacy Avoidance 0.61 0.64 0 0.5 3 
Irresponsibility 0.46 0.41 0 0.43 2.14 
Manipulativeness 0.94 0.71 0 1 3 
Perceptual Dysregulation 0.55 0.48 0 0.42 2.58 
Perseveration 0.85 0.55 0 0.89 2.33 
Restricted Affectivity 0.95 0.68 0 0.86 3 
Rigid Perfectionism 1.01 0.68 0 1 2.8 
Risk Taking 1.39 0.52 0.21 1.32 2.93 
Separation Insecurity 0.84 0.7 0 0.71 3 
Submissiveness 1.36 0.66 0 1.25 3 
Suspiciousness 0.92 0.51 0 0.86 2.29 
Unusual Beliefs 0.52 0.53 0 0.38 2.38 
Withdrawal (PID-5) 0.79 0.61 0 0.7 3       
Traits      
Antagonism  0.74 0.42 0.06 0.68 2.17 
Detachment 0.74 0.44 0.04 0.67 2.17 
Disinhibition 1.01 0.37 0.28 0.96 2.33 
Psychoticism 0.66 0.54 0 0.56 2.42 
Negative Affectivity 0.9 0.42 0.12 0.86 2.11 
Note: Facets/traits listed in alphabetical order instead of organized by facet/trait relationship, 
due to many facets loading strongly on multiple traits. Withdrawal is marked with "PID-5" to 
differentiate it from a scale on another questionnaire with the same label. PID-5 = Personality 
Inventory for DSM-5.  
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Table B3. Descriptive statistics for all narrowband trait and state scales. 
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max 
Trait      
TF-44 62.08 21.78 0 62 122 
IUSF 31.07 8.99 12 31 59 
ASI 22.4 12.15 0 20 59 
STAI-T 41.95 9.94 24 41 70 
 
State      
BDI-II 8.88 7.6 0 6 39 
PSS 16.01 6.91 2 15 33 
STAI-S 35.13 8.26 23 34 66 
Note: ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-
II; IUSF = Intolerance of uncertainty - Short Form; PSS = Perceived Stress 
Scale; TF-44 = Trait Fear - 44 item; STAI-S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory - 
State version; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory - Trait version. 
 
